Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Donterious Stephens was present when Officer Juanita Mills arrested his mother, Mary Stephens, at her workplace. Donterious approached the scene and asked Officer Mills why his mother was being arrested. Officer Mills warned him not to walk up on her, and Donterious complied by standing back. After Mary was placed in a police vehicle, Donterious's father, Warren Stephens, was also arrested. Donterious then spoke to Officer Mills again, and she ordered his arrest. Donterious was arrested but not charged. Mary Stephens and another plaintiff sued Officer Mills, alleging that Donterious's arrest was unlawful.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Officer Mills's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Donterious's arrest was lawful. Officer Mills appealed this decision, arguing that the undisputed material evidence showed she did not violate Donterious's rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Officer Mills did not have actual or arguable probable cause to arrest Donterious for obstructing government operations. The court found that Donterious's mere presence at the arrest scene and his questioning of Officer Mills did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity for Officer Mills, concluding that Donterious's actions did not amount to obstruction under Arkansas law. View "Willis v. Mills" on Justia Law

Marqus Patton was convicted by a Nebraska jury of first-degree murder and using a deadly weapon during a robbery following the attempted robbery and fatal shooting of Kristopher Winters. Patton filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), alleging that his due process rights were violated because the State failed to disclose tacit plea agreements with two witnesses, Emily Gusman and Drake Northrop, who testified against him at trial.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied Patton’s habeas petition but granted a certificate of appealability. The district court was skeptical about the absence of agreements but concluded that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s finding that no tacit plea agreements existed was not unreasonable. The district court also found that any undisclosed agreements would not have been material to the trial's outcome due to the extensive cross-examination of the witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Nebraska Supreme Court had determined there were no tacit plea agreements, and this conclusion was not unreasonable based on the evidence. The court emphasized that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The Eighth Circuit found that the evidence supported either conclusion regarding the existence of tacit plea agreements and that the state court’s determination was reasonable.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Patton’s habeas petition, concluding that the state court’s adjudication did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Patton v. Boyd" on Justia Law

After a welfare check was requested by his fiancée, Joseph Maser was involved in a standoff with police at his suburban Iowa home. Maser had threatened suicide, fired a gun inside his house, and was reportedly intoxicated with access to firearms. Officers attempted to negotiate with Maser for nearly an hour, during which Maser became increasingly agitated and made threats. Maser exited his garage holding a rifle, ignored commands to drop the weapon, and raised the rifle outward from his body. Officer Joshua Van Brocklin, perceiving a threat, shot Maser twice in the chest. Maser survived and subsequently brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Van Brocklin used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.Initially, Maser filed suit in state court against Officer Van Brocklin, the City of Coralville, and other officers, asserting both state and federal claims. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in Burnett v. Smith, which foreclosed excessive force claims under the Iowa Constitution, the district court granted summary judgment on those claims. The district court also granted summary judgment for Officer Van Brocklin on the federal excessive force claim, finding no constitutional violation and awarding qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Van Brocklin’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Maser’s actions—raising a rifle outward after repeated noncompliance and threats—created an imminent threat of serious harm. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Maser’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Maser v. City of Coralville, IA" on Justia Law

In 2015, Shirley Carter was found dead in her home from gunshot wounds. Jason Carter, her son, was later found civilly liable for her wrongful death. Following this, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation Agent Mark Ludwick and Marion County Deputy Sheriff Reed Kious arrested Jason for first-degree murder. However, Jason was acquitted in a jury trial. Jason then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Ludwick and Kious, alleging violations of his constitutional and state-law rights during the investigation of his mother's murder.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed Jason's complaint, granting Ludwick and Kious qualified immunity on all federal claims and ruling that Jason failed to state a claim for his state law claims. The court also dismissed Marion County from the suit, as Jason did not allege a pattern of unconstitutional conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Ludwick and Kious were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Jason failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation for false arrest, as the arrest was conducted pursuant to a facially valid warrant. The court also held that Jason's claim of evidence concealment did not constitute a clearly established constitutional violation. Additionally, the court ruled that Jason's failure-to-investigate claim did not meet the threshold for a substantive due process violation. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jason's state law claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, noting the presence of probable cause and the lack of improper motive. View "Carter v. Ludwick" on Justia Law

Nathan Rinne sued Camden County and two of its commissioners, Greg Hasty and Donald Williams, Jr., alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after Hasty and Williams voted to ban him from all County property for one year. The defendants sought summary judgment on the defenses of qualified and legislative immunity and on the merits of the issue of punitive damages. The district court denied these motions in full.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The defendants then appealed the denial of legislative immunity, qualified immunity, and the issue of punitive damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the denial of legislative immunity, holding that the commissioners' decision to ban Rinne from county property was administrative, not legislative, in nature. The court found that the act of banning Rinne did not concern the enactment or promulgation of public policy but was an effort to monitor and discipline his presence and conduct at future commission meetings. Consequently, the commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, including the issues of qualified immunity and punitive damages, for lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of fact that could not be resolved at the appellate level. View "Rinne v. Hasty" on Justia Law

