Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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Plaintiff, an African-American, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Warden, Deputy Warden, and Major, in their individual capacities, after he was terminated from the ADC. Defendants’ stated reasons for terminating plaintiff are based on their determinations that he violated ADC policy by making false statements and improperly allowing an inmate into the count room.The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for intentional race discrimination. In this case, plaintiff's attempt to show pretext through comparator evidence fails because defendants have provided evidence that a similarly situated Caucasian employee was subject to the same treatment as plaintiff. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's claims that defendants shifted their explanations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Henry v. Burl" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging various gender discrimination and retaliation claims. The district court granted summary judgment as to the discrimination and retaliation claims, and dismissed without prejudice the state constitutional claims. The court concluded that it was permissible for defendant to dismiss plaintiff on the basis of her political affiliations as a matter of law where it is appropriate for defendant to require personal and political loyalty in the Chief Deputy position. In regard to plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, she failed to identify any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant's proffered reasons for dismissing her was pretext for gender discrimination. Furthermore, plaintiff did not apply for any open positions, nor was defendant required to find her a suitable position upon dismissing her from the Chief Deputy position. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant discriminated against her when he failed to hire her for the electronic records manager position because the parties agree that plaintiff did not apply for the position. In regard to the retaliation claims, the court concluded that, assuming plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, defendant offered several reasons for not hiring plaintiff, including that plaintiff was not familiar with the new computer system. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or raise an inference of unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "DePriest v. Milligan" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City of St. Paul, its police chief, and police officer Patricia Englund, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to engage in religious speech at the 2014 Irish Fair. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint based on lack of standing. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the city, its police chief, and Englund in her official capacity based on lack of standing because plaintiff failed to allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that he was indeed subject to a credible threat of prosecution under St. Paul's policies for engaging in religious expression. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claim against Englund in her individual capacity where 42 U.S.C. 1983 imposes liability on an official who oversteps her authority and misuses her power. In this case, Englund allegedly threatened to confiscate banners plaintiff displayed, creating a concrete threat of injury regardless of whether she also threatened to arrest him. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and the dismissal of his claims based on future constitutional violations. View "Miller v. City of St. Paul" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a medical doctor certified in internal medicine, filed suit against Mayo after he was terminated. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim under Minnesota's Vulnerable Victims Act, Minn. Stat. 626.557, subdiv. 3(a), where plaintiff failed to report the violations at issue and his conclusory allegations do not show compliance with the internal reporting procedure; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's defamation claim where Mayo's motive and occasion for making the allegedly defamatory statements were proper and the criticisms were based on reasonable care; the court rejected plaintiff's Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1), claim because EMTALA claims do not apply to patients who are stabilized, and plaintiff had already stated that the patient at issue had been stabilized; assuming without deciding plaintiff established prima facie cases under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. 181.932, subdiv. 1, and EMTALA or that he engaged in protected conduct under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), Mayo established legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for the termination and plaintiff failed to establish that his employment termination was pretext for retaliation or motivated solely by his reports of Minnesota Whistleblower Act, EMTALA, or False Claims Act violations; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the district court's order striking his overlength 51-page declaration, and in denying plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion to defer summary judgment for additional discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alaa E. Elkharwily, M.D. v. Mayo Holding Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against various municipalities and their employees under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, alleging that these employees had improperly accessed her personal data on different occasions. On appeal, defendants that were denied qualified immunity challenged the district court's judgment. The court concluded that defendants' entitlement to sovereign immunity hinges on factual questions regarding the circumstances under which they accessed plaintiff's personal information. The record does not foreclose the possibility that the officers accessed plaintiff's data for a purpose not permitted by the DPPA. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to reassess this factual dispute in the context of an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Mallak v. Runde" on Justia Law

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The Estate of Robert Jason Johnson, who was killed in a motorcycle and car accident, filed suit against the St. Louis Board of Police, various police board officials, and three police officers, alleging civil rights violations stemming from the police’s handling of the accident. The district court dismissed the police board and the police board officials from the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the three police officer defendants. The court concluded that, because the record contains no evidence that defendants materially falsified the accident report or failed to conduct a constitutionally-required investigation, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on the substantive due process claim. The court's conclusion that the accident report was not materially false is also sufficient to dispose of the estate’s claims for violation of the Equal Protection Clause and conspiracy to violate civil rights. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions where the district court viewed both parties partially at fault, and considered the dispute at issue to be a scheduling matter better resolved by the parties themselves than by the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "A.J. v. Tanksley" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against ATK and several of its employees for race, gender, and age discrimination after the company terminated her employment for elbowing another employee in the back. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of any protected class status because she did not show that ATK treated any similarly situated employees in a disparate manner; plaintiff also did not establish a prima facie case by showing that ATK failed to follow its own policies when investigating the elbowing incident; and even assuming that plaintiff had established a prima facie case, ATK articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing her. Furthermore, the district court also correctly concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim was not substantiated where she did not prove a causal connection between her follow up email and her termination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blackwell v. Baker" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Brentwood after he was terminated, alleging race discrimination. A jury awarded plaintiff $1 in nominal damages. Plaintiff then sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and front pay. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that reinstatement was neither possible nor practical where the jury made no findings as to whether plaintiff had in fact violated the safety rules or whether his plant manager's trust concerns were genuine, and that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he was entitled to front pay. View "Olivares v. Brentwood Indus." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a financial advisor, filed suit for First Amendment retaliation, against Nebraska financial regulators after they investigated him and his broker-dealer employer around the time a newspaper reported plaintiff made unkind comments about the President of the United States. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the remedy plaintiffs seeks - declaratory and injunctive relief - is the sort of prospective relief that can be sought in federal court from state officials sued in their official capacities, notwithstanding the state’s sovereign immunity, under Ex Parte Young; the state regulators’ voluntary cessation of their improper inquiries did not moot plaintiff’s case because the department still has regulatory authority over him and the state regulators’ assurances that they know better than to retaliate against him again are not enough to make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur; and the state regulators are mistaken that plaintiff’s requested injunction would be unenforceable and provide no relief. On the merits, the court applied a clear error standard of review and concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that even though the regulators targeted plaintiff partly in retaliation for his constitutionally protected political speech, they did not do enough to deter someone of ordinary firmness from continuing to speak. Therefore, plaintiff's claim failed and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bennie, Jr. v. Munn" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, two men previously arrested in Ramsey County, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the County's collection of all of a detained arrestee's cash upon booking and its related practices violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. After collecting the cash, the county automatically deducts a $25 booking fee. The county later returns the arrestee’s remaining funds in the form of a prepaid debit card. Joining the Sixth Circuit, the court concluded that the private interest at stake is relatively modest and that the county's interest in collecting the fees at booking is substantial. The county's interest in upfront collection of this fee weighs more heavily than the relatively modest private interests of the arrestees. As written, this policy allows for the correction of any errors inherent in the overinclusive system of upfront collection. In this case, plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to establish that Ramsey County’s booking-fee policy fails to pass constitutional muster simply because it provides a post-deprivation remedy instead of a pre-deprivation hearing. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that post-deprivation process simply cannot suffice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings. View "Mickelson v. County of Ramsey" on Justia Law