Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, mother of decedent Marcus Dewayne Slade, filed a wrongful death suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and various local officials after Marcus died in police custody. The cause of death was determined to be PCP toxicity. Plaintiff concedes that she does not have evidence sufficient to recover under Texas's wrongful death statute because she cannot demonstrate that defendants' wrongful actions more likely than not caused Marcus's death. However, plaintiff urges the court to decline to apply Texas's causation standard. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that case law supports an exception when the need for medical care is obvious, and that the standard is inconsistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slade v. City of Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and intervenor, prisoners awaiting execution in the state of Mississippi, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking an injunction preventing the state from conducting executions with compounded pentobarbital. The district court granted a broad preliminary injunction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims where they have not established a liberty interest in the enforcement of Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-51 and they have not shown that Mississippi's alleged deviation from section 99-19-51 would shock the conscience. In this case, Mississippi’s sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining state officials to follow state law, and plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed in establishing a violation of either their procedural or substantive due process rights. View "Jordan v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed suit after he was terminated without notice or a hearing, alleging that the councilmembers’ actions violated state law and denied him constitutional due process. The district court dismissed the suit. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction because he stated a claim for relief under a federal statute and the claim was not frivolous. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim because Texas Government Code Section 614.023 is analogous to the charter provision in Henderson v. Sotelo. Both laws require some action to be taken before termination of employment can occur, but no property right is created by that requirement. The court further concluded that plaintiff's claims against the City and the mayor in his individual and official capacity were properly dismissed. Finally, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend, remanding for an explanation of the district court's exercise of discretion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Stem v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by terminating her employment because she was pregnant. Plaintiff also alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), by failing to pay her overtime. The district court entered judgment in favor of the employer. The court affirmed the judgment as to the FLSA claim, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the employer did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, that plaintiff was working overtime during the period at issue. The court also affirmed as to the Title VII claim, concluding that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after it established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. In this case, the record demonstrated that plaintiff had a contentious relationship with her manager, she caused problems regarding store morale and customer service, and she repeatedly had performance-related problems. View "Fairchild v. All American Check Cashing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against JFS after JFS revoked its employment offer for a field engineer position at a mining site after learning that plaintiff had a rotator cuff impairment that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff could not prove that he was disabled or a qualified individual was erroneous becuase it ignored Congress's expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA in 2008. Under this more relaxed standard, the court concluded that evidence exists supporting a finding either that plaintiff is disabled or was regarded as disabled. Because a factual dispute exists on these issues, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. View "Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Psychologists’ Licensing Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 501.001 - 501.505, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied plaintiff's claim. The court agreed that Section 501.003(b)(1), under which “[a] person is engaged in the practice of psychology” if she represents herself “to the public by a title or description of services that includes the word ‘psychological,’ ‘psychologist,’ or ‘psychology,’” is unconstitutional as applied to speech on her political campaign website. In this case, plaintiff's campaign statements are entitled to full First Amendment protection where her speech on her campaign website was far removed from the context of professional speech and she was not providing advice to any particular client but communicating with the voters at large, so the professional speech doctrine is inapplicable. The court also concluded that the inclusion of “psychologist” on the website was not commercial speech, and therefore the decisions involving a state’s legitimate power to restrict the use of titles in the commercial context are inapplicable. Therefore, because the state’s interest in proscribing misleading speech is limited in the political context, and because the Board’s goal of preventing deception can be served by other means, Section 501.003(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court declined to address plaintiff's overbreadth argument in regard to (b)(1), because that subsection is invalid as applied to her, but the court agreed with her that Section 501.003(b)(2) is overbroad. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Serafine v Branaman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for allegedly stating during a conference call that he destroyed and/or stole research data. The district court granted defendants' special motion to strike the claim under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 971 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court erred in granting the motion despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, when the district court granted dismissal based on its assessment of the credibility of the parties’ affidavits and despite its acknowledgment that a triable fact issue existed, the court applied Article 971 in a manner that is contrary to Louisiana law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lozovyy v. Kurtz" on Justia Law