Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought to install a temporary offsite sign advertising the television program "E! News" without obtaining the required City permits. Deeming the sign "strictly commercial in nature," the City notified plaintiffs that installation of the proposed sign would violate several provisions of its sign ordinance. The district court agreed with the City and granted judgment in its favor. The court held that, in light of plaintiffs' concessions that the E! News sign was an advertisement for a particular product and that it proposed a commercial transaction, the district court properly determined that the signs at issue were commercial speech and correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims. View "Charles, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants' failure to protect him from other inmates and by defendants' deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court concluded that an inmate's lack of awareness of a correctional institution's grievance procedure did not make the administrative remedy "unavailable" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), unless the inmate met his or her burden of proving the grievance procedure to be unknowable. Because plaintiff had not met his burden of proof, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Albino v. Baca, et al" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the aftermath of the shooting of Kristin Marie Maxwell-Bruce by her husband, Lowell Bruce. The Maxwells brought suit against several parties. These interlocutory appeals concern two sets of claims. First, the Maxwells alleged various constitutional violations by the Sheriff's officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Second, the Maxwells sought tort damages under California law against the Viejas defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers with regards to the Maxwell's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. The court reversed the district court's granting of the Viejas defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to tribal sovereign immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maxwell, et al v. County of San Diego, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against defendant, a prosecuting attorney, charging, among other things, that Idaho Code 18-606 violated various provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The prosecuting attorney had previously filed a felony criminal complaint against plaintiff, charging her with "the public offense of Unlawful Abortion" pursuant to section 18-606. The Idaho state district court subsequently dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice and the prosecuting attorney had not determined whether he would re-file the criminal complaint. In the class action suit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction, restraining the prosecuting attorney from enforcing section 18-606 and 18-608(1). Both parties appealed, raising several challenges. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff would likely succeed with her facial constitutional challenges to sections 18-606 and 18-609(1); affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to seek pre-enforcement relief against the enforcement of the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (PUCPA), Idaho Code 18-505; reversed the scope of the injunction to the extent that it granted relief beyond plaintiff; and reversed the district court's determination that plaintiff did not have standing to enjoin enforcement of section 18-608(2) in conjunction with section 18-606. View "McCormack v. Hiedeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of an electronic control device - commonly known as a "taser" - and sued police officers for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law wrongful death. At issue was whether a police officer had used constitutionally excessive force by repeatedly deploying a taser against a combative suspect and whether the manufacturer of that device had provided sufficient warning that its repeated use could lead to death. The deceased suspect had gouged out the eye of a family member, attempting to exorcize her demons, when police officers arrived at the scene. The court held that the taser provided sufficient warning as a matter of law. The court also held that, although the officers used significant force in this case, it was justified by the considerable government interests at stake. Because the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in using force, plaintiffs' state law claims against the officers for wrongful death could not succeed unless the use of the taser constituted deadly force and the use of the deadly force was not justified. The court concluded that it was not convinced that the use of the taser involved deadly force, but even if the taser qualified as deadly force, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances here failed to justify the use of deadly force. View "Marquez, et al v. City of Phoenix, et al" on Justia Law

In this appeal involving parental rights, the court previously published an opinion on a related issue in Mueller v. Auker and that opinion has the facts giving rise to this case. Here, the court held that Detective Rogers, along with Officers Snyder and Green, were entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit; the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Fourth Amendment claim; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the proffered testimony of Dr. Peter Rosen pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or in denying the Muellers' motion on this issue for a new trial; and the district court did not err in dismissing the Muellers' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against St. Luke's without leave to amend, because it was clear that amendment would be futile. The court addressed the remaining challenges and subsequently affirmed the judgment. View "Mueller, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, nine homeless individuals living in the "Skid Row" district of Los Angeles, charged that the City violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing and immediately destroying their unabandoned personal possessions, temporarily left on public sidewalks while plaintiffs attended to necessary tasks such as eating, showering, and using restrooms. Finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the district court enjoined the City from confiscating and summarily destroying unabandoned property in Skid Row. On appeal, the City argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protected homeless persons from government seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property. Accordingly, the court denied the City's appeal. View "Lavan, et al. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was removed from the Costa Mesa City Council meeting for an alleged violation of Costa Mesa Municipal Code 2-61, which made it a misdemeanor for members of the public who speak at City Council meetings to engage in "disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior." On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment facial challenge to the ordinance. Because section 2-61 failed to limit proscribed activity to only actual disturbances, the court reversed the district court's constitutionality ruling and found the statute facially invalid. However, the word "insolent" was easily removed from the ordinance without detriment to the purpose of section 2-61 and it need not be wholly invalidated since it was properly applied to plaintiff's disruptive behavior. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's determinations. View "Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, allegedly engaged in a romantic, but not sexual, relationship with a female prison guard. Plaintiff alleged that both during and after the relationship, the guard perpetrated sexual acts on him without his consent. He filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim and failure to protect claim, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the remaining claims at issue.