Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After law enforcement officers entered Defendant's property without a warrant, the officers obtained a state search warrant to search the property. The search revealed the presence of a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was charged with manufacturing and attempting to manufacture 100 or more marijuana plants. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Defendant to 120 months' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that in light of the circumstances, the district court correctly found that the officers acted in a constitutionally reasonable manner and that the evidence need not be suppressed.

Defendant challenged the sentence he received after pleading guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute more than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base. Defendant specifically challenged the district court's application of the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which applies when a defendant is convicted of a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Defendant argued that the government failed to establish that his prior Arkansas convictions for second-degree battery and second-degree sexual assault qualified as "crimes of violence" under section 4B1.1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) second-degree sexual assault in Arkansas is a crime of violence, and the district court did not err by determining that Defendant's conviction for second-degree sexual assault was for a crime of violence; but (2) because the district court did not provide the government or Defendant with an opportunity to proffer evidence on whether the second-degree battery conviction was for a crime of violence, the case was remanded for resentencing to determine whether Defendant was a career offender under the guidelines.

This was Defendant's second appeal in this child pornography case. In the first appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Defendant's conviction for both receiving child pornography and possessing child pornography violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court therefore reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate one of Defendant's convictions and to resentence Defendant on the remaining count. On remand, the district court vacated the lesser-included possession count and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it chose to vacate the possession conviction instead of the receipt count; (2) Defendant's 120-month sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's special conditions of supervised release.

A jury convicted Defendant of receipt of child pornography. Defendant was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the conviction and that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to introduce into evidence images of child pornography and erred in imposing certain enhancements and an unreasonable sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the images of child pornography into evidence; (3) the district court did not err in imposing the enhancements; and (4) the sentence was reasonable.

A jury convicted Defendant Jeroba Wright of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant as an armed career criminal to 180 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a continuance; (2) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Armed Career Criminal Act by counting Defendant's two prior burglary convictions as independent predicate offenses under the Act.

Defendant pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court sentenced Defendant to eighty-four months' imprisonment, followed by three years' supervised release. Defendant challenged his sentence on appeal. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion granting departures under four separate guidelines; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by increasing Defendant's sentence by six months after he smile at sentencing, as the court may consider a defendant's attitude and demeanor when exercising its sentencing discretion, and the court based its increase in the sentence not solely on the smile, but a combination of it and other factors.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, Charles Watson filed a motion to vacate the 165-month sentence he received after he pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. The district court summarily denied the motion because Watson waived the right to bring a section 2255 motion in his plea agreement. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the waiver was enforceable to the extent Watson claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in matters directly related to his plea agreement. The Court affirmed after addressing the merits of Watson's argument, holding that Watson could not establish he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the relief Watson requested without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Justin Deatherage pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography downloaded to his computer. After a two-day contested hearing, the district court sentenced Deatherage to seventy months in prison and ten years of supervised release. Deatherage appealed four special conditions of supervised release. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) banning possession of all sexually oriented materials during Deatherage's ten years of supervised release; (2) banning use of any computer or device without first receiving written permission from the probation officer; (3) imposing the condition that Deatherage participate participate in sexual offender treatment and abstain from the use of alcohol throughout the course of treatment; and (4) requiring Defendant to disclose business and personal financial information upon request of the probation office.

Defendant Javier Garcia-Hernandez was found guilty by a jury of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home, as the search warrant was supported by probable cause; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain testimony at trial; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conspiracy conviction.

Ray Dansby was convicted by a jury in Arkansas on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The district court denied Dansby's application for a writ of habeas corpus. Dansby appealed on five claims covered by a certificate of appealability and asked the Eighth Circuit to expand the certificate with respect to four other claims. The Eighth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's rejection of three of Dansby's claims; (2) vacated the dismissal of two claims in Dansby's second amended petition, holding (a) the district court erred in determining that Dansby failed to present a Sixth Amendment claim to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and (b) the district court's dismissal of Dansby's Brady-Napue claim on the ground it was procedurally defaulted was improper, as the parties were not afforded adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue of procedural default; (3) denied the applications to expand the certificate; and (4) remanded for further proceedings.