Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
by
Plaintiffs filed suit against the IRS and several of its individual employees, seeking money damages by way of relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, and equitable relief by way of injunction and declaratory judgment. Additionally, the complaints alleged that the IRS invaded plaintiffs’ statutory rights by violating 26 U.S.C. 6103, by conducting unauthorized inspection and/or disclosure of tax return information from their applications and the other information improperly obtained from them. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens actions under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held, however, that the equitable actions are not moot. After the initiation of the suits, the IRS took action to end some unconstitutional acts against at least a portion of plaintiffs. Based on these actions, the district court dismissed the equitable claims as moot. Even if the court accorded deference to the district court, the government has not carried its heavy burden of showing mootness under the voluntary cessation doctrine. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the equitable claims. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

by
PAG sought a preliminary injunction against FEC's rule prohibiting unauthorized political committees, like PAG, from using candidates’ names in the titles of their websites and social media pages. The district court denied PAG's motion. The court concluded that PAG is entitled to a preliminary injunction because there is a substantial likelihood that, as applied to PAG, the FEC’s naming restrictions in 11 C.F.R. 102.14(a) violate the First Amendment. In this case, the restriction, as applied to PAG, is a content-based ban on speech that likely violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s denial of PAG’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the application of section 102.14(a) against PAG’s websites and social media pages. View "Pursuing America's Greatness v. FEC" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against HUD, alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to HUD. Under Circuit precedent the action complained of must be “materially adverse” to support a discrimination claim. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the denial of plaintiff's requests for lateral transfers on the basis of race and/or national origin was not cognizable under Title VII because it did not constitute an adverse employment action. View "Ortiz-Diaz v. HUD" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the OCC’s enforcement action against him was trumped-up and retaliatory. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the case on the pleadings. At issue is whether the Constitution places any limit on the governmental policy-making discretion immunized by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court concluded, in line with the majority of its sister circuits to have considered the question, that the discretionary-function exception does not categorically bar FTCA tort claims where the challenged exercise of discretion allegedly exceeded the government’s constitutional authority to act. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics claims are not time-barred because the continuing-violations doctrine applies to extend the applicable statute of limitations where, as here, a plaintiff alleges continuing conduct causing cumulative harm. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Loumiet v. United States" on Justia Law

by
Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy, an Egyptian-American Muslim employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court concluded that, because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency. Therefore, Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government on Al-Saffy's claims against the State Department because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Saffy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against the Authority, alleging disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the Authority. The court concluded that the district court erred by focusing on only the first definition of "disability" and failed to consider whether plaintiff met either the record-of-impairment or regarded-as-impaired definitions of disability. Compounding the error, the district court also applied an outmoded statutory standard, overlooking material changes to the governing law worked by the 2008 Amendments. Given the legal standard prescribed by the 2008 Amendments, the court held that petitioner came forward with sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that his alcoholism substantially limited major life activities compared to most people in the general population. Furthermore, petitioner's complaint was timely filed under both the three-year and one-year limitations periods provided by District law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. WMATA" on Justia Law

by
Petitioners challenge the Commission's 2015 Open Internet Order, which reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications service, subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201. The Commission determined that broadband service satisfies the statutory definition of a telecommunications service: “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.” In accordance with Brand X, the Commission's conclusions about consumer perception find extensive support in the record and together justify the Commission’s decision to reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. The court rejected petitioners' numerous challenges to the Commission's decision to reclassify broadband, finding that none have merit. The court concluded that the Commission adequately explained why it reclassified broadband from an information service to a telecommunications service and its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. US Telecom never questions the Commission’s application of the statute’s test for common carriage, and US Telecom cites no case, nor is the court aware of one, holding that when the Commission invokes the statutory test for common carriage, it must also apply the NARUC test. See National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC. Where the Commission concluded that it could regulate interconnection arrangements under Title II as a component of broadband service, the court rejected US Telecom's two challenges to the Commission's decision. The court rejected mobile petitioners’ arguments and find that the Commission’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a commercial mobile service is reasonable and supported by the record. In the Order, the Commission decided to forbear from numerous provisions of the Communications Act. The court rejected Full Service Network's procedural and substantive challenges to the Commission’s forbearance decision. The Commission promulgated five rules in the Order: rules banning (i) blocking, (ii) throttling, and (iii) paid prioritization; (iv) a General Conduct Rule; and (v) an enhanced transparency rule. The court rejected Alamo's challenge to the anti-paid-prioritization rule as beyond the Commission’s authority and rejected US Telecom's challenge to the General Conduct Rule as unconstitutionally vague. Having upheld the FCC’s reclassification of broadband service as common carriage, the court concluded that the First Amendment poses no bar to the rules and the court rejected Alamo and Berninger's challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she was suspended without pay for seven days in 2008 and was terminated in 2010. The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff's suspension claims and dismissed her termination claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her termination-based claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court concluded that plaintiff introduced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to concluded that her suspension was motivated by racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this issue. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claim because plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that either her supervisors knew of any protected activity. View "Morris v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, four retired correctional officers, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District deprived them of their federal right under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), 18 U.S.C. 926C, to carry a concealed weapon. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege that they meet the statutory requirements but have been unable to obtain firearms training because the District of Columbia has refused to certify that, as correctional officers, they had a statutory power of arrest. The court held that, taken together, the LEOSA’s plain text, purpose, and context show that Congress intended to create a concrete, individual right to benefit individuals like plaintiffs and that is within “the competence of the judiciary to enforce.” The court, applying de novo review, held that the complaint states a claim under section 1983. In this case, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the federal right they seek to enjoy has been unlawfully deprived by the District to be remediable under Section 1983. Further, plaintiffs allege that the District’s actions resulting from its erroneous interpretation of how the LEOSA applies to these facts have deprived them of their federally established concealed-carry right. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Duberry v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, a legally-blind, African-American woman, filed suit alleging that she was denied a promotion at the Department because of her race and disability. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, at least where a manager regularly requests and receives upgraded vacancies that are earmarked for his subordinates, his decision not to engage in that process because of an employee’s disability or race can be an adverse employment action under the court's case law. The court nevertheless concluded that plaintiff failed to show that she was denied her promotion because of her race or disability. In this case, no reasonable juror could find from the record that her supervisor contributed to the agency's inaction in creating a GS-11 position for plaintiff. Rather, the record supplies ample evidence that the supervisor made the request for the GS-11 position that plaintiff desired, and plaintiff provides no probative evidence in response. Whatever the reason for the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s denial, it could not have been based on discrimination if, as plaintiff recognizes, he was not aware that the requested position was designed to facilitate plaintiff’s promotion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Chambers v. Burwell" on Justia Law