Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Planned Parenthood brought this equitable action against the Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota in their official capacities, seeking to enjoin enforcement of revisions enacted in 2005 to the South Dakota law on informed consent to abortion. The court held that because Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds upheld the human being advisory against a facial challenge, the district court did not err in doing the same in this case. The court also held that the district court erred in holding the relationship advisories unconstitutional where they could be constitutionally applied to a "large fraction" of the women to whom they were relevant. The court further held that the district court did not err in granting Planned Parenthood summary judgment as to the suicide advisory where it violated due process and doctors' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech that was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant. The court finally held that the district court did not err in upholding the risk advisory where Planned Parenthood had not shown that the risk advisory would cause confusion in any case, let alone the quantum of cases required to sustain a facial challenge.

A grand jury indicted defendant, an African-American, for conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, which then carried a 10-year mandatory minimum. The grand jury also indicted defendant's former husband, who is white, for conspiracy to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, which then carried a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution and denial of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss where defendant offered no credible evidence that race or gender played a role in the government's charging decision. The court also held that defendant offered no credible evidence of discriminatory purpose. The court further held that defendant had not shown any credible evidence of purposeful discrimination and the district court properly denied an evidentiary hearing.

Appellee applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1382. The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration subsequently appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the ALJ permissibly discounted appellee's testimony and that the district court substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ in concluding otherwise. In the alternative, the Commissioner asserted that even if the ALJ erred, the district court should have remanded for additional proceedings and erred in directing the entry of an award of benefits. The court held that valid reasons supported the ALJ's adverse credibility determination and that substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's determination that appellee could perform sedentary work as long as he had the option of alternating between sitting and standing. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for the district court to affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff, an inmate in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), alleged that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendants violated the First Amendment when defendants received notice that a magazine plaintiff had ordered was rejected from the mailroom because it was too violent. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint where his allegations were sufficient to plausibly state a claim under section 1983 and, at this extremely early stage of the litigation, there was a reasonable inference that SDSP's policy was unconstitutionally applied to the censored publication. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Appellant appealed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Lake Lotawana, and its mayor, and the subsequent dismissal of her wrongful termination and retaliation claims. On appeal, appellant contended that the city breached her employment contract and that she established triable issues of fact as to her retaliation claims. The court held that the city was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's wrongful termination claim where she did not have an enforceable contract or viable tort claim. The court also held that appellant was terminated because of her inappropriate activities and therefore, the dismissal of appellant's retaliation claims was affirmed because nothing in the record indicated that her opposition to unlawful discrimination was a contributing factor to her termination. The court further held, for the same reasons, that appellant could not succeed under the more stringent standard applied in the Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer in a wrongful-termination suit brought pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 38 U.S.C. 4316. The court held that appellant failed to raise a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer's conduct was reasonable and whether the employer had notice that such conduct would be a ground for discharge because the employer's decision to terminate appellant was reasonable where appellant violated a clear written policy by failing to personally report his absences.

Plaintiff sued his former music teacher, the Logan-Rogersville R-VII School District, and the school principal, asserting nine different claims stemming from the teacher's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims and denying his motion to amend his complaint. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 were time-barred where plaintiff's complaint established that his cause of action accrued in 1992 when he was 15 years old, the statute of limitations was tolled until his 21st birthday, and he had five years, until November 22, 2003, to file his complaint. The court also held that plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title IX were also time-barred where both claims relied on the state's statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims and Missouri imposed a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120.4. For the same reasons, plaintiff's state-law claims were time barred by section 516.120.4. The court further held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse claim was affirmed where Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.046 required him to commence his action within five years of his 18th birthday. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's sexual abuse claim against the school district and principal and the district court did not err in denying as futile plaintiff's motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued Judge Larry Williams for wrongful termination, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Family Medical leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Williams terminated plaintiff's employment because of the letter plaintiff wrote to the editor of a local paper in 2007 regarding the judge's financial committee. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams in his individual capacity on plaintiff's FMLA claims where plaintiff failed to argue how Williams personally received adequate notice and, given the undisputed record that Williams generally delegated the operation of the Road Department to others. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his First Amendment claims; erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his official-capacity claims under the FMLA; but properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff on his individual-capacity FMLA claims against Williams.

Appellant filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it wrongfully denied (or delayed) her promotion and subsequently, wrongfully terminated her. Appellant challenged four of the district court's interlocutory orders, contended that the district court erred by awarding costs to the employer, and asserted that the district court erroneously dismissed some of her claims and erroneously granted summary judgment to the employer on her remaining claims. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where it repeatedly attempted to accommodate appellant despite her attorney's repeated failures to comply with court orders and court-imposed deadlines. The court also held that appellant had not shown that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs to the employer. The court further held that the district court did not err by dismissing appellant's duplicative claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claim under the Ledbetter Act, which she attempted to add without permission from the employer or leave from the court. The court finally held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the hostile work environment claim and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615, claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Minnesota Law Enforcement Association (MLEA) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), concluding as a matter of law that the MLEA's retirement plan arbitrarily discriminated against older employees on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623. The court held that this exclusively age-based reduction in benefits typified "arbitrary age discrimination" and therefore failed to meet the ADEA's safe harbor requirements. The court also held that, although the Department of Corrections was not obligated under federal law to employ certain persons over the age of 55 for reasons that could include age, it could not discriminate against all persons over age 55 solely due to their age. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.