Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Lee was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide plus two counts of armed robbery, based on evidence that he and Thomas traveled to Meyers’s residence in Oshkosh, to collect a drug debt. Four people were present when they arrived: Meyers’s half-brother Johnston, Meyers’s friend Paez and her two-year-old daughter, and Meyers. A fight broke out; Lee pulled a gun and fatally shot Meyers in the abdomen. Lee and Thomas left the apartment and drove to Milwaukee where they met with Johnson. Johnson drove them to a gas station and then dropped Lee off at a street corner. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Thomas were pulled over by Milwaukee police and arrested. Lee was apprehended in Chicago a month later. Lee’s conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an in-court identification of Lee violated his rights to due process and that admission of an out-of-court statement at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. An adequate and independent state ground precluded consideration of Lee’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Lee v. Baenen" on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested Venson for possession of a controlled substance and solicitation of an unlawful act, and he spent 19 days in jail. After a preliminary hearing resulted in the dismissal of charges for want of probable cause, Venson sued the officers involved in his arrest for false arrest, illegal search, and malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties had differing accounts of the events that resulted in the arrest, which apparently involved someone in the vicinity yelling “rocks.” A jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “This was a swearing contest, and nothing precluded the jury from crediting the defendants’ account of what occurred.” View "Venson v. Altamirano" on Justia Law

Aurora hired Gosey as a chef’s assistant in 2008. In September 2009 she applied for an open position as food-services manager at the hospital. The job posting stated a preference for someone with “five to seven years of progressively responsible experience in managing a food service operation,” including experience in managing “staff, budgets and multiple human resources functions.” There were more than 150 applicants. Aurora interviewed Gosey, but ultimately hired a white woman. Gosey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging that she had been denied the promotion, was assigned extra duties, and disciplined for sham infractions because of her race. She accused Aurora’s managers of trying to manufacture an excuse to fire her by altering her attendance records. Two months later, Aurora fired her. Gosey sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The district court granted Aurora summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to claims of harassment and failure to promote, but concluded that further proceedings are necessary on claims that Aurora fired Gosey because of race and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.View "Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Since 1994, Harper has served as Fulton County Treasurer, an elected position with a four-year term. The 21-member County Board sets salaries for elected officials. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and County Clerk were paid the same salary. When Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his retirement, the board increased his salary in order to allow him to receive greater retirement benefits. From 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were paid the same salary from 2007–2010. In the meantime, disputes between Harper and the Board apparently prompted the Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the County Treasurer’s salary in 2010. The Board adopted the recommendation, 10–8, but voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk annual pay raises. Harper filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging sex discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harper failed to show that the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her reports were merely excuses covering sex discrimination. View "Harper v. Fulton Cnty." on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Davis, in prison following a guilty plea, sought federal collateral relief more than a year had expired, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) had expired. He claimed equitable tolling, asserting that his mental limitations excused untimely filing. A magistrate judge found that ability to make such a motion indicated mental competence. The Seventh Circuit vacated, referring to “Catch 22” reasoning and noting that someone else may have drafted and mailed the motion. Davis claimed that a fellow prisoner had done so. Mental incompetence can support tolling of federal statutes of limitations; the likelihood that mentally marginal prisoners will lack the assistance of guardians or lawyers means that, for them, such tolling is especially important. Something more than general inability to cope with legal matters is required, such as inability to understand the charges and assist in one’s own defense. The court declined to limit the range of possibilities, but noted that a report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system concluded that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. The court remanded to allow the district court can take evidence and determine Davis’s abilities. View "Davis v. Foster" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law