Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Nathan Rinne sued Camden County and two of its commissioners, Greg Hasty and Donald Williams, Jr., alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after Hasty and Williams voted to ban him from all County property for one year. The defendants sought summary judgment on the defenses of qualified and legislative immunity and on the merits of the issue of punitive damages. The district court denied these motions in full.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The defendants then appealed the denial of legislative immunity, qualified immunity, and the issue of punitive damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the denial of legislative immunity, holding that the commissioners' decision to ban Rinne from county property was administrative, not legislative, in nature. The court found that the act of banning Rinne did not concern the enactment or promulgation of public policy but was an effort to monitor and discipline his presence and conduct at future commission meetings. Consequently, the commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, including the issues of qualified immunity and punitive damages, for lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of fact that could not be resolved at the appellate level. View "Rinne v. Hasty" on Justia Law

Petra Brokken sued her employer, Hennepin County, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. Brokken claimed that the County's Covid-19 vaccine and testing policy conflicted with her religious beliefs. After initially granting her a religious exemption, the County revised its policy, threatening termination and loss of accrued benefits if she did not comply. Brokken retired under duress and subsequently filed her lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Brokken's claims. The court ruled that she failed to plead an adverse employment action, did not plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with the County’s policy, and that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, the court found that Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute does not create a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute, agreeing that it does not create a private right of action. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA claims. The appellate court held that Brokken plausibly pled an adverse employment action and sufficiently alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the County’s policy. The court also recognized that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Brokken v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Clayton Stewart was involved in a police incident where Officer Victor Garcia of the Jonesboro, Arkansas police department tased him while he was climbing a fence. Stewart fell and was paralyzed as a result. Stewart filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Garcia, Jonesboro Chief of Police Rick Elliot, and the City of Jonesboro, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, and Stewart appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Stewart argued that Garcia lacked probable cause to arrest him, used excessive force, and was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. He also claimed that Elliot was liable as Garcia’s supervisor and that the police department’s policies were unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Garcia had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Stewart for misdemeanor assault and fleeing. Regarding the excessive force claim, the court found that while tasing Stewart in an elevated position could be considered deadly force, Stewart’s right to be free from such force was not clearly established at the time of the incident, entitling Garcia to qualified immunity. On the deliberate indifference claim, the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could find Garcia was aware of Stewart’s serious medical needs, Stewart failed to show that the right was clearly established, granting Garcia qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisory liability claim against Elliot and the municipal liability claim against the City of Jonesboro, finding no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or inadequate policies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Stewart v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Roberts County, South Dakota, and several individuals, including County Sheriff Tyler Appel, County Deputies Zachary Angerhofer and Wesley Bowsher, his adopted son Ross Torgerson, and his ex-wife Terri Torgerson. Torgerson alleged violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil conspiracy. He also asserted a Monell claim against the County, a state-law claim for common law battery against Ross, and a state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claim against Deputy Angerhofer, Deputy Bowsher, Ross, and Terri. These claims stemmed from a domestic dispute involving Torgerson, Ross, and Terri.The defendants moved for summary judgment on Torgerson’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The court concluded that Torgerson failed to state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, as he did not plead that he possessed a constitutional interest that had been violated. The court also determined that Torgerson’s civil conspiracy claim failed due to the lack of a stated constitutional interest and insufficient facts showing a conspiracy. Consequently, Torgerson’s Monell claim against the County also failed. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, considering them to be purely state-related issues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Torgerson did not suffer a deprivation of liberty as he was not charged or prosecuted for any crime, thus failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and Monell claims, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "Torgerson v. Roberts County of South Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, Spirit Lake Tribe, and three individual Native American voters filed a lawsuit against North Dakota’s Secretary of State. They claimed that the state's 2021 redistricting plan diluted Native American voting strength, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits vote dilution, which can occur through packing a minority group into one district or dividing them among several districts to weaken their voting power.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss, which argued that private plaintiffs lacked a cause of action under Section 2 and could not use § 1983 to enforce it. The district court allowed the case to proceed, and after a bench trial, it ruled that the 2021 redistricting map violated Section 2. The court permanently enjoined the Secretary from using the map and ordered the North Dakota Legislative Assembly to adopt a remedial map. When the Assembly failed to do so, the court imposed the plaintiffs' proposed map.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether private plaintiffs could enforce Section 2 of the VRA through § 1983. The court held that Section 2 does not unambiguously confer an individual right enforceable under § 1983. The court emphasized that Section 2 focuses on the entities regulated (states and political subdivisions) rather than unambiguously creating individual rights. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of a cause of action. View "Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Howe" on Justia Law

