Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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Plaintiffs filed suit against the state claiming, inter alia, that the prohibitions in the Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act, Minn. Stat. 216H.03, subd. 3(2) and (3), violate the Commerce Clause. The statute is intended to reduce statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions by prohibiting utilities from meeting Minnesota demand with electricity generated by a new large energy facility in a transaction that will contribute to or increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The court concluded that plaintiffs meet the Article III standing requirement where Plaintiff Basin can demonstrate a probable economic injury resulting from governmental action; plaintiffs' claims are ripe for judicial review because the issues are predominately legal, and the challenged prohibitions are currently causing hardship by interfering with the ability of plaintiffs such as Basin to plan, invest in, and conduct their business operations; the district court did not err in declining to abstain under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.; the district court correctly concluded that the challenged prohibitions have the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of Minnesota; the statute has extraterritorial reach and will impose Minnesota’s policy of increasing the cost of electricity by restricting use of the currently most cost-efficient sources of generating capacity from prohibited sources anywhere in the grid, absent Minnesota regulatory approval or the dismantling of the federally encouraged and approved MISO transmission system; Minnesota may not do this without the approval of Congress; and the district court did not err by enjoining the defendant state officials from enforcing the prohibitions. The court dismissed plaintiffs' cross-appeal as moot. View "North Dakota v. Heydinger" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a civilly-committed individual, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to adequate nutrition. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. The court concluded that the evidence, taken most favorably to plaintiff, demonstrates a violation of his constitutional right to adequate nutrition where there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff proved a violation when he lost 11 pounds in less than two months, his bag lunches often lacked items as punishment for behavior violations, he sometimes received 1200 calories per day instead of the recommended 2000, and food was improperly withheld from him. The court concluded, however, that the evidence against Defendants Rowe and Dickneite is insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference. Finally, the district court properly denied summary judgment to Defendants Englehart, Blake and Weinkein where the right to adequate nutrition was clearly established. View "Ingrassia v. Dicknette" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a licensed California real estate broker, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Nebraska officials in their official capacities, seeking, among other things, prospective relief declaring that provisions of the Nebraska Real Estate License Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-885.01 to 81-885.55, violated her constitutional rights. The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that the Nebraska License Act, on its face, was regulation of speaking or publishing as such,” rather than legitimate regulation of the real estate broker profession; at a minimum, plaintiff was a "broker" because she held herself out as one who was "listing" property for compensation; and plaintiff's contention that the License Act violates the First Amendment because it is vague and overbroad is without merit. The court further concluded that its conclusion that the License Act does not restrict speech contrary to the First Amendment forecloses her other facial attacks on the statute. In this case, the License Act is rationally related to the legitimate State interest in ensuring the competency and honesty of those who hold themselves out as providing professional brokerage services to the sellers and buyers of Nebraska real estate. Finally, plaintiff's claim under the privileges or immunities clause is foreclosed by the Slaughter-House Cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an African-American man who has diabetes, filed suit against his employer, the City, alleging that it had discriminated against him based on his race and had retaliated against him for filing charges of unlawful discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the City did not change plaintiff's conditions following its pretermination investigation, and that plaintiff has not argued that taking medical leave is tantamount to being constructively discharged, nor could he succeed on such an argument on this evidentiary record. Therefore, plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of race discrimination because he has not shown that he suffered an adverse employment action. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination when the City rated his overall performance as unsuccessful because he failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that two Caucasian employees were similarly situated to him. Finally, plaintiff failed to file a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC regarding his fitness exam and thus this claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an African-American, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Warden, Deputy Warden, and Major, in their individual capacities, after he was terminated from the ADC. Defendants’ stated reasons for terminating plaintiff are based on their determinations that he violated ADC policy by making false statements and improperly allowing an inmate into the count room.The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for intentional race discrimination. In this case, plaintiff's attempt to show pretext through comparator evidence fails because defendants have provided evidence that a similarly situated Caucasian employee was subject to the same treatment as plaintiff. