Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

GSK filed suit against Abbott over a dispute related to a licensing agreement and the pricing of HIV medications. The central issue on appeal was whether equal protection prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in jury selection. GSK contended that a new trial was warranted because Abbott unconstitutionally used a peremptory strike to exclude a juror on the basis of his sexual orientation. The court concluded that GSK had established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination where the juror at issue was the only juror to have identified himself as gay on the record and the subject of the litigation presented an issue of consequence to the gay community. The court held that classifications based on sexual orientation were subject to a heightened scrutiny under United States v. Windsor. The court also held that equal protection prohibits peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation. The history of exclusion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the pervasiveness of stereotypes about the group leads the court to conclude that Batson v. Kentucky applied to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation. The court also concluded that a Batson challenge would be cognizable only once a prospective juror's sexual orientation was established, voluntarily and on the record. The court rejected Abbott's harmless error argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that the continuous twenty-four-hour illumination of his cell violated the Eighth Amendment. The court reversed, concluding that there were material issues of fact remaining as to the brightness of the continuous lighting in plaintiff's cell, as to the effect on plaintiff of the continuous lighting, and as to whether the defendant officials were deliberately indifferent. Even if it were possible for a defendant to defeat an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim at summary judgment by showing a legitimate penological interest, defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case. Because the district court did not consider the question of qualified immunity, the court left the issue for the district court to determine in the first instance. The court also remanded for the district court to consider the issue of filing fee deductions. View "Grenning v. Miller-Stout, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former prison inmate, filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I), and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts II and III). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I, dismissal of Counts II and III, and denial of appointment of counsel and informa pauperis (IFP) status. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I where the record indicated that prison mental healthcare professionals were incredibly responsive to plaintiff's needs and no reasonable trier of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for counsel where plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits and he has been able to articulate his legal claims; vacated the dismissal of Counts II and III because it was based on the determination that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his initial complaint, rather than his amended complaint; and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Cano v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claimed that prison officials engaged in retaliatory conduct, of which the governmental actors were aware, because of plaintiff's mother's website, which exposed prison corruption and fought for inmates' rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and plaintiff appealed. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court held that repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" requirement are strikes as "failures to state a claim" when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification within a reasonable time. Plaintiff accrued two strikes for Ninth Circuit dismissals, and three additional strikes for district court dismissals. Therefore, plaintiff has more than met the requirement for a revocation of in forma pauperis status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Knapp v. Hogan, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an action to abate gang activity under California's general public nuisance statutes. The Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA), on behalf of the state, filed a public nuisance action against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC). OCDA subsequently obtained a default judgment, including a permanent injunction (the Order) against OVC and others. Plaintiffs, individuals of whom OCDA and the Orange Police Department (OPD) served the Order and Notice, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that OCDA and OPD's "dismiss-and-serve strategy" violated the procedural due process clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger v. Harris; plaintiffs' suit was not a forbidden de facto appeal barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting relief under general principles of comity and federalism; and the court evaluated the district court's discretionary decision to grant relief under the Colorado River doctrine rather than under Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. The court reversed the district court's judgment against Rackauckas on plaintiffs' second claim for relief in light of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Alderman. Further, the court concluded, inter alia, that the Order profoundly implicated liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause; the district court correctly determined that the Mathews v. Eldridge factors "weigh clearly in favor" of the conclusion that defendants violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to provide any form of hearing before subjecting them to the Order; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief in plaintiffs' favor. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vasquez v. Rackauckas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who has a history of bipolar disorder, delusions, Parkinson's disease, and hypertension, filed suit pro se against defendants, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed his claim and plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Bannister because plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Bannister was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warden Neven and nurses Grisham, Diliddo, and Balao-Cledera because plaintiff expressly waived his appeal against them in his reply brief; vacated the clerk's entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Sussman because the district court abused its discretion in failing to comply with Rule 4(m); vacated the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend his second amended complaint to name additional defendants; and remanded with instructions to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to Dr. Sussman and to allow plaintiff leave to amend his second amended complaint. View "Crowley v. Bannister" on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 includes various immigration-related provisions, passed in response to the growing presence of unauthorized aliens in Arizona. The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and government agencies in Arizona” by creating “a variety of immigration-related state offenses and defin[ing] the immigration-enforcement authority of Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.” Section 13-2929 of the Bill attempts to criminalize transporting, concealing, harboring, or attempting to transport, conceal, or harbor an unauthorized alien under certain circumstances and to criminalize inducing or encouraging an unauthorized alien to come to or reside in Arizona. The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to 13-2929 on the basis that it is preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute, as written, is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause because one of its key elements—being “in violation of a criminal offense”—is unintelligible. The provision is also preempted by federal law and invalid under the Supremacy Clause. View "Valle del Sol, Inc. v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law