Danette Hester, a Special Agent for the IRS in Iowa, applied for a Criminal Investigator position in Georgia but was not hired. After filing a discrimination complaint, the IRS proposed her termination for alleged misconduct. Hester sued, claiming discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, and Hester appealed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on all counts. Hester, a 53-year-old Black woman, alleged retaliation and race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court found that Hester did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hester met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination but failed to show that the IRS's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her was pretextual. The court noted that the IRS limited the hiring to one position due to an upcoming reorganization and that the selected candidate had qualifications Hester lacked, such as fluency in Spanish.Regarding age discrimination, the court found that the four-year age difference between Hester and the selected candidate was not significant enough to support her claim. For the retaliation claim, the court held that Hester did not establish a causal connection between her discrimination complaint and the proposed termination, as the seven-month gap was insufficient to infer causation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Hester failed to provide evidence that the IRS's reasons for its actions were pretextual or that her age, race, or sex played a role in the decision not to promote her. View "Hester v. U.S. Department of Treasury" on Justia Law

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law, alleging they arrested him without probable cause. He also brought federal and state claims against the City of Newton, Iowa. The district court denied summary judgment in part, determining that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondeat superior claim against the City predicated on Galanakis’s false arrest claim. The defendants appealed, arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity protected the officers—and, as to the false arrest claim, the City—from suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim, concluding that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under the influence of marijuana. The court found that Galanakis evinced almost no indicia of intoxication and that his behavior during the stop did not suggest impairment. The court also dismissed the interlocutory appeal as to the state-law claims, noting that without clarification that resolution of the qualified immunity claim necessarily resolves the pendent claims, it declined to exercise jurisdiction. View "Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa" on Justia Law

Inmate Travis Dantzler filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Dr. Tonia Baldwin, a physician at the Clarinda Correctional Facility (CCF), was deliberately indifferent to his knee pain by delaying an MRI and orthopedic referral for nonmedical reasons, specifically his parole eligibility. Dr. Baldwin sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing she was not deliberately indifferent and that the law was not clearly established. The district court denied her motion, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding her deliberate indifference.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and concluded that Dantzler had created a material fact issue as to whether Dr. Baldwin was deliberately indifferent by delaying the MRI and orthopedic referral based on his parole eligibility. The court also determined that Dr. Baldwin was not entitled to qualified immunity, as it was clearly established that delaying medical care for nonmedical reasons could violate the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dantzler had shown an objectively serious medical need and produced verifying medical evidence that the delay in treatment adversely affected his condition. The court also found that Dr. Baldwin's delay in scheduling the MRI for a nonmedical reason (parole eligibility) could support a finding of deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the law was clearly established, and Dr. Baldwin was on notice that delaying medical treatment for nonmedical reasons could constitute deliberate indifference. View "Dantzler v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

An off-duty St. Louis Police Officer, Milton Green, was mistakenly shot by Officer Christopher Tanner during a pursuit of a suspect who had fired at police officers. Green filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tanner and the City of St. Louis, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Tanner did not violate Green’s constitutional rights and that official immunity barred the state-law claims. The court also denied Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to submit newly discovered evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Tanner’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and that there was no constitutional violation. The court also ruled that Green’s Monell claim against the City failed due to the lack of an underlying constitutional violation and that official immunity protected Tanner from the state-law claims. Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to reopen discovery were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tanner’s use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, which involved a rapidly evolving and dangerous situation. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Monell claims against the City, as there was no constitutional violation by Tanner. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Green’s post-judgment motions and the dismissal of the state-law battery claims, agreeing that official immunity applied. View "Green v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Devin Ledbetter was seriously injured by Springfield, Missouri police officer Brandon Helmers. Ledbetter sued Helmers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Helmers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The incident occurred when Helmers and his partner responded to a 911 call about a man holding a woman captive in a tent. Ledbetter, who was in the tent, exited holding a knife. The accounts of what happened next differ, with Helmers claiming Ledbetter was non-compliant and threatening, while Ledbetter claimed he immediately dropped the knife and was compliant. Ledbetter sustained severe injuries, including a fractured hip, during the arrest.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Helmers's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, noting disputed facts about the threat Ledbetter posed and the amount of force used. The case proceeded to trial, but the jury could not reach a verdict on liability. However, they answered special interrogatories, finding Helmers reasonably believed Ledbetter posed an immediate threat but did not believe Ledbetter was resisting arrest. The district court then granted Helmers's motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity, concluding that Helmers did not use excessive force and that his conduct did not violate clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a reasonable jury could find Helmers used excessive force, given the evidence and the jury's special findings. However, the court also held that it was not clearly established that Helmers's use of force was excessive under the circumstances, as existing case law did not provide sufficient guidance for the specific situation Helmers faced. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Helmers qualified immunity. View "Ledbetter v. Helmers" on Justia Law