Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base. Defendant committed his offense prior to passage of the Fair Sentencing Act but was indicted, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced after the Act's passage. Defendant argued at sentencing that he should be sentenced in accordance with the Act. The district court, following the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' precedent in United States v. Sidney, held the Act did not apply to Defendant. As such, the court imposed a sixty-month mandatory minimum term of incarceration and a four-year mandatory minimum term of supervised release. Subsequent to Defendant's sentencing, the Supreme Court abrogated the Eighth Circuit's precedent, finding the Act applicable to defendants in Defendant's position. The Eighth Circuit (1) affirmed the imposition of the sixty-month term of incarceration, holding it was neither unreasonable nor unsupported by adequate explanation; and (2) reversed for reconsideration the term of supervised release. Remanded.

Defendant waived indictment and was charged by information with structuring financial transactions for the purpose of evading currency-transaction reporting requirements and with evading taxes. The district court, varying upwards from Defendant's guidelines range, sentenced him to sixty-months' imprisonment for his illegal structuring charge and ten months' imprisonment for his tax evasion charge and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. The court also ordered restitution in the full amount of the underlying fraud. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, holding (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in determining Defendant's sentence; and (2) the district court did not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it criticized his attorney for advising him not to cooperate with the probation office in preparing his presentence investigation report.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 200 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) nothing in the record established that the conduct engaged in by the government during grand jury proceedings required dismissal of the indictment; (2) the district court did not err in admitting certain evidence; and (3) the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument, but the trial record taken as a whole did not show that Defendant was entitled to reversal of his convictions.

A jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The presentence report classified Defendant as a career offender with a sentencing guidelines range of 360 months to life, and a district court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant later brought a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that, pursuant to Johnson v. United States, his conviction for manslaughter in the second degree under Minn. Stat. 609.205, which contributed to his classification as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, was not a crime of violence. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Sun Bear v. United States, Defendant's motion under section 2255 was not cognizable.

Minnesota State Patrol Captain Thomas Fraser detained Plaintiff at the site of the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Plaintiff, an experienced bridge and construction safety consultant, discussed the cause of the collapse with the media at the time of the collapse. Later, Plaintiff went to the site to investigate. Fraser turned Plaintiff over the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD). An MPD officer handcuffed Plaintiff and transported him to the police department. Plaintiff was released later that night. Plaintiff sued Fraser and others asserting, among other things, false arrest and First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fraser. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding no constitutional violation in Plaintiff's arrest; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the presence of probable cause to arrest Defendant for trespass defeated his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.

Plaintiff was arrested under the authority of St. Louis Ordinance 17.16.270, which prohibits conduct, including speech, that has the consequence of impeding pedestrians or vehicular traffic. After the City dropped the charges against him, Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a facial challenge to the St. Louis ordinance. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding the ordinance to be a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it did not provide fair notice of what conduct was prohibited, and it excessively chilled protected speech.

Plaintiff sued the County of Dakota, Nebraska, and former sheriff's deputy Rodney Herron, alleging Title VII violations, sexual harassment, and violation of the Equal Pay Act. The County advanced a limited offer to settle the Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims, which Plaintiff accepted. Plaintiff then sought an award of attorney's fees on the partial judgment, and the district court ultimately awarded $24,500 in attorney's fees to Williams in two separate orders. The district court certified its orders as final judgments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) so as to allow for an interlocutory appeal. Defendants appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court abused its discretion by entering final judgment under Rule 54(b).

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government wherein he pled guilty to arson and aiding and abetting arson. The government agreed it would recommend a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. At sentencing the government recommended a sentence at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The district court denied the request and instead departed upward under the United States Sentencing Commission. The court then sentenced Defendant to sixty months of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable; and (2) there was no breach of the plea agreement by the government.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a rental vehicle, as consent for the search was validly obtained, and thus, the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the discovery of drugs and a firearm in the vehicle was not a fruit of Defendant's detention, and thus, the Court did not need to decide whether Defendant's initial detention violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) Defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on six counts related to willfully causing bodily injury to another because of that person's race, color, or national origin in violation of certain provisions of the Shepard-Byrd Hate Crimes Prevention Act. The district court sentenced Defendant to 135 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding (1) 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(1) was constitutional; (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (4) the district court did not err in failing to sua sponte grant Defendant a minor role adjustment.