Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Washington State prisoner, sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts and alleged supplemental state law claims for conversion and fraud. Along with his complaint, plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his pro se civil rights action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), "three-strikes" provision, the court concluded that because three of the five dismissals on which defendants relied were not final at the time plaintiff took his appeal, they could not count against him in this case. Therefore, the court declined to revoke plaintiff's IFP status. The court also reversed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's right to access the courts, retaliation, and state law conversion claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to plaintiff's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claim because the district court properly concluded that the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaint could not be cured by an amendment.

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.

Defendant pleaded guilty for violating 18 U.S.C. 704(a), which prohibited the unauthorized wearing of military medals, where defendant fraudulently obtained a Purple Heart and wore it in public. On appeal, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court held that defendant's overbreadth challenge failed because a person violated the unauthorized wearing portion of section 704(a) only if he or she had an intent to deceive. The court rejected defendant's argument that United States v. Alvarez dictated that section 704(a) was unconstitutional. The court held that, under United States v. O'Brien, the government had a compelling interest in preventing the intentionally deceptive wearing of medals; those interests were unrelated to the suppression of free expression because section 704(a) did not prevent the expression of any particular message or viewpoint; and section 704(a) promoted the goals of maintaining the integrity of the military's medals and preventing the fraudulent wearing of military medals. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's facial First Amendment challenge.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a non-profit Christian organization operating a residential drug treatment program and two homeless shelters, engaged in religious discrimination in providing shelter and residential recovery services in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631. At issue was the extent of the protection afforded by the FHA against religious discrimination. The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant and held that, even assuming that section 3604(a) and (b) applied to defendant's homeless shelters, the FHA's religious exemption permitted the practices challenged by plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the court expressed no view on the merits of defendant's arguments about the proper scope of section 3604(a) and (b) and the proper definition of "residence" in section 3602(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim because there was no evidence to establish that defendant treated the men in its parallel drug treatment program any differently than it treated the women and the interference, coercion, or intimidation claim claim because plaintiffs had not exercised a right granted to them by section 3604.

Day-laborer organizations challenged a city anti-solicitation ordinance that barred individuals from standing on a street or highway and soliciting, or attempting to solicit, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle. The court agreed with the day laborers that the ordinance was a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech where the ordinance failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring element of the Supreme Court's time, place, and manner test and where the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it regulated significantly more speech than was necessary to achieve the city's purpose of improving traffic safety and traffic flow at two major intersections. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Costco appealed the district court's order granting class certification in a class action brought by Shirley Ellis, Leah Horstman, and Elaine Sasaki (plaintiffs), alleging that Costco's promotional practices discriminated based on gender. The court held that at least one plaintiff (Sasaki) had standing to bring suit. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in its analyses of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's findings on those issues and remanded for application of the correct standard. The court further held that, although the district court correctly determined that Sasaki was an adequate class representative, the court held that Ellis and Horstman were inadequate representatives for pursuing injunctive relief, given that they were former employees, and remanded for the district court to consider whether they were adequate representatives if a (b)(3) class was certified. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and remanded for reconsideration.

Plaintiff, a high school math teacher, filed suit in federal court alleging that the school district violated his constitutional rights by making him remove banners he displayed in his classroom which referenced "God" and the "Creator." At issue was whether a public school district infringed the First Amendment liberties of plaintiff when it ordered him not to use his public position as a pulpit from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation's history to the captive students in his mathematics classroom. The court agreed with the district court that no genuine issue of material fact remained in the present case. The court held, however, that the district court made a critical error when it determined that the school district had created a limited public forum for teacher speech and evaluated the school district's actions under a traditional forum-based analysis rather than the controlling Pickering-based inquiry. Applying the correct legal principles to the undisputed facts, the court held that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the claims raised by plaintiff. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiff, a minor with dyslexia, by and through her mother and Guardian Ad Litem, appealed from the district court's order affirming the Administrative Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) properly found plaintiff ineligible for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court held that the DOE procedurally violated the IDEA by applying regulations that required exclusive reliance on the "severe discrepancy model" at plaintiff's final eligibility meeting. This violation deprived plaintiff of a significant educational opportunity because it resulted in an erroneous eligibility determination. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order affirming the Hearing Officer's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

The Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute (SPOSFI) and Mary Figone appealed the district court's judgment rejecting their facial First Amendment and vagueness challenges to portions of "Proposition M," a popularly enacted amendment to the rent-stabilization ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco. The court held that, because both SPOSFI and Figone lacked standing, the court could not reach the merits of their challenges. Instead, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.