Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), where he practiced his Jewish faith, filed suit claiming that certain SDSP officials violated his Firth Amendment free exercise rights by denying his requests to erect and eat his meals within a succah in the SDSP recreation yard. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), barred plaintiff from recovering compensatory damages because his suit contained no allegation of physical injury. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting the officials qualified immunity because plaintiff had failed to allege violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff claimed that her termination by EMC because of excessive work absences unlawfully interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) and (a)(2). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing her claims because a reasonable jury could conclude that her protected leave was a "negative factor" in her termination. The court held that the undisputed facts showed that EMC would have made the same adverse decisions whether or not plaintiff was afforded the retroactively designated FMLA leave; the district court did not err in dismissing her retaliation claim as invalid; the district court properly rejected plaintiff's alternative pretext theories; and, as plaintiff failed to present evidence creating an issue of fact as to whether EMC's non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext for FMLA retaliation, the district court properly granted summary judgment.

In citizen initiatives, Roundtable submitted thirteen proposed constitutional amendments to the Missouri secretary of state. The statutory process required state officers to prepare a summary statement, fiscal note summary, and fiscal note for each proposed constitutional amendment. Roundtable alleged in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action that the summaries prepared by the secretary of state and the state auditor "continuously and persistently stymied and frustrated" its intended messages in violation of its constitutional rights and Missouri statute 116.334. The court held that Roundtable lacked standing to raise its First Amendment challenges and its action involved uncertain or contingent future events not yet ripe for judicial review. On the merits, Roundtable's First Amendment claim failed because, inter alia, it had not shown any restriction on its ability to circulate petitions or otherwise engage in political speech. The court further held that the district court did not err in dismissing Roundtable's due process claims and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Roundtable's state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Landlords Moving brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against defendants. Landlords Moving alleged that deputy sheriffs executed an illegal kickback scheme in which they funneled eviction business to private moving companies in exchange for cash payments. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim against all three defendants and entered a final judgment under Rule 54(b). Landlords Moving appealed. The court reversed the dismissal of Landlords Moving's claim against defendant Laurie Main for alleged violations of Landlords Moving's rights under the First Amendment; reversed the dismissal of Landlords Moving's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to that claim; and affirmed the dismissal of all other claims and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on their race and discrimination retaliation claims. The court held that, even assuming both husband and wife presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, they both have failed to present adequate proof to overcome AGC's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions - limiting wife's cross-training opportunities and terminating husband. The court also held that wife did not produce sufficient evidence to indicate AGC's employment actions allegedly denying her cross-training were retaliatory in nature and husband did not provide evidence that his termination was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on all claims.

Plaintiff, born in Jordan, filed suit alleging that the City discriminated against him based on his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court affirmed and held that plaintiff failed to establish that Captain Adler was a decisionmaker and thus had not presented direct evidence of discrimination; the record failed to support an inference that Adler's discriminatory animus was a proximate cause of the police chief's decision to forego hiring plaintiff for a full-time position; plaintiff failed to establish that he was a more qualified candidate; and the police chief's explanation had some basis in fact and did not support an inference of pretext.

Plaintiff, an Arkansas inmate, appealed following the district court's disposition of her claims against Sergeant Donavion, the sole remaining defendant in her 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The court concluded that plaintiff administratively exhausted her constitutional claims arising from the confiscation of her Catholic Bible, rosary beads, and other religious materials during a cell shakedown, and the subsequent failure to return these items. The court also concluded that trialworthy issues existed on these claims. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the claims against Donavion and remanded for further proceedings.

An Arkansas jury found in favor of plaintiff on her Title VII claims of race discrimination and constructive discharge against the school district and individual members of the County's Board of Education and awarded her compensatory damages, wage and fringe benefits, and punitive damages. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that, under the circumstances, it believed that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude defendant was constructively discharged. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to grant the Rule 50 motion on that claim. The court held that the jury was not instructed to consider whether the individual Board members affirmatively proved ignorance of federal law when discriminating against defendant on the basis of her race. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's Rule 50 motion vacating the punitive damage award, but remanded this issue to the district court. Because the court's resolution of the constructive discharge claim and the punitive damage awards directly affected the degree of success plaintiff obtained in her civil rights action, the court remanded the issue of attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants alleging, among other claims, that officers used excessive force against her in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Justin Hooper. Officer Hooper performed a "leg sweep" on plaintiff while trying to stop her from striking her boyfriend. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Officer Hooper used excessive force against plaintiff based on the physical distance between plaintiff and her boyfriend at the time of the incident, the nature of the crime at issue (disorderly conduct), and the degree of the injury suffered. The court also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where the right Officer Hooper allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

The EEOC filed suit against CRST, one of the country's largest interstate trucking companies, alleging that CRST subjected Monika Starke "and approximately 270 similarly situated female employees" to a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The EEOC alleged that CRST was responsible for severe and pervasive sexual harassment in its New-Driver Training program. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims as to Starke because the EEOC, suing as plaintiff in its own name under section 706 of Title VII, could not be judicially estopped because of Starke's independent conduct; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of Tillie Jones because the EEOC had produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine fact issue as to the severity or pervasiveness of harassment that she allegedly suffered; vacated, without prejudice, the district court's award of attorneys' fees to CRST because CRST was no longer a "prevailing" defendant under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k); and affirmed the remainder of the district court's orders and remanded for further proceedings.