Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the cities, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., federal civil rights laws, and state laws stemming from the cities' demolition of his properties after declaring them nuisances. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim under federal law and that the statute of limitations barred his FHA claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by ordering the parties to brief the issue of whether plaintiff's complaints stated a claim under federal law; the district court properly considered the relevant evidence and did not err by excluding evidence plaintiff submitted; the district court did not err in concluding that the two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's FHA claims; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's complaint, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1981-83 claims, failed to state a claim under federal law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to alter or amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court concluded on remand that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on any ground. Determining that the court had jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant's decisions were motivated by racial animus; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant made stigmatizing comments about Plaintiff Jones that deprived Jones of his liberty interest to earn a living in his profession as a substance abuse counselor; and, therefore, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on the sections 1981 and 1983 claims. The court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Jones, et al. v. McNeese" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging deliberate indifference by the University to her rape by another student and state law violations including breach of contract, misrepresentation, and negligence following a back injury she received in training for the field hockey team. The district court granted summary judgment to the University. The court concluded that plaintiff had not demonstrated a genuine issue of matter fact as to whether the University acted with deliberate indifference in respect to her rape and its aftermath; although plaintiff's sexual assault was clearly devastating to her, plaintiff had not shown that the University violated Title IX in its response to it or otherwise; plaintiff had not created a genuine issue of material fact on her negligence claim because she had not presented evidence to show the University breached a duty to conform to a standard of care; the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's misrepresentation claims because she provided no evidence that any representations made to her were actually false; plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on her breach of contract claim; plaintiff has not shown that Judge Autrey abused his discretion by declining to recuse where alumni connections were not a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality; plaintiff has not shown error or abuse by the district court or violation of her due process rights where she failed to present her positions as required by the court rules for the orderly disposition of issues; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to extend discovery under Rule 56(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Roe v. St. Louis University, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, suffering from high-blood pressure, filed suit claiming that he became partially blind after treatment was delayed while in the Faulkner County, Arkansas jail. The court concluded that Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's medical-screening claim where there was no clearly established right to a general medical screening when admitted to a detention center and where he had less obvious signs of a serious medical condition; the County was was entitled to summary judgment on the medical-screening claim; at best, plaintiff's experts showed that Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin should have known that they were committing malpractice - but malpractice was not deliberate indifference; Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin were entitled to qualified immunity on whether medication should have been prescribed after several high blood-pressure readings; Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin were entitled to qualified immunity on whether they should have responded sooner to the missing medication at issue; at most, Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin were negligent, but deliberate indifference was more even than gross negligence; and since the County's prescription-delivery system may not be inextricably intertwined with Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin's treatment of plaintiff, the court lacked jurisdiction over the County's appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed judgment as to Dr. Stewart and Nurse Lumpkin on all claims, and as to the County on the medical-screening and delay-in-treatment claims. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the appeal of the claim against the County for delay in delivery, remanding for further proceedings. View "Fourte v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed sex- and pregnancy-based employment discrimination claims against Nationwide under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.6. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge, where, even if her supervisor's comment that it was best that plaintiff go home with her babies might support a finding of intent to force plaintiff to resign, plaintiff did not give Nationwide a reasonable opportunity to address and ameliorate the conditions that she claimed constituted constructive discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff waived her argument that she was actually discharged because she did not raise it in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Nationwide. View "Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating her constitutional rights. The district court denied the officers qualified immunity and the officers filed an interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that no reasonable police officer could actually believe that plaintiff's warrantless arrest was lawful, given the information supplied to the officers and the circumstances surrounding the arrest. The officers arrived at plaintiff's door when she was nursing her infant and lead her out of her home in handcuffs based on an invalid, recalled arrest warrant for failure to appear to contest a simple traffic violation. After she was given a strip search and body cavity search, plaintiff was detained in jail overnight, the first time she had been separated from her infant. Because the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the grounds of the warrantless arrest, the court did not address whether the humiliating indignities suffered by plaintiff as a result of the officers' conduct constituted an independent rationale for a section 1983 claim on unreasonable seizure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bechman v. Magill, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, after being acquitted of state law charges related to the possession of firearms, filed suit against the City and eight police officers, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers on his Fourth Amendment claim against them in their individual capacities. The court concluded that the officers did not exceed the scope of plaintiff's consent for them to be in the basement of his home where the officers had to walk through the basement to access another room; the warrant was supported by probable cause where the officers noticed two sawed off shotguns; the record did not reflect the deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth that violated the Fourth Amendment; and the officers had probable cause to arrest him on the state gun charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Fagnan v. City of Lino Lakes, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that recent amendments to Minnesota's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. 65B.41-71, violated the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the new provisions. The court concluded that the "inherently misleading" standard was broad enough in application to encompass 411-Pain's references to the $40,000 in potential insurance benefits. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(5). The court concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits in the ultimate litigation because the ads at issue were "inherently misleading" where 411-Pain's use of actors posing as persons of authority to sell its business extended a misleading aura of authorized approval to the services in question and where the disclaimer "PAID ACTOR" did not disclaim endorsement by the actors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(6). Finally, the court concluded that the requirements at issue in subsections 6(d)(1), 6(d)(2), and 6(d)(3) were constitutional and the court rejected plaintiffs' claims to the contrary. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "1-800-411-Pain Referral, et al. v. Leroy Otto, D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming malicious prosecution and violations of his civil rights. After plaintiff's attorney failed to comply with discovery deadlines, the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit with prejudice for failure to prosecute and failures to comply with a court order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that, in these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to impose the "ultimate sanction" of dismissal with prejudice without first considering the viability of lesser sanctions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Bergstrom v. Sgt. Michelle Frascone, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Timothy Geithner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that no senior-international-agent position was available to which plaintiff could be promoted based on his work in the "M" case and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the IRS's failure to promote him to a senior international agent for his work on the "M" case constituted a materially adverse employment action; failed to demonstrate unlawful retaliation because no reasonable juror could determine that the IRS undertook material adverse employment actions; and failed to demonstrate constructive discharge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "AuBuchon v. Geitner" on Justia Law