Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A jury rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arising from an incident at the county jail during which the plaintiff, an inmate, was injured. The district court denied a motion for new trial. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court was obligated to consider the same evidence considered by the jury and determine whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court's statement that it would not set aside the verdict âunless the testimony is such that reasonable persons could not believe it, because it contradicts indisputable physical facts or lawsâ indicated that the court applied the wrong standard.

After exhausting state appeals of his conviction and 240-year sentence for a 2004 Indiana home invasion that resulted in four deaths, the defendant unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The prosecution's witnesses included a participant in the crime, who testified as part of a plea bargain, and police officers, who testified about a "tip" that led them to the defendant. The double-hearsay testimony of the officers, which included statements supposedly made by the defendant to the tipster, was admitted on the theory that it was offered, not for the truth of the matters asserted, but to show the course of the investigation. The court did not instruct the jury of the limited purpose of the testimony. The double-hearsay testimony was, "beyond reasonable dispute," offered to establish the truth of the statements made, in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution went to great lengths to establish the credibility of the absent tipster. The state court incorrectly applied the "course of investigation" exception; there was no attempt to appropriately limit the testimony or instruct the jury. The testimony had a substantial, injurious impact.

The Board of Education laid off about 1,300 teachers in 2010. When additional funds became available, the Board recalled 715 teachers, but did not have any policy on recalls. The union obtained an injunction rescinding the discharges and requiring the board to work with the union to establish procedures by which those teachers can attempt to show that they are qualified for new vacancies as they arise. The Seventh Circuit ordered that the injunction be modified to delete the requirement of cooperation with the union, which is not required by the Illinois School Code provisions concerning recall, 105 ILCS 5/34-18. Illinois law gives tenured teachers a property interest in continued employment and, while pre-termination due process is not required for good-faith economic layoffs, there is a legitimate expectation that laid-off teachers will be considered for vacancies for a reasonable amount of time. To comply with due process requirements, the Board must develop procedures by which teachers can prove their qualifications for those vacancies.

Three white police officers, in good standing, resigned and later sought to be rehired. They were required to reenter the force as entry-level officers with respect to compensation and seniority. An African-American officer who had resigned was subsequently rehired. The city enacted an ordinance, in the interest of diversity, granting him credit for past service. The union filed suit. A state court determined that the union lacked standing. A state suit later filed by the individuals was dismissed as untimely. The officers filed in federal court, which first applied the "paycheck rule," under which each discriminatory paycheck is a separate act that resets the limitations period, but entered judgment for the city when that rule was rejected by the Supreme Court. In 2009, while appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, amending Title VII (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)), reinstating the paycheck rule. The Act is expressly retroactive. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Title VII and Equal Protection claims, based on actions after the state court's decision, were not barred. The compensation system need not be intrinsically discriminatory under Title VII. The court concluded that the paycheck rule also applies to the Equal Protection claims, the limitations period for which began to run when the officers requested equal treatment. The state court decision did not have preclusive effect because it dealt only with the limitations period and did not address discrimination.