Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, five female Drug Court participants, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for injuries resulting from sexual abuse by Scott Edwards, a Lieutenant in the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department, while he acted as “tracker” for the Drug Court. The district court granted Defendant Graham-Thompson qualified immunity and denied Defendant Krigbaum, the County Sheriff, qualified immunity. Krigbaum appealed. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity on Krigbaum, concluding that he did not have notice of a pattern of conduct by Edwards that violated a clearly established constitutional right; plaintiffs presented no evidence that Krigbaum had knowledge of sexual misconduct by Edwards that would create an inference Krigbaum turned a blind eye to or consciously disregarded a substantial risk of the constitutional harm Edwards was causing - conscience-shocking violations of plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights by a member of the Sheriff’s Department performing duties for the Drug Court; and the policy in question was designed to protect persons and did not “give rise to unconstitutional conditions.” View "S.M. v. Krigbaum" on Justia Law

Linn State's Board of Regents adopted a mandatory drug screening policy. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the drug screening policy. In Barrett v. Claycomb, a panel of this court reviewed an interlocutory appeal, discussing, and ultimately reversing, the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs on their facial challenge to the drug testing policy. On remand, plaintiffs clarified their claims to assert an as-applied challenge to the very same policy. The district court, in part, permanently enjoined Linn State from conducting any further collection, testing, or reporting. On appeal, Linn State challenged the district court's grant of a permanent injunction and subsequent grant of attorneys' fees in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that, on balance, testing the entire student population entering Linn State is reasonable and hence constitutional and an effective means of addressing Linn State's interest in providing "a safe, healthy, and productive environment for everyone who learns and works at LSTC by detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among students." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six homecare providers, filed suit challenging Minnesota's Individual Providers of Direct Support Services Representation Act, Minn. Stat. 179A.54, 179A.06. The Act allows homecare providers for Medicaid program participants to unionize. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause claim because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 152, does not preempt Minnesota's regulation of domestic service workers; plaintiffs' state preemption argument against the SEIU failed because even if the state laws conflict irreconcilably, the law passed most recently by the legislature controls and thus the Act trumps the older statute's definition of "employees;" the district court properly dismissed the providers' tortious interference claim against the state defendants because federal courts are unable to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law; and the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Contract Clause claims where plaintiffs did not have authority to negotiate compensation or benefits terms with program participants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Greene v. Dayton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an incarcerated felon, filed suit against defendants, alleging that the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-105(a)(1)(B), violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. An employee of the police department denied plaintiff's request for information regarding an individual plaintiff had assaulted because the Act only permits an incarcerated felon to request information of public record through an attorney. The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants because the Act does not violate the equal protection clause where the Act's limitation on those who many benefit from the law is rationally related to at least two legitimate government purposes: the prevention of unlawful use of the statute like harassing or threatening a witness or victim and conserving government resources; the Act does not violate plaintiff's due process right to access the courts because he has not shown that he will suffer an actual injury as a result of the Act's exclusion; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motions because his claims failed on the merits and he was not entitled to additional discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gregory Holt v. Michelle Howard" on Justia Law

Spectra filed suit against the City, alleging that the City violated federal and Missouri law by requiring Spectra to comply with a local ordinance governing public rights of way. Determining that Spectra's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim is properly before the court, the court concluded that section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 253, does not authorize a private right of action for damages under section 1983. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Spectra's section 1983 claim. The court also concluded that the district court properly abstained under Colorado River, which permits federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases where "parallel" state court litigation is pending, meaning that there is "a substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully dispose of the claims presented in the federal court." Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's first request for attorney fees and the City's renewed fee request. Spectra did not continue actively to pursue its section 1983 claim after the district court dismissed it, but simply reasserted it for the purpose of preserving its rights on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spectra Commc'n Grp. v. City of Cameron, MO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his disability discrimination and constructive discharge claims against SNS. The court concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable person would not have found his work environment intolerable. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to SNS on plaintiff's claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 213. The court concluded that the fact that an employee is disciplined in accordance with an employment policy is not enough to prove a constructive discharge claim under the MHRA. In this case, while one of plaintiff's supervisors laughed when asked about plaintiff's future at SNS and another supervisor told plaintiff that "this" would continue if he did not resign, the evidence was insufficient to create a material factual dispute about whether plaintiff's work environment was intolerable. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not give SNS a reasonable opportunity to resolve any problems with supervisors and plaintiff admits that he never complained about his supervisors during his employment. Therefore, the district court properly granted SNS summary judgment on plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cosby v. Steak N Shake" on Justia Law

The Army hired URS to destroy munitions at a facility in Arkansas. Smith, a black male, was hired by URS as a full-time temporary instructor/trainer for employees on the Arkansas project. Within months URS hired another black male and a white male (Griffin) for training positions; there were already four individual with various credentials in training positions. Smith alleges that the white man was paid more for essentially the same work and was given a favorable ranking in deciding which trainers should be terminated first, notwithstanding the fact that Griffin had a disciplinary report in his personnel files, for distributing purportedly obscene material in a class. Smith and testified that Griffin had openly conducted a side-business of selling health drinks from his office space at URS on company time without being disciplined. After being terminated during a reduction in forces, Smith sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of URS, noting “evidence of dissembling” that a jury could rely upon to discount URS's claimed rationales for its actions. View "Smith v. URS Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sell technology that permits computers to identify license-plate numbers in digital photographs taken by cameras mounted on vehicles. The cameras automatically photograph everything the vehicles encounter, with GPS coordinates; software provides notice if a photographed vehicle is subject to repossession. The information is sold to clients, including automobile finance and insurance companies and law enforcement. Arkansas’s Automatic License Plate Reader System Act prohibits use of automatic license plate reader systems and permits any person claiming harm from a violation to seek damages from the violator. Vigilant and its affiliates sued, arguing that “use of [automatic license plate reader] systems to collect and create information” and dissemination of the information constitutes speech and that the Act impermissibly restricts this speech based on content—license-plate data—and on the identity of the speaker, because it exempts some entities, such as law enforcement agencies. The district court dismissed, ruling that state officials were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lack standing, so there is no Article III case or controversy. State officials do not have authority to enforce the Act, so they do not cause injury; the Act provides for enforcement only through private actions for damages. View "Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law