Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner plead guilty to conspiring to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana and possessing with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. Petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing and this court granted a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that petitioner failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would have accepted the offer to plead guilty pursuant to the more favorable terms offered prior to the suppression hearing. Consequently, petitioner has not proven that counsel's advice prejudiced his defense. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's section 2255 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree assault, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that the State failed to disclose that a key prosecution witness received favorable consideration in exchange for his testimony. The court noted that, even if it had reason to doubt compliance with the statute of limitations in this case, the court proceeded to the merits in the interest of judicial economy. On the merits, the court concluded that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland nor Napue v. Illinois where nothing in the factual findings indicated that the district court's finding that no formal or tacit agreement existed between the State and the witness was reasonable. The court assumed that the financial assistance the witness received for staying in a hotel for one week and relocating to another apartment was subject to Brady's disclosure mandate. However, failure to disclose this information here did not violate Brady because it did not undermine confidence in the verdict. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "White v. Steele" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured as a delivery driver for UPS and UPS failed to offer him another full time position that he was able to perform, plaintiff filed suit for disability discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential job functions for the delivery driver position; however, the district court erred by determining as a matter of law that defendant was unable to perform the essential job functions of the feeder driver position; there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on his claim that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; plaintiff presented evidence that UPS expected that feeder driver positions would become open in the near future; and thus defendant provided sufficient evidence to support his 2012 disability discrimination claim. In regard to the 2013 discrimination claim, plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that he was qualified to perform the essential job functions of any available job; plaintiff failed to show that UPS failed to make a good faith effort to help him in seeking an accommodation; and thus summary judgment for UPS was appropriate as to this claim. Finally, the court concluded that defendant waived his 2013 accommodation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Faidley v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dindinger, Loring, and Freund filed suit against Allsteel, alleging claims of sex-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d); Dindinger and Loring also brought claims of sex-based wage discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6A, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and Loring additionally brought a claim of sex-based discrimination for failure to promote under Title VII. On appeal, Allsteel challenged the district court's denial of its motion for a new trial and grant of plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court correctly instructed the jury that Allsteel could not rely on economic conditions to establish its affirmative defense to the Equal Pay Act claim that a factor other than sex justified the pay discrepancies between plaintiffs and their male comparators; even if the court were to agree that economic conditions could be a factor other than sex justifying a pay differential in some circumstances, Allsteel did not present evidence to establish such a defense here; and because Allsteel did not present evidence that economic conditions caused the pay differentials plaintiffs experienced, the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that Allsteel could not rely on economic conditions to establish an affirmative defense. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting "me-too" evidence; limiting Allsteel's ability to offer evidence regarding the audit; and by admitting testimony from Loring's supervisor. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in regard to attorney's fees, but remanded the issue of costs with instructions to determine whether charging clients separately for Westlaw research is the prevailing practice in Iowa. Accordingly, the court remanded as to this issue and affirmed in all other respects. View "Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former transport deputy for the county, filed suit against Sheriff Andy Shock, in his individual and official capacities, for unlawful employment termination under state and federal law. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the deprivation of his First Amendment right to free association. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the sheriff in his official capacity because, under Arkansas law and the policies promoted by the county, the sheriff did not act as a final policymaker in the employment decisions of the sheriff's office where such decisions were subject to review by the quorum court. However, the court vacated the finding of qualified immunity for the sheriff in his individual capacity because the district court should have applied the Elrod-Branti analysis to determine whether a government employer could violate an employee's First Amendment rights even if acting under the mistaken belief that the employee was affiliated with a certain candidate. The court explained that the Elrod-Brandi test applied when a constitutional right at issue involved joining, working for or contributing to the political party and candidates of the employee's choice. Therefore, the court remanded that issue for the district court to apply the analysis in the Elrod-Branti line of cases. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Thompson v. Shock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CSM, alleging civil rights violations after she was terminated. The district court granted summary judgment to CSM. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish the causation element of her prima facie case of retaliation and reprisal based on the attenuated temporal proximity of the decline in her work performance and the her complaints, and the lack of evidence from which a jury could infer a discriminatory motive. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to CSM on these claims. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's gender discrimination claims where plaintiff had a history of satisfactory performance and the evidence demonstrated that her supervisors and coworkers had on numerous occasions informed her of perceived deficiencies in her work. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to CSM on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim where she failed prove that the comments at issue were so objectively and subjectively offensive that they altered the terms and conditions of her employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Liles v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, when it terminated his employment for harassing a co-worker and threatening a supervisor. The district court ultimately granted BNSF summary judgment on the merits and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to submit evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that his FRSA-protected activities were a contributing factor in BNSF's decision to discharge him for harassing and intimidating a co-worker. Because BNSF did not sufficiently develop its alternative waiver argument, did not raise a laches or estoppel defense in the district court or on appeal, and presented insufficient proof (if any) on these fact intensive issues, the court left these questions for another day. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gunderson v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor son J.M., filed suit against the School District, alleging unlawful use of isolation and physical restraints, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.; and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), RSMo 213.010 et seq. The district court dismissed the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the MHRA claim. In this case, plaintiff did not file an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., due process complaint, request a due process hearing, or engage in the exhaustion procedures under the IDEA. The court concluded that because the complaint sought relief available under the IDEA, denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), the claims were subject to exhaustion, barring an applicable exception. The court rejected plaintiff's futility and inadequate remedy arguments and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "J.M. v. Francis Howell School District" on Justia Law

After Jerome Harrell died while in custody at the county jail, Harrell's estate filed suit against the county and various correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Harrell's constitutional rights as well as other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that genuine issues of fact remain on the question of whether defendants Armstrong and Culloton were deliberately indifferent to Harrell's serious medical needs when they allowed him to scream, howl, and bang against his cell door for eight hours without attempting to talk to him or seek medical intervention. Therefore, the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Armstrong and Culloton on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed as to this issue. The court concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the trustee's excessive force claim where, among other things, Harrell was actively resisting the extraction procedure by ignoring directives to lie down on his bunk and resisting defendants' efforts to subdue him once they entered his cell, and defendants' testimony about the degree of Harrell's resistance was corroborated. Under the totality of these circumstances, none of the defendants' actions, either singly or in combination, amounted to an objectively unreasonable application of force. Therefore, the court affirmed as to the excessive force claim. Because the court was remanding some of the federal claims, the court also vacated the dismissal of the state law claims and remanded. View "Ryan v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American female, filed suit against DHS, alleging disparate treatment on account of race, and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed the claims. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for disparate treatment "on account of her race, when she was disciplined for something that a Caucasian female employee did not accomplish." The court concluded that plaintiff's claim of discipline did not allege that the Caucasian employee was not disciplined or received less discipline. The court explained that without an allegation of disparate treatment, this claim failed. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing the retaliation claim where plaintiff alleged but-for causation. The court explained that plaintiff's claim permitted the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wilson v. Arkansas DHS" on Justia Law