Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. View "Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner suffering from schizoaffective disorder and who is proceeding pro se, sought damages from California prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of his request for a guardian ad litem because the Pro Bono Coordinator advised the court that no one was available to undertake the representation. In these consolidated appeals, at issue was whether the district court erred, under Rule 17(c)(2), by declining to appoint a guardian ad litem and instead staying plaintiff's cases indefinitely until he is found to be restored to competency. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 1291, or in the alternative, as a collateral order pursuant to Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by staying plaintiff's cases until he was found competent (if ever). Such a stay order failed to adequately protect plaintiff's interest and thus did not constitute "another appropriate order" under Rule 17(c). Instead, it amounted to a dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Davis v. Walker" on Justia Law

Family PAC filed suit alleging that three provisions of the Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The district court granted summary judgment in part for Family PAC and Family PAC subsequently sought attorneys fees and expenses. The court held that the term "costs" under Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure did not include attorney's fees and recoverable as part of costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 and similar statutes. Therefore, in this case, the district court properly concluded that the statement in the court's previous opinion that "[e]ach party shall bear its own costs of appeal," did not preclude Family PAC, as prevailing party, from obtaining an award of appellate attorney's fees under section 1988. View "Family Pac v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others protested weekly outside the locked fence that surrounds the LA Campus of the VAGLA to draw public attention to the VA's failure to use the lawn for veterans. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the inconsistent enforcement of 38 C.F.R. 1.218, which prohibited the posting of materials on VA property except under certain circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff with regard to declaratory relief, but denied any injunctive relief based on mootness. Plaintiff appealed. The district court concluded that a June 2010 e-mail instructing the VAGLA police to enforce section 1.218(a)(9) precisely and consistently mooted plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction by closing the LA Campus fence as a forum for all speech. The court agreed with the district court that the Government's voluntary cessation of its inconsistent enforcement of section 1.218(a)(9) mooted the request for injunctive relief. The court held that the VA satisfied its heavy burden of demonstrating mootness. The court presumed that the Government acted in good faith, and that presumption was especially strong here, where the Government was merely recommitting to consistent enforcement of one of its own longstanding regulations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosebrock v. Mathis, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Counties, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. 52.1; and common law false imprisonment. Plaintiff was erroneously arrested pursuant to a 1985 warrant, released, and then erroneously arrested again pursuant to a 1989 warrant and detained for a month. Plaintiff shared the same first and last name as the true subject of the warrant and police mistakenly believed that plaintiff was that person both times he was arrested. The district court granted the Counties' motions for summary judgment on all claims and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that the 1989 warrant satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it contained both the subject's name and a detailed physical description; that plaintiff was erroneously arrested based on the 1985 warrant simply did not affect whether the warrant itself satisfied the particularity requirement; and even if the Fourth Amendment did not require Los Angeles County to include more detailed information in the 1989 warrant in order to avoid the risk of repeated misidentification, defendant failed to show that the county had a policy or custom of failing to do so. The court also concluded that the officers' belief that plaintiff was the true subject of the warrant was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; plaintiff's detention did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in regards to plaintiff's state law claims, because the employees relevant to this case would be able to invoke statutory immunities to avoid liability, the Counties could as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Rivera v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Students brought a civil rights suit against the school district and two school officials after the school asked a group of students to remove clothing bearing images of the American flag when school officials learned of threats of race-related violence during a school-sanctioned celebration of Cinco de Mayo. The court concluded that school officials did not violate the students' rights to freedom of expression, due process, or equal protection where the school officials anticipated violence or substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities and their response was tailored to the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the policy was not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the students' rights to due process. View "Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers and the city after the officers entered her home without a warrant and shot her five or six times when she reacted violently to the officers' presence, grabbing a knife and threatening to kill the officers. Plaintiff, a woman in her mid-50s suffering from a mental illness, told the officers that she did not want to be taken to a mental health facility. The court affirmed in part, holding that the officers were justified in entering plaintiff's home initially under the emergency aid exception because they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that she was in need of emergency medical assistance and they conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner up to that point. The court held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the second entry violated the Fourth Amendment where a jury could find that the officers acted unreasonably by forcing the second entry and provoking a near-fatal confrontation. The court further held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the officers used excessive force by resorting to deadly force and shooting plaintiff. Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected claims of municipal liability; the court joined the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue and held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, applied to arrests; on the facts presented here, there was a triable issue as to whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability; and the court vacated summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the mandatory uniform policy at their children's public elementary school (RGES) under the First Amendment. The court concluded that RGES's inclusion of the motto "Tomorrow's Leaders" on its uniform shirts compelled speech because it mandated the written motto on the uniform shirts. The court also concluded that the exemption for uniforms of "nationally recognized youth organizations such as Boy Scouts and Girls Scouts on a regular meeting days" was content-based. Accordingly, the court concluded that strict scrutiny review applied. Because the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), RGES was not required to make any showing regarding its justifications for including the written motto or the exemption in the policy. Further, plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to produce any countervailing evidence. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether defendants' countervailing interest was sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the written motto and the exemption. View "Frudden v. Pilling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's concealed handgun laws. At issue was whether a responsible, law-abiding citizen had a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm in public for self-defense. The court concluded that the right to bear arms included the right to carry an operable firearm outside the home and that carrying weapons for the lawful purpose of self defense was a central component of the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment required that the state permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the home. The California scheme did not allow the typical responsible, law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Because the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits eschewed history and tradition in their analysis of the constitutionality of such regulations, the court found their approaches unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the Second Amendment claim because the County's "good cause" permitting requirement impermissibly infringed on the Second Amendment right to bear arms in lawful self-defense. View "Peruta v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

GLAAD filed a putative class action alleging that CNN violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51 et seq., and California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., by intentionally excluding deaf and hard of hearing visitors from accessing the videos on CNN.com. CNN filed a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16 et seq., arguing that GLAAD's claims arose from conduct in furtherance of CNN's free speech rights and that GLAAD failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court concluded that CNN's conduct was in furtherance of its free speech rights on a matter of public interest; where, as here, an action directly targeted the way a content provider chose to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action was based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California's anti-SLAPP statute; GLAAD failed to establish a probability of success on the merits of its Unruh Act claims because it has not shown intentional discrimination based on disability as required under California law; at this juncture, none of CNN's constitutional challenges posed a barrier to GLAAD's pursuit of its DPA claims; GLAAD's DPA claims were not foreclosed by the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption; GLAAD's DPA claims have the requisite minimal merit to survive CNN's free speech challenge and dormant Commerce Clause challenge; and the court certified to the California Supreme Court the remaining dispositive question of state law regarding GLAAD's DPA claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying CNN's motion to dismiss. View "Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN" on Justia Law