Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the State for violating section 102(a) of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a), and against Judge Gaertner, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for retaliating against her for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech. The court concluded that plaintiff was not an eligible employee covered by the FMLA because she was a member of the personal staff of the judge, who held a public elective office; although plaintiff's blog posts and other speech discussed her own case in detail, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's speech related to a matter of public concern; plaintiff's actions were sufficient evidence of disruption; plaintiff did not cite clearly established law putting the judge on notice that Pickering balancing in a situation such as this would fall in plaintiff's favor, nor did the court identify any such case law; and the district court correctly determined that the judge was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's section 1983 claim where the judge did not have notice that his termination of an insubordinate employee who compromised the propriety and efficiency of his courtroom could violate her right to free speech. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hemminghaus v. State of Missouri, et al." on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit against Audrain, alleging that Audrain violated federal civil rights statutes by refusing to consider David Lunceford to a vacant operating room nurse position on the basis of his sex. The district court concluded that Lunceford did not suffer an adverse employment decision because he never completed a Request for Transfer form so Audrain never made a decision to deny him the position. In light of the evidence, the court concluded that Lunceford did not make every reasonable attempt to convey his interest in the position and the district court did not err in concluding that the EEOC did not establish a claim of employment discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that, during his incarceration as a pretrial detainee, he received constitutionally deficient medical care and that medical officials used excessive force against him while responding to his medical emergency. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Johnson's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to show that the doctor acted with deliberate indifference; affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Nurse Smith where plaintiff has not identified any evidence that the nurse ever refused or failed to treat him; affirmed the grant of Nurse Anderson's and Nurse Washburn's motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive-force claim; and concluded that, in this case, a nurse's act of hitting plaintiff's nose was a de minimus use of force that was not actionable under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Tucker v. Holladay, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the County and the sheriff after he was terminated as deputy sheriff. The court concluded, under the Pickering/Connick balancing test, that at least some of plaintiff's campaign speech does not merit First Amendment protection; that even if plaintiff's speech was fully protected by the Constitution, the sheriff could have reasonably believed that the speech would be at least potentially damaging and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and among coworkers in the sheriff's office and detrimental to the close working relationships and personal loyalties necessary for an effective and trusted local policing operation; considering North Dakota law and well-established federal and state jurisprudence, the sheriff could have logically and rationally believed that his decision to terminate plaintiff was well within his duties as a public official; and that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity to shield him from any liability. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the sheriff's motion for summary judgment. View "Nord v. Walsh County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a public transit officer and Metropolitan Council under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer violated plaintiff's constitutional rights when the officer arrested plaintiff at a downtown bus stop. The court concluded that the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest based on plaintiff's nonverbal conduct and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim; though the court agreed that the use of force in this case may have been unreasonable, and acknowledged that plaintiff described being pepper sprayed as a painful experience, plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he suffered more than de minimus injury; therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's retaliatory arrest claim because the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest; but the officer was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity from plaintiff's retaliatory use of force claim where plaintiff's First Amendment right to make comments and to obtain the officer's badge number was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Kopp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that plaintiff was unable to show a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show circumstances which would give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff also failed to show direct or inferential evidence his employer engaged in retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Young v. Builders Steel Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, CBE, under 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBE. The court concluded that, even considering the otherwise time-barred acts that were similar to the acts that occurred within the limitations period, plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her hostile work environment claim. The twelve incidents of alleged harassment that occurred after March 1, 2007, as well as the similar acts that occurred before then, taken together are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to show that plaintiff's work environment was objectively offensive. Having affirmed the district court's decision on the hostile work environment claim, the court need not further address plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Clay v. Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as trustee for the next of kin of her deceased son, filed suit against five police officers and the city, alleging violations of the son's (1) Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (2) the Minnesota wrongful death statute, Minn. Stat. 573.02. The court concluded that Officer Devick was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions during his initial encounter with the son where a reasonable officer faced with the same circumstances would not have known that the decision to kick and hit the son in an attempt to detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the second encounter with the son where plaintiff failed to establish that the punches, kicks, knee strikes, and tasers they used on the son were unconstitutional. Even if the conduct was unconstitutional, it was not clearly established at the time. The court agreed with the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence showing that the officers intentionally apprehended the son in a way that they believed was prohibited by law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity and dismissal of the wrongful death claim against the individual officers. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the city. View "Smith v. City of Minneapolis, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was arrested for violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095, which prohibits flag desecration, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cape Girardeau, the arresting police officer, and the prosecuting attorney. Both the arresting officer and attorney stated that they were unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which struck down statutes criminalizing flag desecration as unconstitutional. Plaintiff's charges were dismissed against him and he was released from jail. On appeal, the officer challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and award of attorney's fees. The State, which intervened, appealed the district court's order declaring its flag desecration statute facially unconstitutional and the award of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonably competent officer in his position would have known that plaintiff's expressive conduct was constitutionally protected and would have concluded no arrest warrant should issue for the expressive conduct engaged in by plaintiff. The court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095 was overbroad and criminalizes a substantial amount of expressive activity. Further, the statute was not susceptible to an appropriate narrowing construction and, therefore, the district court did not err in holding the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the officer and the state jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and costs; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees based on the rate for the St. Louis legal market, instead of Cape Girardeau; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Cape Girardeau. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Snider, III v. Peters" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated after Sgt. Earl Eaton pepper-sprayed him when he refused to return to his cell after showering, and Cpl. Renita White turned off the water, preventing him from rinsing off the pepper spray for ten to fifteen minutes. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim where plaintiff was warned that he would be pepper-sprayed if he did not comply with the order to "catch the cuffs," plaintiff threw an object or spit on Eaton three times, and Eaton deployed a small amount of pepper spray after each act of defiance. Further, there was no specific evidence of malicious motive to harm, or evidence that the force used was excessive. The court concluded that Eaton was entitled to qualified immunity on the delayed decontamination claim where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Eaton acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of White's claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Burns v. Eaton, et al." on Justia Law