Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After her first termination from the City of Pasadena Police Department and subsequent reinstatement, plaintiff brought a lawsuit in state court claiming that she had been discriminated against and harassed by the City due to its perception that she had a disability. After her second termination, she reinstated her discrimination and harassment claims in an administrative proceeding, where she also argued that the termination was retaliatory. Both of plaintiff's actions resulted in a decision in favor of the City. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims in federal court based on the same theories in state proceedings. The court held that California principles of issue preclusion prevented the court from reaching these issues.

Plaintiff sued the Corps for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., by failing to interview him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. The court found that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' failure to interview and promote him. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps was reversed.

This case concerned a class action by civilly committed persons confined at Atascadero State Hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order denying defendants qualified immunity. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari, vacated the court's judgment, and remanded for reconsideration. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims for money damages. The conclusory allegations in plaintiffs' second amended complaint were insufficient to establish defendants' individual liability for money damages. On remand, plaintiffs could proceed with their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

This case involved an Oregon statute which adopted a special statute of limitations for abuse victims. Under the statute, an action must be commenced before the person reached age 40 or within five years of discovery of the causal connection between the abuse and the injury. At issue was the effect of this statute on plaintiff's federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that he was beaten by teachers at his elementary school from 1986-1988. The court concluded that Oregon's general statute of limitations, rather than the specialized abuse statute, governed plaintiff's claims and that federal, not state law, governed accrual of his claims.

Plaintiff, a continuing political committee, alleged that three provisions of Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The court held that Washington's disclosure requirements, Washington Revised Code, 42.17.090, and Washington Administrative Code 390-16-034, which required these committees to disclose the name and address of contributors giving more than $25, and additionally to disclose the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100, survived exacting scrutiny because they were substantially related to the important governmental interest in informing the electorate. The court held that Washington Revised Code 42.17.105(8), which prohibited a political committee from accepting from any one person contributions exceeding $5,000 within 21 days of a general election, was not closely drawn to achieve the state's important interest in informing the electorate. Therefore, section 42.17.105(8) was therefore unconstitutional as applied to ballot measure committees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose from claims that the federal government, with the assistance of major telecommunications companies, engaged in widespread warrantless eavesdropping in the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks. At issue was whether plaintiffs have standing to bring their statutory and constitutional claims against the government for what they described as a communications dragnet of ordinary American citizens. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were not abstract, generalized grievances and instead met the constitutional standing requirement of concrete injury; nor do prudential considerations bar the action; the claims did not raise a political question nor are they inappropriate for judicial resolution; and the court did not impose a heightened standing requirement simply because the case involved government officials in the national security context. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal on standing grounds and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint against government officials and a group of telecommunications companies. Plaintiffs challenged section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Section 802 allowed the U.S. Attorney General to certify that a telecommunications company provided assistance at the behest of the government in connection with investigation of terrorism, thereby triggering immunity on the theory that application of section 802 required dismissal of plaintiffs' case and negated the cause of action under various federal statutes. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiffs demanded no monetary damages. Consequently, the court need not reach the merits of the Takings Clause claim.

These consolidated appeals arose from claims that major telecommunications carriers assisted the government with intelligence gathering following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the telecommunications companies' participation in the surveillance program. At issue was the constitutionality of section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, which allowed for immunity for the telecommunications companies. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did not violate Articles I and III of the Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss was affirmed as to the challenged section 802 claims.

This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff, a minor who had been diagnosed with autism, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) hearing officer's decision that plaintiff's free and appropriate public education placement complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff also claimed that his tuition reimbursement request for the 2007-2008 school year was timely, and that Loveland Academy was his "stay put" placement. The court held that Loveland Acadamy was not plaintiff's stay put placement because the DOE only agreed to pay tuition for the limited 2006-2007 school year and never affirmatively agreed to place plaintiff at Loveland Academy. The court also concluded that plaintiff's tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school year was time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 individualized education programs complied with IDEA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court.