Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated students' constitutional rights when they detained the students for breathalyzer tests prior to entering their Junior/Senior Prom. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not established an actual or reasonable expectation of privacy in the party bus, which they had abandoned once they had exited for the Prom; the bus driver had apparent authority to consent to search the party bus; and therefore, the search of the party bus did not violate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the initial waiting period for the breathalyzer mouthpieces and a trained individual to administer the breathalyzer tests was reasonable, because it was necessary for the testing; detaining a student after he or she was found to be alcohol free was not “reasonably related” to the reason for the detention “in the first place” of determining if the student passengers on the party bus had been drinking; the individual school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no binding clearly established law at the time; and claims against the remaining defendants have been abandoned or have no merit. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims. Because plaintiffs have not established that they should succeed on any of their allegations concerning their Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ziegler v. Martin Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

After Terrance Bowen was beaten to death by his cellmate, Carl Merkerson, at Baldwin State Prison, the administrator of Bowen's estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Bowen's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was housed in a cell with Merkerson. The district court dismissed the action, holding that it did not state Eighth Amendment claims against the prison officials and that, in any event, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed as to claims against Deputy Warden Doug Underwood and Corrections Officer Cager Edward Davis. In this case, Deputy Warden Underwood and Officer Davis allegedly knew from the population chart and the cell checklist that Merkerson, a convicted murderer, was designated a Level III mental health inmate who had been transferred to Unit K-3, “the lock-down segregation unit for disciplinary, protected custody and mental health individuals,” after assaulting his former cellmate. They also allegedly were aware of the specifics of Merkerson’s severe paranoid schizophrenia, his delusions, and his violent impulses. Therefore, the court concluded that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts showing that Deputy Warden Underwood and Officer Davis were both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and also drew the inference. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bowen v. Warden" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Filbeck, a lieutenant with the sheriff's office, arrested the new owner's agents of his foreclosed home. Plaintiffs, who were lawfully performing their jobs, filed suit against Filbeck and the Sheriff, individually and in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs alleged a conversion claim against all defendants. Plaintiffs further alleged claims for negligent hiring and retention, as well as for ratification. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck based on qualified immunity where a jury could reasonably conclude on the record that Filbeck was never a tenant at sufferance after the foreclosure had been finalized, and he - not plaintiffs - was the intruder. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck on the conversion claim where the evidence could establish a substantive claim of conversion under Georgia law. However, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the County and Sheriff on the conversion claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. Filbeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Florida law. At issue is whether defendant discriminated against plaintiff by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform either her duties or the essential duties of another position for which she was qualified. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims of discrimination failed. To the extent plaintiff intended to request a permanent light-duty position, it is undisputed that no such position existed. Defendant was not required by the ADA to create a permanent light-duty position especially for plaintiff. In regards to a request for a reassignment, plaintiff did not support the request with any evidence that there was a specific, full-duty vacant position she was qualified for and could have done, given her medical condition. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to initiate an “interactive process” to identify a reasonable accommodation, as required by ADA regulations. The court also concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where all of the evidence in the record shows that plaintiff was terminated solely as the result of her inability to return to full duty at the expiration of her eligibility for light-duty status. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Frazier-White v. Gee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the VA, alleging claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 626. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish an element of their prima facie failure-to-hire case because they were not objectively qualified to perform the duties of a PACT pharmacist; the court found no “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” giving rise to an inference of age or gender discrimination; even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs’ reassignment to the float pool constitutes a prima facie retaliation case, plaintiffs presented no evidence that the Bay Pines’ legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the reassignment was pretextual; plaintiffs' remaining retaliation claims also failed; and plaintiffs’ evidence does not amount to an actionable hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Trask v. Secretary, Dept. of VA" on Justia Law

Two off-regular-duty Miami-Dade police officers were moonlighting by providing "police services" to a local bar and nightclub, Blue Martini. The officers got into an altercation with two individuals, Gustavo and Elsa Martinez, and arrested them. The Martinezes filed suit against the officers, as well as Miami-Dade and Blue Martini. The Martinezes' claims have been settled or resolved. In this appeal, Blue Martini challenged the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the County on the County’s indemnification claim against Blue Martini. Blue Martini claims for the first time on appeal that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 - which makes a private employer responsible for the acts or omissions of the deputy sheriff while performing services for that employer while off duty - wrongfully deprived it of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Because the constitutional question raised is purely a legal one and because the matter is likely to arise again, the court exercised its discretion to entertain the claim. The court held that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 reasonably serves a variety of legitimate governmental interests, easily passes rational basis scrutiny, and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the School District and the School Board, alleging that they discriminated and retaliated against her by refusing to renew her employment contract and filing an ethics complaint against her. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the proper framework for examining mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence is the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., - not the McDonnell Douglas framework. Applying the proper mixed-motive framework to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims against the School District and School Board members Scott Morgan and Mark Nesmith. However, the court found that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's remaining discrimination claims, as well as all of her retaliation claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604, against Aimco, on behalf of herself and her son Karl, who was born with Down Syndrome, alleging that Aimco threatened her and her son with eviction and non-renewal of their lease purportedly because Karl had harassed and made threats to members of the apartment complex’s staff. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that this case is not moot despite the fact that plaintiff and her son were ultimately allowed to remain in their apartment. The court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim alleging that Aimco discriminated against her and her son by making their apartment unavailable because of Karl's disability; plaintiff stated a claim for disparate treatment in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the rental where she alleged that, because of Karl’s disability, Aimco representatives mistreated him by yelling at him, making him do maintenance work around the complex, and barring him from the community rooms and the office; and plaintiff stated a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate where plaintiff requested Aimco staff to let her and her son remain in their apartment while she made arrangements for Karl to be placed in offsite care to avoid future incidents or misunderstandings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P." on Justia Law