Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the FEC’s rule requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only those donations “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.” At issue in this appeal is whether the rule survives Step Two of the Chevron framework and State Farm's arbitrary and capricious test, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. The court held that the FEC’s purpose requirement satisfies both Chevron Step Two and State Farm review has the benefit both of being a correct application of black letter administrative law and of forestalling to some other time an answer to the important constitutional questions bubbling beneath the surface of this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title IX, and various D.C. tort laws, seeking damages from the District. Plaintiff alleged that, while attending a District school for emotionally disturbed students, she and a teacher had a consensual sexual relationship that led to the birth of a child. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that in order for the district court to assess whether plaintiff stated a facially plausible complaint, plaintiff needed to assert the elements of the type of municipal policy that caused her injury. Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education standard where she has not alleged that anyone - much less an appropriate official - knew of any acts of sexual harassment while the harassment was ongoing. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet the statutory notice requirement for her tort claim and that her alternative claim seeking to discover a police report about the incident is forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., alleging that the District: (1) unlawfully refused to accommodate her disability, and (2) retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation by terminating her employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the District. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's refusal-to-accommodate claim because she was not a qualified individual. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's retaliation claim because she did not proffer any evidence proving that the actual reason for her termination was retaliatory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minter v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics action against the FBI, alleging that the FBI violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they detained, interrogated, and tortured him over the course of four months in three African countries. The district court dismissed the suit. The court held that in this case, where the agents' actions took place during a terrorism investigation and those actions occurred overseas, special factors counsel hesitation in recognizing a Bivens action for money damages.Two special factors are present in this case. First, special factors counseling hesitation have foreclosed Bivens remedies in cases “involving the military, national security, or intelligence.” Second, the Supreme Court has never “created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside the borders of the United States.” The court further concluded that the weight of authority against expanding Bivens combined with the court's recognition that tort remedies in cases involving matters of national security and foreign policy are generally left to the political branches, counsels serious hesitation before recognizing a common law remedy in these circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal because plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action. View "Meshal v. Higgenbotham" on Justia Law