Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the surviving spouse benefit provided by the city to its retired employees discriminated on the basis of sex. Plaintiff's theory of liability was that because, in the aggregate, the city paid a larger amount of money to the married retirees who selected the surviving spouse benefits than it did to single retirees who did the same, and male retirees were more likely to be married, the surviving spouse benefit had an unlawful disparate impact on female retirees. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's disparate treatment claim because she failed to allege intentional discrimination and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's disparate impact claim because, even assuming she had Article III stand, her claim failed as a matter of law.

Defendant, a city police officer, appealed from the denial of qualified immunity in plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court held that it was clearly established in December 2008 that a supervisor could not retaliate against a public employee for his or her subpoenaed deposition testimony offered as a citizen in the context of a civil rights lawsuit. The court agreed and affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs, a group of foster children, appealed the dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their substantive and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and violations of their statutory rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA), 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.; the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.; and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1431 et seq. The complaint alleged that the county's foster care system was plagued by systemic failures that resulted in violations of the rights guaranteed to foster children by federal statutes and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reversed the dismissal of Counts One, Two, Three, Eight, and Eleven; affirmed the dismissal of Counts Nine and Ten; and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should allow plaintiffs leave to amend their substantive due process claims, and plaintiffs could seek further leave to amend if they wished to add a claim under the IDEA's express cause of action.

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. 15301-15545, by failing to conduct a general election recount, in which plaintiff lost, in accordance with HAVA provisions. Because HAVA section 301 was not intended to benefit voters and candidates in local elections with respect to recounts, such individuals did not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of claims he brought against Board Members, in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that the Board Members deprived him of his constitutional rights when, in an ex parte emergency proceeding, they summarily suspended his authority to prescribe medication. The court held that the Board Members were absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims for money damages where they were functionally comparable to judges and their summary suspension authority was comparable to a judicial act. The court also held that Younger abstention barred plaintiff's claims for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case stemmed from a class action that began more than a quarter century ago where Idaho state prisoners at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) prevailed on their claims that, inter alia, because of deliberate indifference, without any connection to a legitimate penological purpose, the inmates were subjected to needless pain and suffering on account of inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The district court issued an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations and the injunctions remained in effect in 2008 and 2009 when the facts giving rise to this case occurred. The Portland law firm of Stoel Rives, LLP was appointed to represent the prisoner class. At issue on appeal was whether Stoel Rives was entitled to an attorneys' fee award in the class action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that, in this case, the judge had discretion to consider whether Stoel Rives's work on a motion to compel conformity to the injunction was "directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief." The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in awarding fees in a reasonable amount for bringing about that conformity with the injunction. Here, Stoel Rives's work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost. The firm showed no evidence of milking the case, and the fees were "directly and reasonably incurred." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections.

This case arose when the FCC found that Minority had "willfully and repeatedly" violated 47 U.S.C. 399b when it broadcasted paid promotional messages on its radio station from for-profit corporations. The statute was a a content-based ban on speech: public broadcasters could transmit many types of speech, but, unlike most other stations, they could not transmit three classes of advertising messages. Minority contended that section 399b was an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech because it banned all paid public issue and political speech while permitting promotional messages by non-profits. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the ban on the transmission of advertisements for goods and services by for-profit entities, but the court struck down as unconstitutional the ban on public issue and political advertisements.

Petitioner sought dismissal of the charges against him based on the claim that the state had violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the United States Constitution. The state courts summarily rejected the petitions and petitioner subsequently raised his claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 2241, requesting a permanent stay of the state criminal charges against him. The federal district court declined to reach the merits of petitioner's claim, holding that principles of federalism precluded review of the petition before petitioner had been tried and convicted in state court. The district court accordingly dismissed the petition without prejudice, leaving him free to raise his claim in a post-conviction habeas petition. Petitioner then appealed the district court's order, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his habeas petition based on abstention principles. The court clarified its rule that, absent specifically defined extraordinary circumstances, principles of federalism and comity prohibited a federal district court from entertaining a pre-conviction habeas petition that raised a Speedy Trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution. Further, McNeely v. Blanas did not alter that rule.