Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a bus driver and the Metropolitan Council after the bus driver kicked plaintiff off the bus for failing to pay the bus fare, allowed passengers to exit the bus and physically remove plaintiff, and accelerated and braked multiple times in an attempt to knock plaintiff off the bus or to scare him away from the front of the bus. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a bruised thigh, a bruised cheek, and scrapes on both of his hands. The district court granted summary judgment to the bus driver and the Metropolitan Council. Plaintiff appealed the grant of qualified immunity to the bus driver. The court agreed with the district court's application of the intent-to-harm standard, concluding that plaintiff failed to show that the bus driver's actions amounted to substantive due process where it is clear that the bus driver's objective in all of his actions was to remove plaintiff from the bus and to continue driving his route. The bus driver was was not acting in a manner to maliciously or sadistically cause plaintiff physical harm, and the bus driver's actions were related to his legitimate responsibilities of driving the bus. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the bus driver and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Truong v. Hassan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two public officials in their official capacities, alleging that the procedures they enforce for placing initiatives on Nebraska state and municipal ballots violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all but the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale, entered judgment for plaintiff on that claim, enjoined Gale from enforcing certain provisions of the Nebraska Constitution, and awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court made clear in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that a wish to engage in future conduct, alone, does not provide the immediacy needed for threatened enforcement of a contested law to constitute injury in fact. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish standing to bring his Fourteenth Amendment claim where his interest in placing an initiative on the ballot, even if evidenced by a sworn statement and sample petition filed with Gale, is insufficient to establish an imminent threat of enforcement. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to prove he has standing to assert his interest as a petition signer where there is no evidence that plaintiff is registered to vote. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Bernbeck v. Gale" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from UPS, he filed suit alleging race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The court affirmed, concluding that the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding of unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff has not put forth evidence to rebut UPS's contention that it fired him due to his conduct. The record shows that plaintiff cursed in the workplace, arguably threatened his supervisor, had multiple conflicts with other employees, and disagreed with company efforts to address the problems. Because plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish that UPS's given reason for his termination was pretextual, the district court did not commit reversible error by concluding that plaintiff failed to show that a material question of fact remains as to pretext. View "Smith v. UPS" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dale Helmig was convicted of first-degree murder of his mother. In 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated his conviction and gave the State 180 days to retry him. The State declined to retry Helmig. Helmig then filed suit against law enforcement officers and Osage County, Missouri under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional right to due process by not disclosing certain materially favorable evidence, fabricating evidence, and conspiring to misuse evidence. The court found no intent or bad faith on behalf of the officers to disclose Brady evidence to the prosecutor or the defense; Sheriff Fowler’s lack of testimony at trial about his limited knowledge of the report at issue when he was never asked about whether the report was or was not substantiated both fails to support a Brady claim and is protected by absolute immunity; and no reasonable juror could infer the existence of a conspiracy to deprive Helmig of a fair trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Helmig v. Fowler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of murdering her three-year-old daughter, filed suit against current and former members of the Parole Board, alleging that the inclusion of photographs of her murdered daughter in her file deprived her of her right to have her request for parole heard by an unbiased and impartial board, which violated her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's due process claim fails because she does not have a protected federal due process right to parole. Nor does South Dakota's discretionary parole process that is applicable here create a liberty interest in parole by statute. Furthermore, despite the fact that plaintiff has a statutory right to a parole hearing, that right is not a protected liberty interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jenner v. Nikolas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Anoka under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment while he was in custody at the county jail. The district court denied Anoka's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. In this case, plaintiff arrived at the jail with instructions from his doctor in the form of a Vicodin prescription, and the deputies and the jail nurse ignored his complaints of pain and requests for treatment. When plaintiff was prescribed additional medication by a jail doctor, he did not receive it. Moreover, defendants had fair warning about the unconstitutionality of a failure to provide pain medication for serious dental conditions in particular. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying defendants qualified immunity. The court declined to impose sanctions. View "Dadd v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly employed at UICSM as a physician assistant, filed suit alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment to UICSM. The court noted that 29 C.F.R. 825.311(a) inarguably permitted UICMS to contact plaintiff to inquire about her "status and intent to return to work." The court concluded that UICMS was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's interference claim where plaintiff has not presented evidence that UICMS's requests for her to work from home when she had a broken foot were a condition of her employment nor that her compliance with them was anything but voluntary. The evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to find that UICMS interfered with plaintiff's right to FMLA leave. In regard to plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court concluded that the sequence of events alone does not give rise to a causal link between UICMS's alleged discriminatory motive and its decision not to renew plaintiff's contract strong enough to permit her to forgo the burden-shifting framework; applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court concluded that UICMS has proffered plaintiff's tardy charting as a nondiscriminatory justification for deciding not to renew her contract; and plaintiff has not created a dispute as to pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Massey-Diez v. UICMS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, DSU, alleging a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted DSU's motion fro summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action by being exposed to floor-stripping and waxing products while employed as a custodian at DSI. In this case, plaintiff asserts facts that allegedly contradict DSU's argument, but many of those facts are not supported by the record, support claims plaintiff did not appeal, or reference incidents of alleged adverse action that are barred by the statue of limitations. Other facts, such as plaintiff's insistence that she had in fact previously applied for office jobs at DSU, while disputed, would not affect the outcome of the suit and as such, are not material. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material fact preventing the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of DSU. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Dick v. Dickinson State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served on the Missouri grand jury that considered whether probable cause existed to indict Darren Wilson, the Ferguson, Missouri, police officer who shot and killed Michael Brown in August 2014. Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory judgment that the Missouri statutes restricting grand jurors from disclosing information were unconstitutional as applied to her. She claimed that the state’s grand-jury secrecy laws violate her First Amendment right to free speech. On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the district court erred by dismissing her First Amendment claim under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court concluded that the district court properly abstained from the immediate exercise of federal jurisdiction because answers to state-law issues by the Missouri courts could alter or avoid altogether the need for a decision on Doe’s First Amendment claim. Rather than dismissing the case, the court concluded that the district court instead should have retained jurisdiction and stayed the proceedings while the parties litigate the state-law questions in the Missouri state courts. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. The court noted that, when the state-law issues have been resolved, if the First Amendment claim has not become moot, plaintiff may return to federal district court and pursue it. View "Grand Juror Doe v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when attempting to arrest plaintiff for an alleged parole violation. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of plaintiff's convictions for impersonating a peace officer and attempted first degree murder where the conviction for impersonating a peace officer was a crime involving deception which had probative value outweighing any prejudice and where plaintiff failed to show that the use of the conviction for attempted first degree murder for impeachment purposes substantially influenced the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the court could not say that no reasonable juror could have concluded that an officer's third application of a taser was an objectively reasonable approach to ensuring that plaintiff was incapacitated and unable to harm him or the other officers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Procknow v. Curry" on Justia Law