Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case, which came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a second time, was one of many related to the United States government's Terrorist Surveillance Program. After the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation was investigated by the Treasury Department, Al-Haramain and two of its lawyers (Plaintiffs) filed suit, thinking they had been unlawfully surveilled. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the suit was not precluded by the state secrets privilege and remanded for consideration of whether FISA preempted the privilege. On remand, the district court (1) concluded that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) preempted the state secrets privilege; (2) held that 50 U.S.C. 1810 waived the United States' sovereign immunity; and (3) awarded the two individual Plaintiffs statutory damages and attorney's fees. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in predicating the United States' liability for money damages on an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under section 1810. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment awarding damages and attorney's fees to Plaintiffs, holding that section 1810 does not include an explicit waiver of immunity, nor was it appropriate to imply such a waiver.

At issue here was whether a court should apply the exclusionary rule where law enforcement agents attached mobile tracking devices to the underside of a defendant's car and used those devices to track the car's movements. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture marijuana but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the installation and use of the tracking devices was not a Fourth Amendment search. Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which holds that the government's installation of a GPS tracking device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted Defendant's certiorari petition, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded for consideration in light of Jones. The Ninth Circuit then affirmed, holding that pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. United States, suppression was not warranted here because the agents objectively relied on then-existing binding precedent when they attached tracking devices to Defendant's vehicle and used those devices to monitor the vehicle's movements.

Defendant was charged with six counts related to the sexual assault of his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Defendant denied than an assault occurred and claimed that he and Girlfriend had consensual sex. At trial, the court prevented Defendant from (1) presenting testimony from police witnesses to support his defense that Defendant made false claims against him in the past alleging physical or sexual assault, and (2) cross-examining Girlfriend about prior acts of prostitution. Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court's rulings denied him his constitutional right to present a complete defense and to confront the complaining witness under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's right to present a defense was unconstitutionally abridged, and the state court's conclusion to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded.

Petitioner, an Arizona state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was sentenced to death on each of two counts of felony murder. In this petition, Petitioner challenged his capital sentences, arguing that (1) the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona was unreasonable; (2) the Supreme Court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund and Tison to the facts of the case, holding it was not objectively unreasonable; (2) held the Supreme Court did not base its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) vacated the district court's judgment on Petitioner's third argument, holding that the district court did not err in finding Petitioner defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim by failing to fairly present the claim to the Arizona courts but remanding to allow the district court reassess whether Petitioner established cause and prejudice for the procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.

This opinion was a revised version of an earlier opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 24, 2012. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that, although the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search Defendant's room, they needed no such suspicion because Defendant was subject to suspicionless search as a condition of his probation. The holding in this case was based on United States v. Baker, in which the Ninth Circuit held that such searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In this revision, the Ninth Circuit overruled Motley v. Parks and later cases that relied on it, including Baker, to the extent they held that there was no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that these cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Samson v. California that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers. United States v. King, therefore, was vacated, and the case was referred to the original panel for disposition consistent with this opinion.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the appeal. On remand to the district court from a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Defendant contended his counsel was ineffective for presenting evidence at his sentencing hearing that he had suffered four head injuries and that these injuries affected his mental functions at the time of the murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to submit this additional evidence.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. This case was the second time Defendant sought habeas review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's first habeas petition. The State of Arizona subsequently issued a death warrant and set August 8, 2012 as Cook's execution date. Here Defendant asserted that his pretrial was ineffective and that his postconviction relief (PCR) counsel was ineffective. Defendant argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan required the district court to excuse his procedural default because of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in his state PCR proceedings. Defendant also asked the Court to stay his execution so he could further pursue his underlying pretrial IAC claim. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief for judgment under Martinez, holding that Martinez does not apply to this case; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a stay of execution, as Defendant's pretrial IAC claim lacked merit.

Defendant Rufino Valdes-Vega appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found in his truck. Defendant contended that the stop of his truck by border patrol agents seventy miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border violated the Fourth Amendment, and consequently, the cocaine found in his truck must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case did not provide border patrol agents with reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was smuggling drugs or aliens.

Marc and Claire Headley were two former ministers of the Church of Scientology International. Marc sued the Church and Claire sued the Church and the Religious Technology Center under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Act), making claims of forced labor and that the Church and Center psychologically coerced them to provide labor. Specifically, they contended that the Church and Center violated the Act by causing them to believe that they could not leave the ministry or that they would face serious harm in doing so. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) Marc's allegations of instances of physical force against him did not raise a triable issue of material fact on his forced-labor claim; and (2) Marc's and Claire's claims of psychologically coerced labor were barred by the ministerial exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Headleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether they were victims of forced-labor violations; and (2) the record did not allow the conclusion that the Church or Center violated the Act.