Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, as personal representative for the Estate of Jeffry Alan Barton, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-105, alleging that Arkansas State Trooper Zachary Owens and other defendants denied Barton medical care, in violation of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to create an inference that Owens was deliberately indifferent to Barton’s need for medical attention; a reasonable officer in 2011 would have recognized that failing to seek medical care for an intoxicated arrestee who exhibits symptoms substantially more severe than ordinary intoxication violates the arrestee’s constitutional rights, all the more so when the surrounding circumstances indicate that a medical emergency exists; and therefore, a reasonable officer would have understood that he was violating Barton's clearly established constitutional rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Owens. Likewise, the court also concluded that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to create an inference of malice. Thus, Owens is not entitled to statutory immunity under the ACRA. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Barton v. Owens" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the MPRB and the superintendent of the MPRB, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her First Amendment and equal protection rights, as well as for reprisal and aiding and abetting race and color discrimination under state law. The district court granted in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiff asserts that the negative performance evaluation, suspensions and write-ups, a performance improvement plan, and refusal to promote her constituted adverse employment actions. Performance ratings that have a negative impact on promotion potential do not constitute an adverse employment action unless the rating actually led to the denial of the promotion. In this case, plaintiff has not offered any evidence that defendants would have chosen her for a promotion absent the comments at issue. The court found that plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the performance evaluations were actually used in the promotion decision or that the comments regarding plaintiff’s protected speech negatively influenced the decision. Furthermore, defendants have proffered non-retaliatory reasons for the alleged adverse employment actions, including plaintiff’s failure to reprimand subordinates appropriately. The court also concluded that the state law claims belongs in state court and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen and political activist, filed suit against the Township and its clerk, alleging violations of his Minnesota and federal constitutional rights and unlawful retaliation. The district court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff alleged that the Township targeted him specifically and prevented him from viewing and photocopying the type of documents generally available to the public. The court concluded that plaintiff has no cause of action under the Minnesota Constitution because there is no private cause of action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution. Furthermore, the Township did not "create" a common law right by allowing plaintiff and others some access to documents. The court also concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment claim was properly dismissed because the Township did not create a First Amendment right to access all information simply by allowing plaintiff and other members of the public some access to its documents. Finally, plaintiff has failed to show any chilling effect on his constitutional rights, and plaintiff did not engage in protected activity by filing the lawsuit and his claim of retaliation fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eggenberger v. West Albany Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffers from Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, filed suit against the Department after it denied him "shelter needy" benefits, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The court concluded that the appeal was timely, rejecting the district court's conclusion that plaintiff did not timely file notice and proof of service; concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency; and disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that section 256.045 of the Minnesota statutes prevented the court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the appeal from a state agency’s decision. In interpreting Minn. Stat. 256.045, subd. 7, the court concluded that subdivision 7 lays out one permissible route through which an aggrieved party may appeal from the Commissioner’s order and thus prevent it from becoming final, but it does not strip the federal court of its authority to hear the same appeal through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Because the district court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction based solely on the state statute, the district court failed to determine whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367 or whether any abstention doctrine applied. Therefore, the court vacated the decision dismissing the supplemental state-law claim and remanded for further consideration. Because the state agency’s decision was not final, the district court erred by finding that plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims were precluded. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's allegations failed to state a due process or equal protection claim. Because plaintiff’s equal protection claim is predicated on the same allegations as his ADA and RA claims, the district court did not err by dismissing the section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wong v. Minnesota DHS" on Justia Law

Nikko Jenkins killed four people, including Curtis Bradford, three weeks after he was released from prison after serving ten and a half years of a twenty-one year sentence. Plaintiff, Bradford's mother, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1988 and state law against the State and the Department of Corrections, and department officials. Plaintiff also filed suit against the county, the city, and CCS. Plaintiff alleged violation of Bradford’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law negligence claims under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act (STCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,209 et seq. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the city, the county, and CCS because her claims are forfeited. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 claims against the department officials in their individual capacities because there is no general substantive due process right to be protected against the release of criminals from confinement, even if that release violates state law, and the two exceptions to this rule are not applicable in this instance: first, no special relationship exists between the victim and Jenkins; and the state-created exception is inapplicable because Bradford was not a member of a limited, precisely definable group. Finally, plaintiff has forfeited any challenge to the district court's ruling dismissing her state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "Glasgow v. Nebraska" on Justia Law

