Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case arose when plaintiff, a neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse, sought an accommodation from her employer that would have allowed her an unspecified number of unplanned absences from her job. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on her reasonable accommodation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). The court held that plaintiff's performance was predicated on her attendance; reliable, dependable performance required reliable and dependable attendance. An employer need not provide accommodations that compromise performance quality. Because regular attendance was an essential function of a neo-natal nursing position, the court affirmed.

During the 2004 presidential campaign, plaintiffs, anti-Bush protestors, organized a demonstration at a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. Plaintiffs contended that Secret Service agents engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment by requiring that they demonstrate at a distance from the President because they were protesting - rather than supporting - his policies. In addition, plaintiffs maintained that the police officers who carried out the Secret Service agents' directions used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a claim against the Secret Service agents for violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have not, however, pleaded sufficient facts to sustain their Fourth Amendment claim against the police supervisors. Accordingly, the court held that the excessive force claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint and judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs' action sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 C.F.R. 1307.3, against them and for return or compensation for marijuana taken by the Government. Plaintiffs alleged that they consumed marijuana as a "sacrament/eucharist" in their religious ceremonies, and that their use was protected by the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2000bb-4. The court held that plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief arising from the Government's seizure of marijuana met the constitutional requirements and prudential factors for ripeness, and plaintiffs have associational standing to assert their claims. Strictly construing the "appropriate relief" provision in favor of the Government, the court concluded that RFRA did not authorize suits for money damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for compensation for the seized marijuana.

Plaintiffs alleged that section 31 of article I of the California Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and caused the unfair exclusion of African American, Latino, and Native American students from higher education. They sought to enjoin the Governor and the President of the University of California, Mark Yudof, from enforcing section 31. Yudof asserted that he was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that he was an improper defendant pursuant to Rule 21. Although the court held that plaintiffs' suit against Yudof was not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court held that plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to section 31 was precluded by Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, where the court previously upheld the constitutionality of section 31. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against the Governor and Yudof for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).

Plaintiff sued two Nevada Gaming Control Board agents under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. The court held that the district court erred when it reserved the issue of whether the agents had qualified immunity for the jury even though the parties did not materially dispute what facts the agents knew when they arrested plaintiff. The court also held that the agents did not violate clearly established rights by arresting plaintiff. Accordingly, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and the court reversed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of her brother Eric, appealed the judgment of the district court in favor of defendants. The complaint asserted a claim against defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by subjecting Eric to an unreasonable search and seizure and denying due process and the equal protection of the laws. A claim was also asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as several claims under Arizona law. The court reviewed the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and held, among other things, that the exclusion of testimony showing plaintiff's state of mind was both error and prejudicial and the exclusion of experts' opinions based on that testimony was equally error and prejudicial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff, a photojournalist, contended that viewing restrictions at a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) horse roundup violated her First Amendment right to observe government activities. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that most of the relief sought was moot because the roundup ended in October 2010. Alternatively, the district court concluded that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment. The court held that, because the preliminary injunction motion sought unrestricted access to future horse roundups, and not just the one that took place in 2010, the case was was not moot. With regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the district court erred by failing to apply the well-established qualified right of access balancing test set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the public had a First Amendment right of access to horse gathers, and if so, whether the viewing restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the government's overriding interests.

Petitioner, who is serving a sentence in Nevada State Prison, appealed the dismissal of his claims against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated several of his constitutional rights. The court held that petitioner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Correctional Officer Sean LaGier and failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Correctional Officer Joseph Rodriquez, but plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against Associate Warden Mary Carter and Correctional Officers Rosa Rodriguez, Sean LaGier, and Danilo Santos required further consideration. The district court should not have dismissed petitioner's state-law claims with prejudice. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.