Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an electrician position at Navistar’s plant. Navistar hired 16 electricians while Whitfield’s application was pending. The written job description required that an applicant have either eight years of experience or a journeyman card. Whitfield allegedly had nine years of experience, with four years in the U.S. Navy. A foreman interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required experience. The Union was allegedly unable to verify his experience through numerous employers, but did not consider Whitfield’s experience in the Navy. Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to provide additional references. In 1998, Whitfield obtained an IBEW card, so there was no doubt that he met the requirements. The Union cleared him for hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to the foreman, who opened his folder and saw that the word “black” written on the cover sheet. While the resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired five white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in 1999 the foreman told him that Navistar would not allow him to hire Whitfield. At trial Navistar asserted errors in his resume and lack of PLC experience, an allegedly unstated qualification. In 2001 Whitfield and 26 others sued Navistar under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court certified the other plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the case for discovery, but separated his claim for trial. The hostile work environment action settled during trial. During joint discovery there was extensive evidence showing extreme racial hostility at the plant. At Whitfield’s 2012 trial, the court rejected his submission regarding evidence from the class trial and concluded that his evidence was insufficient to prove discrimination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting an updated EEOC chart as clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired. View "Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp." on Justia Law

Bunn, who is legally blind, quit his job at a Dairy Queen franchise and sued the franchisee under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112. Bunn believed that the employer failed to accommodate his disability and subjected him to illegal disparate treatment when it reduced his scheduled hours during the winter months. The district court granted the employer summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employer did reasonably accommodate Bunn’s disability by giving him a regular work station, unlike other employees who were required to rotate stations. The undisputed facts show that he was suspended due to insubordinate conduct towards a supervisor, that his hours decreased following the suspension, and that the restaurant saw decreased demand during the cold weather months and adjusted many employee schedules accordingly. View "Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Averhart, formerly a guard at the Cook County Jail, was suspended without pay in 2001 and fired in 2003. She had filed an EEOC charge of discrimination in 2000 and was investigated for smuggling drugs and contraband to prisoners. She had been arrested for shoplifting. She claimed retaliation for her corroboration of a coworker’s claims of sexual harassment and filed her first of four federal lawsuits in 2001. She has lost them all, along with two state suits. The district court dismissed the fourth suit as barred by the earlier decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit frivolous. The court noted that she was never an employee of the Merit Board, which approved her firing; that a claim against the Sheriff’s Department was filed almost a decade beyond the statute of limitations; and that new theories of race and sex discrimination do not avoid preclusion, which requires all legal theories that concern the same events to be brought in a single suit. The court gave Averhart 14 days to show cause why it should not impose sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, possibly including a financial penalty and an order revoking her privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. View "Averhart v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

In 1971 Cannon was convicted of murder. He was paroled and was a general in the El Rukn street gang when he became involved in a second murder and was arrested by the Chicago Police Department’s Violent Crimes division. He was threatened and tortured until he confessed that he was driving the car in which the murder occurred. Immediately after leaving police custody, Cannon recanted his confession and complained to the Office of Professional Standards. The complaint was dismissed. Cannon's confession was used at his 1984 trial; he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Cannon filed a federal complaint, asserting torture. By this time, there had been news reports of other incidents but it was not known that the abuse against African American men was pervasive and occurred with the complicity of then-commander Burge. In 1988, on his attorney’s advice, Cannon settled for the $3000 nuisance value offered by the defendants and signed a broad release of his claims. Cannon also appealed his conviction. By the time of a second remand, the judge who originally ruled on Cannon’s motion to suppress was caught accepting bribes and there was evidence that the officers who procured his confession regularly used torture. In 2001, Cannon agreed to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, to armed violence and conspiracy to commit murder, in exchange for a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the state dismissed the 1983 murder charges solely because neither side anticipated the effect of the plea agreement on Cannon’s parole status for the 1971 conviction. By the time a court ordered a new hearing on that issue, Cannon had been in prison for 23 years for the 1983 murder. Cannon filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, based on the release in the 1986 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the case “casts a pall of shame” over the city, the officers, and the trial judge, but also on Cannon. Cannon settled knowing that the defendants were lying. There was no evidence that, at the time he settled, the purposefully concealed a broader scandal. View "Cannon v. Burge" on Justia Law

Huon, a lawyer representing himself, sued his former employer Johnson & Bell, and its attorneys, for intentional discrimination based on race (Asian) and national origin (Cambodian) in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. After remand, the district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Huon’s suit was barred by claim preclusion because it arose out of the same “series of connected transactions” as claims that he previously litigated in state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims mirrored those raised in state court.View "Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd." on Justia Law

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

A psychiatrist, called 911 to report that Sutterfield had just left her office, indicating that she had received some bad news, and had remarked, “I guess I’ll go home and blow my brains out.” She informed officers that Sutterfield had worn an empty gun holster, from which she surmised that Sutterfield owned a gun. Officers were unable to locate Sutterfield. Hours later, the doctor told officers that Sutterfield had called minutes earlier stating that she did not need assistance, but did not indicate that Sutterfield no longer posed a danger to herself. Hours later, Sutterfield answered her door but would only state that she had “called off” the police. Officers concluded that they would have to enter forcibly. Sutterfield called 911. After informing Sutterfield of his intention to open the storm door forcibly, an officer yanked the door open and entered. A struggle ensued. Sutterfield can be heard on the 911 recording demanding that the officers let go of her and leave. Officers conducted a protective sweep and observed a compact disc carrying case in plain view. The soft-sided case was locked. An officer surmised from its feel and weight that there might be a firearm inside. He forced the case open and discovered a handgun and concealed-carry licenses from other jurisdictions. They also discovered a BB gun made to realistically resemble a handgun. They seized the guns and transported Sutterfield to a psychiatric hospital. Sutterfield sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances; even if the officers exceeded constitutional boundaries in searching the closed container and seizing the guns, they are protected by qualified immunity.View "Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

After drinking vodka, Ford rode with Grace to Ford’s home. The men passed 15-year-old Hodge, sitting next door. Ford and Hodge greeted each other. Inside Ford’s house, Ford said, “I can’t stand that mother fucker. I’ll be back.” Ford left the house; Grace soon heard a popping sound. He looked out and saw Hodge lying in the street. Ford came inside and said, “I got to get the fuck out of here … meet me … and pick me up.” Grace located a police officer and led him to the crime scene. Hodge, shot in the back of his head, died the next day. Gary Police Officer Quasney immediately spoke with witness Simmons, who stated that he had seen the victim talking to a black male in a black hooded sweatshirt, who shot Hodge. At a second trial, following a mistrial, Simmons was unavailable. The trial court denied the state’s request for admission of prior testimony, but admitted Quasney’s testimony recounting Simmons’s statements under the excited utterance exception. During closing arguments, Ford’s attorney argued that the state had failed to explain why Ford would shoot Hodge. In response, the prosecutor asserted that motive could not be known because the victim was dead and “If that person who committed the offense don’t talk, how would we ever know?” Convicted, Ford was sentenced to 50 years. Direct appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The federal district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Even assuming that an objection would have been sustained, Ford failed to show prejudice.View "Ford v. Wilson" on Justia Law