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's claims that defendants shifted their explanations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Henry v. Burl" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging various gender discrimination and retaliation claims. The district court granted summary judgment as to the discrimination and retaliation claims, and dismissed without prejudice the state constitutional claims. The court concluded that it was permissible for defendant to dismiss plaintiff on the basis of her political affiliations as a matter of law where it is appropriate for defendant to require personal and political loyalty in the Chief Deputy position. In regard to plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, she failed to identify any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant's proffered reasons for dismissing her was pretext for gender discrimination. Furthermore, plaintiff did not apply for any open positions, nor was defendant required to find her a suitable position upon dismissing her from the Chief Deputy position. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant discriminated against her when he failed to hire her for the electronic records manager position because the parties agree that plaintiff did not apply for the position. In regard to the retaliation claims, the court concluded that, assuming plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, defendant offered several reasons for not hiring plaintiff, including that plaintiff was not familiar with the new computer system. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or raise an inference of unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "DePriest v. Milligan" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City of St. Paul, its police chief, and police officer Patricia Englund, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to engage in religious speech at the 2014 Irish Fair. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint based on lack of standing. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the city, its police chief, and Englund in her official capacity based on lack of standing because plaintiff failed to allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that he was indeed subject to a credible threat of prosecution under St. Paul's policies for engaging in religious expression. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claim against Englund in her individual capacity where 42 U.S.C. 1983 imposes liability on an official who oversteps her authority and misuses her power. In this case, Englund allegedly threatened to confiscate banners plaintiff displayed, creating a concrete threat of injury regardless of whether she also threatened to arrest him. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and the dismissal of his claims based on future constitutional violations. View "Miller v. City of St. Paul" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a medical doctor certified in internal medicine, filed suit against Mayo after he was terminated. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim under Minnesota's Vulnerable Victims Act, Minn. Stat. 626.557, subdiv. 3(a), where plaintiff failed to report the violations at issue and his conclusory allegations do not show compliance with the internal reporting procedure; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's defamation claim where Mayo's motive and occasion for making the allegedly defamatory statements were proper and the criticisms were based on reasonable care; the court rejected plaintiff's Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1), claim because EMTALA claims do not apply to patients who are stabilized, and plaintiff had already stated that the patient at issue had been stabilized; assuming without deciding plaintiff established prima facie cases under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. 181.932, subdiv. 1, and EMTALA or that he engaged in protected conduct under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), Mayo established legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for the termination and plaintiff failed to establish that his employment termination was pretext for retaliation or motivated solely by his reports of Minnesota Whistleblower Act, EMTALA, or False Claims Act violations; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the district court's order striking his overlength 51-page declaration, and in denying plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion to defer summary judgment for additional discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alaa E. Elkharwily, M.D. v. Mayo Holding Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against various municipalities and their employees under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, alleging that these employees had improperly accessed her personal data on different occasions. On appeal, defendants that were denied qualified immunity challenged the district court's judgment. The court concluded that defendants' entitlement to sovereign immunity hinges on factual questions regarding the circumstances under which they accessed plaintiff's personal information. The record does not foreclose the possibility that the officers accessed plaintiff's data for a purpose not permitted by the DPPA. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to reassess this factual dispute in the context of an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Mallak v. Runde" on Justia Law

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The Estate of Robert Jason Johnson, who was killed in a motorcycle and car accident, filed suit against the St. Louis Board of Police, various police board officials, and three police officers, alleging civil rights violations stemming from the police’s handling of the accident. The district court dismissed the police board and the police board officials from the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the three police officer defendants. The court concluded that, because the record contains no evidence that defendants materially falsified the accident report or failed to conduct a constitutionally-required investigation, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on the substantive due process claim. The court's conclusion that the accident report was not materially false is also sufficient to dispose of the estate’s claims for violation of the Equal Protection Clause and conspiracy to violate civil rights. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions where the district court viewed both parties partially at fault, and considered the dispute at issue to be a scheduling matter better resolved by the parties themselves than by the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "A.J. v. Tanksley" on Justia Law