Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rodolfo Suarez appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the guilty verdict on that charge was fatally inconsistent with the jury's decision to acquit him on a charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant also appealed his sentence of 240 months' imprisonment, which the district court imposed based on the twenty-year mandatory minimum, contending that his 2003 guilty plea to felony drug possession in California state court did not qualify as a "prior conviction" that "has become final" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, holding that because Defendant's 2003 guilty plea and participation in a drug rehabilitation program resulted in neither a formal entry of judgment by the state court nor a sentence of imprisonment or probation, the district court erred in applying the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) to Defendant.

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 214.4 grams of actual methamphetamine. Defense counsel indicated that Defendant wanted his family members, including his wife and young son, present at the sentencing hearing. The district court, however, ordered that Defendant's family members be excluded from the sentencing proceedings after expressing displeasure at what it perceived as the manipulative use of Rivera's young son as a sentencing "prop." The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the district court's exclusion of his family members from the sentencing proceedings. Remanded for re-sentencing.

Defendant appealed his conviction and imposition of a sixty-month sentence following his entry of a plea of guilty to a single charge of possessing child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea, and Defendant's challenges to the grand jury instructions were untimely and therefore waived; but (2) vacated the supervised release portion of Defendant's sentence, holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide adequate analysis for the imposition of the residency restrictions in Defendant's lifetime term of supervised release. Remanded for resentencing.

Kennard Johnson was sentenced to eleven years, four months in the superior court of California following his entry of a plea of guilty to four theft-related counts for defrauding an auto dealership and stealing a vehicle. Johnson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court granted. Johnson appealed, challenging the adequacy of the district court's chosen remedy for the violation of Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and claiming that it was error for the district court to grant the writ subject to imposing a new sentence within the lawful maximum range. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Johnson's habeas petition but vacated the district court's remedy, holding (1) the district court's decision to grant the writ subject to the state court resentencing Johnson failed adequately to remedy the constitutional violation, as the ineffective assistance of counsel Johnson received affected the entire plea negotiation stage of the proceedings in the superior court; and (2) the district court should grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, subject to the state court vacating Johnson's conviction and granting him a new trial.

Chi Mak appealed his jury conviction of conspiring to violate export control laws and attempting to export a defense article to the People's Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the AECA and its implementing regulations do not violate Mak's First Amendment rights since the AECA is substantially related to the protection of an important governmental interest; (2) the court's instructions to the jury concerning technical data did not violate Mak's Due Process rights because they expressly required the government to prove that the documents at issue were not in the public domain; (3) the court's instructions to the jury on willfulness did not violate Mak's Sixth Amendment rights because they did not prevent the jury from fully deliberating as to whether Mak acted willfully, as required by the AECA; and (4) the documents at issue were covered by the United States Munitions List at the time Mak attempted to export them, and therefore, Mak's conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial.

Michelle Wing appealed the district court's revocation of her second term of supervised release, which had not yet commenced, based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her previously revoked first term of supervised release. Wing contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her second term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, under its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), the district court did not have jurisdiction under section 3583(e)(3) to revoke King's second term of supervised release based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her revoked term of supervised release, as subsection (e)(3) requires that the court find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of the term of supervised release that is being revoked.

Plaintiffs, operators of a shuttle service between Sesabe and Tucson, Arizona, alleged that Border Patrol agents stopped their shuttle repeatedly and in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs brought claims against the Border Patrol agents as well as the agents' supervisors, who they claimed reviewed and directed the stops. The court held that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim against any supervisory defendant other than Ralph Hunt, who directly participated in the alleged underlying violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to Hunt, but reversed and directed the entry of final judgment with respect to the remaining supervisors.

Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking damages for the 31 months during which they were barred from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium imposed by local officials on new projects. Plaintiffs asserted that the moratorium violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought damages against the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly related to the city's legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, the court held that the city did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants' determination, that plaintiff's psychological disorder made her unfit for reinstatement from disability retirement to active service with the Caltrans, deprived her of her right to a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111-12117. At issue was whether a state employee could sue state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of Title I of the ADA. The court concluded that Congress' inclusion of a comprehensive remedial scheme in Title I precluded section 1983 claims predicated on alleged violations of the ADA Title I substantive rights. The court also concluded that plaintiff's allegations of fact did not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.