Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Machete, a film production company, filed suit claiming that a Texas film incentive program was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all of Machete's claims. The court concluded that Machete lacked standing to pursue its only available federal claim against the director of the Texas Film Commission in her official capacity. The court also concluded that Machete has not shown that it has clearly established that the First Amendment requires a state which has an incentive program like this one to fund films casting the state in a negative light. Consequently, Machete cannot show that Governor Rick Perry’s general counsel, David Morales, violated Machete’s clearly established rights in this context. Machete's due process clause claims are similarly unavailing. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Machete's claims under the Texas Constitution because Morales did not forbid Machete from filming, producing, or releasing its movie, but merely opted not to subsidize the film with Texas taxpayer funds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Machete Prod. v. Page" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department on his claims of employment discrimination in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1, retaliation in violation of GINA, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the first claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the Department requested, required, or purchased his genetic information, or discriminated against him on the basis of genetic information; the district court's conclusion that the timeline of events and the Department's submitted evidence showed that its actions were motivated by plaintiff's refusal to take a stress test; and the district court's findings - that the timing of plaintiff's placements on administrative duty showed that the Department’s motive was ensuring compliance with the Wellness Program and furthering its goals, not discriminating against plaintiff because of his national origin - were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after her son died of complications from heatstroke while he was incarcerated. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order deferring ruling on their motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity and ordered limited discovery. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed because the district court correctly concluded that the complaint was sufficient and that further factual development was needed to rule on defendants’ qualified immunity defense, and because the discovery that the district court ordered was narrowly tailored to the facts needed to rule on the defense View "Hinojosa v. Livingston" on Justia Law

In a first appeal, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding that material fact issues surrounded the discriminatory purpose and effect of the Board’s adoption of a redistricting plan that concentrated economically disadvantaged students in a majority-nonwhite school district. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Board. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in concluding that Option 2f does not make express racial classifications and so is not subject to strict scrutiny on that basis. Option 2f employed several means to shift the student population among the east bank schools. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative theory that, despite Option 2f’s facial neutrality, the redistricting plan’s funneling feature is nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny because it had both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that rational basis review is satisfied as to the equal protection claim and the court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Board. View "Lewis, Sr. v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of retaliation after her attempt to rescind her resignation was denied. Plaintiff offered her resignation, but before she finished her employment, she testified against the Executive Director, claiming sexual harassment. Then plaintiff attempted to rescind the resignation but the Executive Director rejected her rescission. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because rejecting an employee’s rescission of resignation can sometimes constitute an adverse employment action and because plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial conflict of evidence on the question of whether her employer would have taken the action ‘but for’ her testimony. View "Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking attorneys' fees after she proved in an administrative hearing that a school district had violated her child’s right to a free appropriate public education by repeatedly placing him in isolation during school hours. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying section 1415(i)(2)(B)’s limitations period to this action for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA by a party that prevailed at the administrative level. Because the statute contains no limitations period for such actions, the district court should have borrowed one from state law. The court held that the limitations period for such an action does not begin to run until the time for seeking judicial review of the underlying administrative decision passes, and that plaintiff’s action was timely under any limitations period that could be borrowed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after their son, Quamaine Mason, was fatally shot while Officer Martin Faul was responding to a reported armed robbery. The complaint alleged Monell claims against Faul's employer, Lafayette, and Lafayette's Chief of Police, as well as claims against all three defendants under Louisiana law. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Faul on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and state law claims because there are material fact issues that preclude summary judgment in favor of Faul on the basis of qualified immunity. In this case, a reasonable jury could conclude that when Faul fired the final two shots, Mr. Mason would have appeared incapacitated to an objectively reasonable officer. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Mason v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

Three movants appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in State of Texas v. United States, where 26 states seek injunctive relief against the United States and several officials of DHS to prevent them from implementing a program entitled “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” (DAPA). Movants are aliens who have lived in the United States for more than ten years, currently live in the Rio Grande Valley, and have minor children who are United States citizens. Movants believe that they are likely to receive grants of deferred action if DAPA goes into effect. The court reversed the district court's order denying intervention because movants satisfy the requirements for intervention by right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court remanded to the district court. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law