Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for allegedly stating during a conference call that he destroyed and/or stole research data. The district court granted defendants' special motion to strike the claim under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 971 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court erred in granting the motion despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, when the district court granted dismissal based on its assessment of the credibility of the parties’ affidavits and despite its acknowledgment that a triable fact issue existed, the court applied Article 971 in a manner that is contrary to Louisiana law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lozovyy v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

Machete, a film production company, filed suit claiming that a Texas film incentive program was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all of Machete's claims. The court concluded that Machete lacked standing to pursue its only available federal claim against the director of the Texas Film Commission in her official capacity. The court also concluded that Machete has not shown that it has clearly established that the First Amendment requires a state which has an incentive program like this one to fund films casting the state in a negative light. Consequently, Machete cannot show that Governor Rick Perry’s general counsel, David Morales, violated Machete’s clearly established rights in this context. Machete's due process clause claims are similarly unavailing. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Machete's claims under the Texas Constitution because Morales did not forbid Machete from filming, producing, or releasing its movie, but merely opted not to subsidize the film with Texas taxpayer funds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Machete Prod. v. Page" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department on his claims of employment discrimination in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1, retaliation in violation of GINA, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the first claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the Department requested, required, or purchased his genetic information, or discriminated against him on the basis of genetic information; the district court's conclusion that the timeline of events and the Department's submitted evidence showed that its actions were motivated by plaintiff's refusal to take a stress test; and the district court's findings - that the timing of plaintiff's placements on administrative duty showed that the Department’s motive was ensuring compliance with the Wellness Program and furthering its goals, not discriminating against plaintiff because of his national origin - were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after her son died of complications from heatstroke while he was incarcerated. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order deferring ruling on their motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity and ordered limited discovery. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed because the district court correctly concluded that the complaint was sufficient and that further factual development was needed to rule on defendants’ qualified immunity defense, and because the discovery that the district court ordered was narrowly tailored to the facts needed to rule on the defense View "Hinojosa v. Livingston" on Justia Law

In a first appeal, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding that material fact issues surrounded the discriminatory purpose and effect of the Board’s adoption of a redistricting plan that concentrated economically disadvantaged students in a majority-nonwhite school district. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Board. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in concluding that Option 2f does not make express racial classifications and so is not subject to strict scrutiny on that basis. Option 2f employed several means to shift the student population among the east bank schools. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative theory that, despite Option 2f’s facial neutrality, the redistricting plan’s funneling feature is nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny because it had both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that rational basis review is satisfied as to the equal protection claim and the court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Board. View "Lewis, Sr. v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of retaliation after her attempt to rescind her resignation was denied. Plaintiff offered her resignation, but before she finished her employment, she testified against the Executive Director, claiming sexual harassment. Then plaintiff attempted to rescind the resignation but the Executive Director rejected her rescission. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because rejecting an employee’s rescission of resignation can sometimes constitute an adverse employment action and because plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial conflict of evidence on the question of whether her employer would have taken the action ‘but for’ her testimony. View "Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law