Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and attempting to escape from a correctional institution. The district court sentenced Defendant to 264 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed his sentence, alleging procedural error in the district court's calculation of the offense level, its refusal to award Defendant a one-point reduction of his offense level for timely notice of an intent to plead guilty, and its lack of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) notice before imposing the sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found no error on these issue but remanded to the district court for an explanation of the reasons for the two-month upward variance from the Guidelines range of 210-262 months' imprisonment.

Defendant Jose Villa-Madrigal was charged with possession of five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of the vehicle he was driving that was conducted by an Arkansas highway patrolman. After a suppression hearing, the district court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant subsequently entered an unconditional guilty plea, which was accepted. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument was foreclosed by his guilty plea, which was knowing and voluntary.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Thomas Frederick was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, sexual contact with a minor, and tampering with a witness. The district court sentenced Frederick to 145 months in prison. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the district court's decision to disallow him from asking the complainants about prior accusations of sexual abuse, and the district court did not err in concluding that the probative value of allowing Appellant to cross-examine the complainants on these matters was substantially outweighed by the danger of mini-trials and confusion of the jury; and (2) the district court did not err in prohibiting Appellant from presenting testimony of a certain witness at trial.

Defendant pled guilty to unauthorized access to a protected computer, aggravated identity theft, threats to the Vice President of the United States, possession of child pornography, and distribution of child pornography. The district court sentenced Defendant to 216 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its application of two-level enhancements under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice, or U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(7)(A) because Defendant's offenses involved at least ten images of child pornography. In addition, the Court found that Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable.

Rogers Group, Inc. brought suit in district court against the City of Fayetteville, seeking to prevent the enforcement of the City's ordinance regulating rock quarries in or near the City's corporate limits. The district court granted Rogers Group's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the ordinance prior to its enforcement date. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The City then repealed the ordinance. Rogers Group moved for attorneys' fees and costs, arguing that it was a prevailing party. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Rogers Group was entitled to a fee award under 42 U.S.C. 1988 even though the court never reached the constitutional claims because the allegations in the complaint raised a substantial constitutional claim sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Rogers Group was a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988 even though the district court never reached its constitutional claims.

Defendant Kirby David pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced David to 72 months' imprisonment. David appealed, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an upward variance. Specifically, David argued that the court gave undue weight to the sentence imposed for his previous felony conviction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering David's previous sentence as a "benchmark" for finding the punishment that was apparently necessary to deter David from repeating his criminal behavior.

After Defendant pled guilty to one count of possessing child pornography, Defendant pled guilty to failure to appear (FTA). The district court imposed two concurrent terms of supervised release, which the court subsequently revoked. Following the second revocation, the district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-four months' imprisonment and imposed and eighteen-month term of supervised release solely on the FTA count. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the supervised release portion of Defendant's revocation sentence, holding (1) the district court erred when it sentenced Defendant eighteen months' supervised release on the FTA count; but (2) the district court did not err when it imposed the maximum term of supervised release in addition to a term of imprisonment.

On February 27, 2010 and March 25, 2010, Defendant sold cocaine base to a confidential informant. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of at least five grams of cocaine base. Before his September 29, 2011 sentencing hearing, Defendant submitted a memoranda urging the district court to apply the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which had taken effect on August 3, 2010. Retroactive application of the FSA would have had the effect of reducing Defendant's statutory maximum term of imprisonment. The district court denied Defendant's request, consistent with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Sidney, which held that the FSA was not retroactive, even as to defendants who were sentenced after the enactment of the FSA where their criminal conduct occurred before the enactment. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently abrogated Sidney and ruled that the FSA's provision applies to offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 2010 but were not sentenced until after August 3. The Eighth Circuit accordingly vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

After a seven-day trial, a jury found Troy Solomon and Dr. Christopher Elder guilty of conspiring to dispense and distribute and aiding and abetting the distribution of hydrocodone, alprazolam, and promethazine from a Missouri pharmacy to Houston, Texas. The jury also convicted Solomon of conspiring to commit money laundering. Following the jury verdict, the government filed a motion for an order of forfeiture in the amount of $991,114. On appeal, Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions and forfeitures, and Elder argued the district court abused its discretion in not severing his trial from Solomon's. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendants' convictions; (2) the total forfeiture judgment was proper; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Elder's motion for severance.

Dr. Leonard Onyiah, a black man born in Nigeria, sued St. Cloud State University and the Board of Trustees of Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (collectively, the University) for wage discrimination based on race, national, origin, and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age of Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to the University, dismissing all claims with prejudice. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Onyiah's Title VII and ADEA claims; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony of a professor of mathematics at the University.