Petra Brokken sued her employer, Hennepin County, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. Brokken claimed that the County's Covid-19 vaccine and testing policy conflicted with her religious beliefs. After initially granting her a religious exemption, the County revised its policy, threatening termination and loss of accrued benefits if she did not comply. Brokken retired under duress and subsequently filed her lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Brokken's claims. The court ruled that she failed to plead an adverse employment action, did not plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with the County’s policy, and that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, the court found that Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute does not create a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute, agreeing that it does not create a private right of action. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA claims. The appellate court held that Brokken plausibly pled an adverse employment action and sufficiently alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the County’s policy. The court also recognized that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Brokken v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Clayton Stewart was involved in a police incident where Officer Victor Garcia of the Jonesboro, Arkansas police department tased him while he was climbing a fence. Stewart fell and was paralyzed as a result. Stewart filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Garcia, Jonesboro Chief of Police Rick Elliot, and the City of Jonesboro, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, and Stewart appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Stewart argued that Garcia lacked probable cause to arrest him, used excessive force, and was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. He also claimed that Elliot was liable as Garcia’s supervisor and that the police department’s policies were unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Garcia had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Stewart for misdemeanor assault and fleeing. Regarding the excessive force claim, the court found that while tasing Stewart in an elevated position could be considered deadly force, Stewart’s right to be free from such force was not clearly established at the time of the incident, entitling Garcia to qualified immunity. On the deliberate indifference claim, the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could find Garcia was aware of Stewart’s serious medical needs, Stewart failed to show that the right was clearly established, granting Garcia qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisory liability claim against Elliot and the municipal liability claim against the City of Jonesboro, finding no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or inadequate policies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Stewart v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Roberts County, South Dakota, and several individuals, including County Sheriff Tyler Appel, County Deputies Zachary Angerhofer and Wesley Bowsher, his adopted son Ross Torgerson, and his ex-wife Terri Torgerson. Torgerson alleged violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil conspiracy. He also asserted a Monell claim against the County, a state-law claim for common law battery against Ross, and a state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claim against Deputy Angerhofer, Deputy Bowsher, Ross, and Terri. These claims stemmed from a domestic dispute involving Torgerson, Ross, and Terri.The defendants moved for summary judgment on Torgerson’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The court concluded that Torgerson failed to state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, as he did not plead that he possessed a constitutional interest that had been violated. The court also determined that Torgerson’s civil conspiracy claim failed due to the lack of a stated constitutional interest and insufficient facts showing a conspiracy. Consequently, Torgerson’s Monell claim against the County also failed. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, considering them to be purely state-related issues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Torgerson did not suffer a deprivation of liberty as he was not charged or prosecuted for any crime, thus failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and Monell claims, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "Torgerson v. Roberts County of South Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, Spirit Lake Tribe, and three individual Native American voters filed a lawsuit against North Dakota’s Secretary of State. They claimed that the state's 2021 redistricting plan diluted Native American voting strength, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits vote dilution, which can occur through packing a minority group into one district or dividing them among several districts to weaken their voting power.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss, which argued that private plaintiffs lacked a cause of action under Section 2 and could not use § 1983 to enforce it. The district court allowed the case to proceed, and after a bench trial, it ruled that the 2021 redistricting map violated Section 2. The court permanently enjoined the Secretary from using the map and ordered the North Dakota Legislative Assembly to adopt a remedial map. When the Assembly failed to do so, the court imposed the plaintiffs' proposed map.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether private plaintiffs could enforce Section 2 of the VRA through § 1983. The court held that Section 2 does not unambiguously confer an individual right enforceable under § 1983. The court emphasized that Section 2 focuses on the entities regulated (states and political subdivisions) rather than unambiguously creating individual rights. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of a cause of action. View "Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Howe" on Justia Law

Danette Hester, a Special Agent for the IRS in Iowa, applied for a Criminal Investigator position in Georgia but was not hired. After filing a discrimination complaint, the IRS proposed her termination for alleged misconduct. Hester sued, claiming discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, and Hester appealed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on all counts. Hester, a 53-year-old Black woman, alleged retaliation and race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court found that Hester did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hester met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination but failed to show that the IRS's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her was pretextual. The court noted that the IRS limited the hiring to one position due to an upcoming reorganization and that the selected candidate had qualifications Hester lacked, such as fluency in Spanish.Regarding age discrimination, the court found that the four-year age difference between Hester and the selected candidate was not significant enough to support her claim. For the retaliation claim, the court held that Hester did not establish a causal connection between her discrimination complaint and the proposed termination, as the seven-month gap was insufficient to infer causation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Hester failed to provide evidence that the IRS's reasons for its actions were pretextual or that her age, race, or sex played a role in the decision not to promote her. View "Hester v. U.S. Department of Treasury" on Justia Law