Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, convicted of murdering her three-year-old daughter, filed suit against current and former members of the Parole Board, alleging that the inclusion of photographs of her murdered daughter in her file deprived her of her right to have her request for parole heard by an unbiased and impartial board, which violated her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's due process claim fails because she does not have a protected federal due process right to parole. Nor does South Dakota's discretionary parole process that is applicable here create a liberty interest in parole by statute. Furthermore, despite the fact that plaintiff has a statutory right to a parole hearing, that right is not a protected liberty interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jenner v. Nikolas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Anoka under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment while he was in custody at the county jail. The district court denied Anoka's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. In this case, plaintiff arrived at the jail with instructions from his doctor in the form of a Vicodin prescription, and the deputies and the jail nurse ignored his complaints of pain and requests for treatment. When plaintiff was prescribed additional medication by a jail doctor, he did not receive it. Moreover, defendants had fair warning about the unconstitutionality of a failure to provide pain medication for serious dental conditions in particular. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying defendants qualified immunity. The court declined to impose sanctions. View "Dadd v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly employed at UICSM as a physician assistant, filed suit alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment to UICSM. The court noted that 29 C.F.R. 825.311(a) inarguably permitted UICMS to contact plaintiff to inquire about her "status and intent to return to work." The court concluded that UICMS was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's interference claim where plaintiff has not presented evidence that UICMS's requests for her to work from home when she had a broken foot were a condition of her employment nor that her compliance with them was anything but voluntary. The evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to find that UICMS interfered with plaintiff's right to FMLA leave. In regard to plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court concluded that the sequence of events alone does not give rise to a causal link between UICMS's alleged discriminatory motive and its decision not to renew plaintiff's contract strong enough to permit her to forgo the burden-shifting framework; applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court concluded that UICMS has proffered plaintiff's tardy charting as a nondiscriminatory justification for deciding not to renew her contract; and plaintiff has not created a dispute as to pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Massey-Diez v. UICMS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, DSU, alleging a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted DSU's motion fro summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action by being exposed to floor-stripping and waxing products while employed as a custodian at DSI. In this case, plaintiff asserts facts that allegedly contradict DSU's argument, but many of those facts are not supported by the record, support claims plaintiff did not appeal, or reference incidents of alleged adverse action that are barred by the statue of limitations. Other facts, such as plaintiff's insistence that she had in fact previously applied for office jobs at DSU, while disputed, would not affect the outcome of the suit and as such, are not material. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material fact preventing the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of DSU. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Dick v. Dickinson State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served on the Missouri grand jury that considered whether probable cause existed to indict Darren Wilson, the Ferguson, Missouri, police officer who shot and killed Michael Brown in August 2014. Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory judgment that the Missouri statutes restricting grand jurors from disclosing information were unconstitutional as applied to her. She claimed that the state’s grand-jury secrecy laws violate her First Amendment right to free speech. On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the district court erred by dismissing her First Amendment claim under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court concluded that the district court properly abstained from the immediate exercise of federal jurisdiction because answers to state-law issues by the Missouri courts could alter or avoid altogether the need for a decision on Doe’s First Amendment claim. Rather than dismissing the case, the court concluded that the district court instead should have retained jurisdiction and stayed the proceedings while the parties litigate the state-law questions in the Missouri state courts. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. The court noted that, when the state-law issues have been resolved, if the First Amendment claim has not become moot, plaintiff may return to federal district court and pursue it. View "Grand Juror Doe v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when attempting to arrest plaintiff for an alleged parole violation. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of plaintiff's convictions for impersonating a peace officer and attempted first degree murder where the conviction for impersonating a peace officer was a crime involving deception which had probative value outweighing any prejudice and where plaintiff failed to show that the use of the conviction for attempted first degree murder for impeachment purposes substantially influenced the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the court could not say that no reasonable juror could have concluded that an officer's third application of a taser was an objectively reasonable approach to ensuring that plaintiff was incapacitated and unable to harm him or the other officers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Procknow v. Curry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the state claiming, inter alia, that the prohibitions in the Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act, Minn. Stat. 216H.03, subd. 3(2) and (3), violate the Commerce Clause. The statute is intended to reduce statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions by prohibiting utilities from meeting Minnesota demand with electricity generated by a new large energy facility in a transaction that will contribute to or increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The court concluded that plaintiffs meet the Article III standing requirement where Plaintiff Basin can demonstrate a probable economic injury resulting from governmental action; plaintiffs' claims are ripe for judicial review because the issues are predominately legal, and the challenged prohibitions are currently causing hardship by interfering with the ability of plaintiffs such as Basin to plan, invest in, and conduct their business operations; the district court did not err in declining to abstain under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.; the district court correctly concluded that the challenged prohibitions have the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of Minnesota; the statute has extraterritorial reach and will impose Minnesota’s policy of increasing the cost of electricity by restricting use of the currently most cost-efficient sources of generating capacity from prohibited sources anywhere in the grid, absent Minnesota regulatory approval or the dismantling of the federally encouraged and approved MISO transmission system; Minnesota may not do this without the approval of Congress; and the district court did not err by enjoining the defendant state officials from enforcing the prohibitions. The court dismissed plaintiffs' cross-appeal as moot. View "North Dakota v. Heydinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civilly-committed individual, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to adequate nutrition. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. The court concluded that the evidence, taken most favorably to plaintiff, demonstrates a violation of his constitutional right to adequate nutrition where there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff proved a violation when he lost 11 pounds in less than two months, his bag lunches often lacked items as punishment for behavior violations, he sometimes received 1200 calories per day instead of the recommended 2000, and food was improperly withheld from him. The court concluded, however, that the evidence against Defendants Rowe and Dickneite is insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference. Finally, the district court properly denied summary judgment to Defendants Englehart, Blake and Weinkein where the right to adequate nutrition was clearly established. View "Ingrassia v. Dicknette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed California real estate broker, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Nebraska officials in their official capacities, seeking, among other things, prospective relief declaring that provisions of the Nebraska Real Estate License Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-885.01 to 81-885.55, violated her constitutional rights. The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that the Nebraska License Act, on its face, was regulation of speaking or publishing as such,” rather than legitimate regulation of the real estate broker profession; at a minimum, plaintiff was a "broker" because she held herself out as one who was "listing" property for compensation; and plaintiff's contention that the License Act violates the First Amendment because it is vague and overbroad is without merit. The court further concluded that its conclusion that the License Act does not restrict speech contrary to the First Amendment forecloses her other facial attacks on the statute. In this case, the License Act is rationally related to the legitimate State interest in ensuring the competency and honesty of those who hold themselves out as providing professional brokerage services to the sellers and buyers of Nebraska real estate. Finally, plaintiff's claim under the privileges or immunities clause is foreclosed by the Slaughter-House Cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American man who has diabetes, filed suit against his employer, the City, alleging that it had discriminated against him based on his race and had retaliated against him for filing charges of unlawful discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the City did not change plaintiff's conditions following its pretermination investigation, and that plaintiff has not argued that taking medical leave is tantamount to being constructively discharged, nor could he succeed on such an argument on this evidentiary record. Therefore, plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of race discrimination because he has not shown that he suffered an adverse employment action. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination when the City rated his overall performance as unsuccessful because he failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that two Caucasian employees were similarly situated to him. Finally, plaintiff failed to file a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC regarding his fitness exam and thus this claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law