Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth appealed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated without cause from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs in violation of Article III, section 22 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Based on the meaning of Article III, section 22 determined by the final arbiter of Commonwealth law, the court held that plaintiff did not have a protected interest in continued employment beyond the term of the governor who appointed her. Therefore, plaintiff's termination without cause did not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded.

These consolidated appeals arose from a two-day execution of a search warrant by the Guam Police Department's (GPD) SWAT team in coordination with federal DEA and ATF agents. The search resulted in one of the largest busts of stolen items in Guam's history. The search took place on Raymond (Ray) and Lourdes (Lou) Duenas's compound. The district court denied Ray's and Lou's motions to suppress evidence of the drugs and stolen goods seized in the raid and their statements. A jury convicted Ray and Lou on multiple counts. The Ninth Circuit Court (1) reversed Ray's conviction, holding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the former testimony of by-then-deceased Officer Smith under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) because it incorrectly concluded that defense counsel had a similar motive to cross-examine Officer Smith when it questioned him at the suppression hearing as it would have had at the trial; (2) affirmed Lou's conviction, as it was supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) held that the district court did not err by deciding not to exclude the stolen items, drugs, and other paraphernalia found in the compound.

At issue was in this case was whether Petitioner, a California prisoner, was entitled to habeas corpus relief where Petitioner alleged violations that required the California state courts to suppress the incriminating statement he made after he expressly waived his Miranda rights. The California court of appeal affirmed Petitioner's conviction, concluding that Petitioner was required under Davis v. United States to unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Petitioner later filed a federal habeas petition. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on Petitioner's Miranda claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc. The Court reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief, holding that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded with directions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner was convicted of six murders in Arizona state court and was sentenced to death in 1998. Petitioner was also convicted of first-degree attempted murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and first-degree burglary. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on Jones's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the COA to include ineffective assistance of counsel allegations related to Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition, holding (1) on all contentions of prosecutorial misconduct, there was no fundamental unfairness to Petitioner and no due process violation; (2) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the prejudice prong of Strickland was not satisfied; and (3) therefore, Petitioner received a fair trial leading to his jury conviction, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the Arizona courts to deny habeas relief.

Defendant, a fifty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, appealed from his conviction, following a bench trial, of two counts of assault on a federal officer. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of the "reasonable apprehension of harm" prong of common law assault, and because the evidence would have been sufficient to convicted Defendant of attempted battery if the district court had not relied on the erroneous model jury instruction then in effect, the judgment of conviction on the second count was reversed and remanded for retrial under the proper standard; (2) the district court did not err in precluding Defendant from introducing evidence as part of a diminished capacity defense; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit mental health evidence in support of Defendant's theory of self-defense.

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal possession of a homemade machine gun under 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Defendant contended (1) he had a Second Amendment right to possess a homemade machine gun in his home, and (2) Congress did not have the power to enact section 922(o)'s prohibition against possessing machine guns pursuant to the powers delegated to it in the Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) machine guns are "dangerous and unusual weapons" that are unprotected by the Second Amendment; and (2) Defendant's second argument failed because the Court already held in United States v. Stewart that the Commerce Clause authorizes section 922(o)'s machine gun possession ban.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute various quantities of methamphetamine, including one quantity of more than 900 grams. The district court sentenced Defendant to 135 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not subject to sentencing entrapment because he had the intent and capacity to produce more than 900 grams of methamphetamine and acted on that intent without hesitation; (2) the district court did not err in failing to impose a two-point enhancement, as a defendant need not be personally involved in the importation of illegal drugs to receive the U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement for an offense involving the importation of a controlled substance; and (3) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable even though it was the same as his co-defendant's sentence, as the co-defendant cooperated with the government while Defendant did not.

This appeal raised the question of whether a civil detention under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which sets up a process for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, constitutes a term of imprisonment that both precludes and tolls the commencement of a supervised release term of a sex offender who has completed his incarceration for a criminal conviction. Following the expiration of his criminal sentence, Defendant was detained under the Act's stay-of-release provision. Though Defendant received no hearing during his stay period and was detained only pursuant to a civil statute, the government argued that Defendant was imprisoned in connection with a criminal conviction, thus tolling the commencement of his term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that, during the almost five years Defendant was detained while awaiting his civil commitment hearing, he was not "imprisoned in connection with a conviction," which was required to toll the commencement of supervised release.

Defendant appealed his convictions for illegal reentry, making a false statement in a passport application, and making a false statement in an application for supplemental security income benefits. These convictions rested on the government's allegation that Defendant was not a United States citizen. To prove that allegation, the government introduced a document appearing to be a transcription of Defendant's birth certificate from the Philippines. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the introduction of the birth certificate violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Four days after Plaintiff, a detective in the City of Burbank Police Department, disclosed the alleged use of abusive interrogation tactics by his colleagues to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, he was placed on administrative leave by the chief of police. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the chief of police and others in the Burbank Police Department, alleging that his placement on administrative leave was unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg controlled Plaintiff's case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that, under Huppert, Plaintiff's disclosure to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department was made in the course of his official duties, and thus fell outside the protection offered by the First Amendment.