Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Georgia state prisoner, filed suit alleging that the grooming policy enforced in Georgia state prisons violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the GDOC substantially burdened his exercise of a sincerely held religious belief that Islam requires him to grow an uncut beard. The district court granted summary judgment for the GDOC. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Holt v. Hobbs rendered the district court's analysis inadequate. The court vacated and remanded for further consideration because the district court never analyzed the substantial burden, compelling interest, or least restrictive means of plaintiff's case, and because the GDOC has revised its grooming policy since the district court rendered its decision. View "Smith v. Owens" on Justia Law

This case concerns certain provisions of Florida's Firearms Owners' Privacy Act (FOPA), Fla. Stat. 790.338, 456.072, 395.1055, & 381.026. The district court held that FOPA's record-keeping, inquiry, anti-discrimination, and anti-harassment provisions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Exercising plenary review and applying heightened scrutiny as articulated in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the court agreed with the district court that FOPA's content-based restrictions—the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions—violate the First Amendment as it applies to the states. The court explained that, because these three provisions do not survive heightened scrutiny under Sorrell, the court need not address whether strict scrutiny should apply to them. The court concluded, however, that FOPA's anti-discrimination provision—as construed to apply to certain conduct by doctors and medical professionals—is not unconstitutional. Finally, the court concurred with the district court's assessment that the unconstitutional provisions of FOPA can be severed from the rest of the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded so that the judgment and permanent injunction can be amended in accordance with this opinion. View "Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force, assault, and battery. The district court granted law enforcement officers summary judgment based on qualified and official immunity. Officer Deaton threw a diversionary device, known as a “flashbang,” into a dark room occupied by plaintiff and her boyfriend, who were asleep, without first visually inspecting the room. The court concluded that Deaton used excessive force, but he is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that his conduct violated the Constitution. The court also concluded that Deaton is entitled to official immunity because plaintiff failed to prove that Deaton intended to injure plaintiff. Finally, Deaton's supervisor is also entitled to qualified immunity from the complaint against his subordinate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dukes v. Deaton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the complaints based on statute of limitations grounds. The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) maintains a Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID), which contains drivers' personal information. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants repeatedly accessed plaintiffs' private information through the DAVID database without their knowledge or consent. The court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on plaintiffs' claims when the alleged DPPA violations occurred; plaintiffs have failed to present any theory that would entitle their claims to be treated as filed within the limitations period; and thus their actions are time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Indian River County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Defendants, correctional officers who were members of the Correctional Emergency Response Team (CERT), were indicted and charged with various civil rights, conspiracy, and obstruction-of-justice violations stemming from alleged abuses of prisoners and subsequent cover-ups. Officers Rushin and Hall were found guilty of one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct and two counts of Obstruction of Justice. Defendant Lach was convicted of Deprivation of Rights, Conspiracy to Obstruct, and Obstruction of Justice. The court found no error on the part of the district judge. The court also concluded that the record reveals that defendants had adequate ability to make their arguments to the jury and that the minimal restrictions put in place regarding cross examination and admission of evidence were reasonable in light of the arguments made to the district judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rushin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Myra Furcron appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mails Centers Plus, LLC (“MCP”) on Furcron’s claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. In addressing Furcron’s sexual harassment claim, the district court found that Furcron failed to produce sufficient evidence that the alleged harassment was based on sex. On the retaliation claim, the district court found that Furcron failed to demonstrate that she engaged in protected activity and that Defendant’s defense was a pretext for her termination. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. The Court concluded that questions of fact remained on Furcron's harassment claim. The Court concluded that her allegations with respect to the pretext argument. View "Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the Broward County (Florida) Sheriff’s potential liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failing to rehire a former deputy allegedly due to his political loyalties and in violation of his First Amendment rights. Broward County has expressly designated its sheriff as its chief correctional officer (CCO); thus, at issue in this case was the basic question whether a Florida county sheriff, acting in his capacity as chief correctional officer in the hiring and firing of his deputies, was an arm of the state entitled to the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. After careful review, and having the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Florida sheriff was not an arm of the state when acting in this capacity. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Sheriff and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Stanley v. Broward County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Leokadia Bryk, a disabled nurse, sought a reasonable accommodation in the form of a job reassignment to another unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital because she required the use of a cane, which posed a safety hazard in the psychiatric ward where she worked. After Bryk did not obtain another Hospital position, the Hospital terminated her employment. The EEOC filed suit on her behalf against the Hospital. Based on the framework in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., did not require job reassignment without competition as a reasonable accommodation. The court also agreed with the district court’s summary judgment rulings finding that Bryk was a “disabled qualified individual” under the ADA and that the Hospital’s 30-day allowance to apply for alternate jobs was reasonable as a matter of law. However, the court disagreed with the district court’s order granting in part the EEOC’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for alteration of the judgment. The court explained that, except in rare circumstances not present here, motions under Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise new legal theories or arguments, much less in this case where the movant under Rule 59(e), the EEOC, was seeking to contravene language in the jury instructions and verdict form that the EEOC had previously proposed. Therefore, the EEOC failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard and the district court erred in altering the judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

After a teacher at Carver Middle School submitted an application for the approval of the Carver Gay-Straight Alliance, the superintendent denied the application on the ground that the application failed to identify an allowed purpose for the club. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. 4071-72. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint alleging that the Board violated the Act. The court concluded that the complaint is ripe because the Board made a final decision when it rejected the application of the Alliance to form a club, and the complaint is not moot because the district court can still fashion relief for a violation of the Act. The court also concluded that the Act applies to Carver Middle School because it provides courses for high school credit and, under Florida law, these courses constitute “secondary education.” Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Major Wheeler and others, alleging, inter alia, a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights and a claim under Georgia law for defamation. After plaintiff reported constitutional violations by his fellow officers, Major Wheeler issued a county-wide alert to all law-enforcement officers, picturing plaintiff, warning that he was a “loose cannon” who presented a “danger to any [law-enforcement officer] in Douglas County,” and directing officers to “act accordingly.” The district court denied Wheeler's motion for qualified immunity and official immunity on the defamation claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations allow for the reasonable inferences that the Police Department communicated with the Sheriff’s Department about plaintiff's complaints prior to Wheeler’s issuance of the be-on-the-lookout advisory (BOLO), that the Sheriff’s Office and Wheeler knew about the termination-appeal hearing, and that Wheeler issued the BOLO at least in part in retaliation for plaintiff's complaints. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Wheeler violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights when he issued the BOLO and the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The court also concluded that plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from retaliation that imperiled his life was clearly established at the time that Wheeler issued the BOLO. The allegations satisfy the showing of a deliberate intention to do wrong—that is, actual malice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of official immunity. View "Bailey v. Major Tommy Wheeler" on Justia Law