Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the Institute and several of its employees, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race and national origin under federal and Minnesota law. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' treatment of her autistic son, AA. The court agreed with the district court that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and summary judgment for defendants was proper. In this case, there is insufficient evidence to show that any unfavorable treatment was motivated by race or national origin; the evidence does not support a finding of discriminatory motive where AA's treatment hours do not support plaintiff's claim; plaintiff's complaints that the Institute used different treatment programming, technology, or methods with AA do not support a finding of discriminatory motive; there is no evidence that the Institute declined to employ the technology with AA for reasons of race or national origin; the evidence does not support a finding that the Institute’s handling of plaintiff’s recommended discharge was a denial of benefits motivated by race or national origin; the record belies plaintiff's claim that the Institute ignored the recommendation of AA’s independent psychologist when it decided to recommend his discharge; and the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the Institute treated her less favorably than it did other parents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Abdull v. Lovaas Inst. for Early Intervention" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, claiming that BNSF refused to hire him on account of his obesity and thereby discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101-1126. The district court granted summary judgment for BNSF and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his claims. The court concluded that, taken as a whole, the relevant statutory and regulatory language makes it clear that for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment - and thus a disability - under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition. This remains the standard even after enactment of the ADAAA, which did not affect the definition of physical impairment. Because plaintiff failed to produce evidence that his obesity was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff did not have a physical impairment under the ADA. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff's argument that BNSF perceived him as having a physical impairment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morriss v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as a juvenile detention officer, filed suit against the County, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that the County retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, Arkansas law , and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The County terminated plaintiff's employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 because plaintiff was not a qualified individual where she could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. Even if the court were to find that extending plaintiff's FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that she could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. Likewise, the court agreed with the district court that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. The court further held that plaintiff failed to present a submissible case of retaliation under the ADA where plaintiff's request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. And because plaintiff still was unable to perform an essential function of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the County did not violate FMLA by terminating her after her FMLA expired. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scruggs v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging disability discrimination, failure to continue to accommodate, retaliation, and harassment. After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff was transferred to a new position at Wal-Mart. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on all claims. Plaintiff has conceded that the new overnight cashier position is less physically strenuous than stocking, and her acceptance of that position was accompanied by a $.20/hour raise. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an underlying adverse employment action, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and she cannot prove her claim that Wal-Mart failed to accommodate her disability; with temporal proximity alone to support her argument for pretext, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue for trial on her retaliation claim; in regard to her workplace harassment claim, plaintiff failed to identify any discriminatory statements made to her or any evidence sufficiently severe to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment; and plaintiff failed to successfully establish that she faced a hostile work environment where plaintiff offers no examples or evidence of an increased workload beyond stating that she had four pallets to stock one night. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Matt Holten and Jeff Ellis under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants, law enforcement officers, used excessive force while taking plaintiff into custody. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal, and he eventually filed a brief challenging only the district court’s dismissal of the claim against Holten. The notice of appeal, however, specified that plaintiff was appealing only a different order in the case. Where an appellant specifies one order of the district court in his notice of appeal, but fails to identify another, the notice is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction to review the unmentioned order. Where a district court dismisses one claim at an early stage of the case, and later enters an order and judgment dismissing a second claim, a notice of appeal that cites only the later order and judgment does not confer appellate jurisdiction to review the earlier order. In this case, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order not mentioned in plaintiff's notice of appeal. Because plaintiff failed to raise any arguments in regard to the order he did mention, the court determined that plaintiff has abandoned any challenge to that order. View "Rosillo v. Holten" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Matt Holten and Jeff Ellis under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants, law enforcement officers, used excessive force while taking plaintiff into custody. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal, and he eventually filed a brief challenging only the district court’s dismissal of the claim against Holten. The notice of appeal, however, specified that plaintiff was appealing only a different order in the case. Where an appellant specifies one order of the district court in his notice of appeal, but fails to identify another, the notice is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction to review the unmentioned order. Where a district court dismisses one claim at an early stage of the case, and later enters an order and judgment dismissing a second claim, a notice of appeal that cites only the later order and judgment does not confer appellate jurisdiction to review the earlier order. In this case, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order not mentioned in plaintiff's notice of appeal. Because plaintiff failed to raise any arguments in regard to the order he did mention, the court determined that plaintiff has abandoned any challenge to that order. View "Rosillo v. Holten" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSL, alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. 213.055, 213.070. The district court granted CSL's motion for summary judgment. In regard to the sex discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of his written warnings, and plaintiff's version of the events immediately preceding his firing fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of CSL’s stated basis for terminating his employment. Because plaintiff admitted that he failed to comply with CSL’s policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to the credibility of CSL’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure was the basis for the termination of his employment. Because plaintiff failed to show how he and a female employee engaged in similar conduct, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether CSL treated plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated female employees. Further, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether CSL treated plaintiff unfavorably relative to similarly situated employees; without facts connecting the comment at issue, made by one of Denn’s peers, to CSL’s decision to fire Denn, the statement does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding Denn’s discrimination claim; and the fact that other male employees were disciplined was insufficient to render summary judgment improper. In regard to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence showing that his discrimination complaint was a “contributing factor” to any adverse action taken by CSL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Denn v. CSL Plasma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant John Daugherty was sufficiently involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff to qualify as a decision maker, given that the evidence showed that he participated in the investigation leading up to her termination, and that he was the one who ultimately told her she was terminated; there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daugherty had earlier told plaintiff that she should step down because she was “a female” and “a single mom,” that it was “a man’s world,” and that she needed to “man up;" and because the court construed such comments, if made by a decisionmaker, as direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the court concluded, under a mixed-motive analysis, plaintiff may be entitled to some of the remedies she sought in her complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Morrow v. Zale Corp." on Justia Law

The ACLU filed suit against the director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Mo. Rev. Stat. 546.720 is unconstitutional as applied to department records the ACLU obtained under the Missouri Sunshine Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 610.010 et seq., and then posted on its website. Section 546.720 prohibits the disclosure of the identities of individuals who participate in executions. On appeal, the director challenged the district court's order denying immunity. The court concluded that the ACLU has alleged an injury in fact because it has shown an objectively reasonable fear of legal action that chills its speech. The court concluded, however, that the ACLU’s injury is not fairly traceable to the director because he does not possess any statutory authority to enforce section 546.720, and the ACLU's injury is fairly traceable only to the private civil litigants who may seek damages under the statute and thereby enforce the statute. Therefore, the court concluded that the ACLU lacks standing. The court also concluded that the director is also immune from suit because he lacks authority to enforce the challenged statute. In this case, the director’s authority to define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Balogh v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an independent lease truck driver for FMC Transport, filed suit against FMC Transport, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FMC Transport. FMC Transport's accident review board had concluded that plaintiff's accident was preventable and the company later terminated him. Although plaintiff is a member of a protected class and he did suffer an adverse employment action, and even if he did meet FMC Transport's legitimate expectations, the court concluded that he failed to present evidence that supports an inference of discrimination. Further, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, because he has not shown that the circumstances of his termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macklin v. FMC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law