Nikko Jenkins killed four people, including Andrea Kruger, three weeks after he was released from prison after serving ten and a half years of a twenty-one year sentence. Plaintiff, Andrea's husband, filed suit against defendants, alleging deliberate indifference, violation of Andrea’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988(a), and state law negligence claims under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act (STCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8, 209 et seq. The district court granted the state and department officials' motion to dismiss. Rejecting plaintiff's waiver argument, the court concluded that there is no general substantive due process right to be protected against the release of criminals from confinement, even if that release violates state law, and the two exceptions to this rule are not applicable in this instance: first, no special relationship exists between the victim and Jenkins; and the state-created exception is inapplicable because Andrea was not a member of a limited, precisely definable group. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the state law claims against the department officials in their individual capacities because the department officials’ actions were taken while they were acting in the scope of their employment; state law claims against the department officials in their official capacities were properly dismissed where the discretionary function exception applied to the department officials' calculation of Jenkins's release date; plaintiff's claim of arithmetic error was not properly pled; the decision not to seek a civil commitment was also a discretionary function; and any mandatory duty to turn over documents was not properly pled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kruger v. Nebraska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Institute and several of its employees, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race and national origin under federal and Minnesota law. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' treatment of her autistic son, AA. The court agreed with the district court that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and summary judgment for defendants was proper. In this case, there is insufficient evidence to show that any unfavorable treatment was motivated by race or national origin; the evidence does not support a finding of discriminatory motive where AA's treatment hours do not support plaintiff's claim; plaintiff's complaints that the Institute used different treatment programming, technology, or methods with AA do not support a finding of discriminatory motive; there is no evidence that the Institute declined to employ the technology with AA for reasons of race or national origin; the evidence does not support a finding that the Institute’s handling of plaintiff’s recommended discharge was a denial of benefits motivated by race or national origin; the record belies plaintiff's claim that the Institute ignored the recommendation of AA’s independent psychologist when it decided to recommend his discharge; and the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the Institute treated her less favorably than it did other parents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Abdull v. Lovaas Inst. for Early Intervention" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, claiming that BNSF refused to hire him on account of his obesity and thereby discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101-1126. The district court granted summary judgment for BNSF and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his claims. The court concluded that, taken as a whole, the relevant statutory and regulatory language makes it clear that for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment - and thus a disability - under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition. This remains the standard even after enactment of the ADAAA, which did not affect the definition of physical impairment. Because plaintiff failed to produce evidence that his obesity was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff did not have a physical impairment under the ADA. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff's argument that BNSF perceived him as having a physical impairment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morriss v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as a juvenile detention officer, filed suit against the County, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that the County retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, Arkansas law , and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The County terminated plaintiff's employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 because plaintiff was not a qualified individual where she could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. Even if the court were to find that extending plaintiff's FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that she could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. Likewise, the court agreed with the district court that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. The court further held that plaintiff failed to present a submissible case of retaliation under the ADA where plaintiff's request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. And because plaintiff still was unable to perform an essential function of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the County did not violate FMLA by terminating her after her FMLA expired. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scruggs v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging disability discrimination, failure to continue to accommodate, retaliation, and harassment. After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff was transferred to a new position at Wal-Mart. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on all claims. Plaintiff has conceded that the new overnight cashier position is less physically strenuous than stocking, and her acceptance of that position was accompanied by a $.20/hour raise. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an underlying adverse employment action, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and she cannot prove her claim that Wal-Mart failed to accommodate her disability; with temporal proximity alone to support her argument for pretext, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue for trial on her retaliation claim; in regard to her workplace harassment claim, plaintiff failed to identify any discriminatory statements made to her or any evidence sufficiently severe to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment; and plaintiff failed to successfully establish that she faced a hostile work environment where plaintiff offers no examples or evidence of an increased workload beyond stating that she had four pallets to stock one night. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law