Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a former Maricopa County Board of Supervisors member and his spouse, filed suit against defendants, former prosecutors and their spouses, alleging that defendants initiated a frivolous federal civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., suit against plaintiffs. The suit was part of an ongoing "political war" in Maricopa County. The prosecutors claimed that they were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from any claims arising out of their filing of the civil RICO action. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were not sufficiently "analogous to those of a prosecutor." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss based on these claims. View "Stapley v. Pestalozzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after Robert St. Jovite committed suicide when he was an inmate in the California Prison System. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims that the warden and captain impermissibly convened a staff meeting that resulted in the absence of all floor officers from the building where a jury could conclude that the complete withdrawal of all supervision created an unconstitutional risk of harm to the mentally ill inmates in St. Jovite's building and that the warden and captain were responsible for, and deliberately indifferent, to this lack of supervision. The jury could also conclude that the lack of floor staff was an actual and proximate cause of St. Jovite's death. The court also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims based on the failure to administer CPR by defendants where there was a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to St. Jovite's potentially serious medical need. Accordingly, the court vacated summary judgment with respect to these claims. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs principally claimed that their school districts have an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., to provide them with a word-for-word transcription service so that they can fully understand the teacher and fellow students without undue strain and consequent stress. The court held that courts evaluating claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and Title II must analyze each claim separately under the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. In these cases, the district courts legally erred in granting summary judgment by holding that plaintiff's Title II claim was foreclosed as a matter of law by the failure of her IDEA claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the grants of summary judgment on the ADA claims in both cases and on the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51, 52, claim in K.M. v. Tustin, remanding for further proceedings in both cases. View "K. M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a GPS device. The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for plaintiff's claims. The court held, however, that such an action was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey if it was not a collateral attack on either the fact of a parolee's confinement as a parolee or the parolee's underlying conviction or sentence. Because petitioner's action was such an attack, the court reversed and remanded . View "Thornton v. Brown" on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law

These interlocutory appeals stemmed from an encounter between a group of young men and several BART officers that ended with the shooting and death of one of the men. The court concluded that Defendant Mehserle was not entitled to immunity from Oscar Grant, Jr.'s Fourteenth Amendment claim where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mehserle's action's were required by a legitimate law enforcement purpose; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal asserting a right to federal law qualified immunity from a California state law (Civil Code 52.1) violation; Mehserle was entitled to qualified immunity from a claim that he unlawfully arrested Plaintiff Anicete; the district court failed to consider whether there was any evidence that Mehserle participated in the extended detentions of Plaintiffs Anicete, Reyes, or Nigel Bryson; the district court properly denied Mehserle qualified immunity from Plaintiff Jack Bryson's unlawful arrest claim; Defendant Pirone was properly denied qualified immunity for his initial detention of Reyes, the Brysons, and Greer; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity for conducting a de facto arrest of Reyes and the Brysons; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity from Greer's unlawful arrest claim; and to the extent the district court relied on Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco to deny Defendant Domenici immunity, its judgment was vacated. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. BART" on Justia Law