Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1997 petitioner shot and killed four men; he was sentenced to death. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence. On remand the court reimposed the death sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner waived state post-conviction relief after the court found him competent to forego further challenges to his sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He changed his mind. The trial court dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The federal district court granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated the Sixth Amendment by offering to forego the death penalty if petitioner would waive a jury trial, and ordered resentencing. The Seventh Circuit reversed without considering petitioner's additional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court twice vacated the Seventh Circuit's decisions. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courtâs judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed that Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of competence to waive post-conviction remedies; and remanded for consideration of remaining grounds for habeas relief.

Plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 30-year terms to begin after a 28-year sentence for an unrelated conviction. Five years later, DNA testing revealed a match to plaintiff's uncle. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated. He sued the city and two officers, alleging malicious prosecution and due process violations (Brady v. Maryland) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was ample probable cause to commence proceedings against plaintiff, apart from the victim's identification: shoe prints in snow leading from the crime scene to plaintiffâs residence; wet shoes in the house; no other male present when police arrived; plaintiff behind the residence holding jeans that matched the victim's description; plaintiff's wallet in those jeans; and an alibi that did not check out. Plaintiff had no evidence of malice and the officers enjoy state-law immunity, because there was no willful and wanton conduct. Even if police failed to disclose "pressure" they put on the victim to identify plaintiff during a "show-up," there is no evidence that they coerced her to lie; it is unlikely that the result would have been different if the pressure had been disclosed.

Plaintiff, employed by the department of public works since 1972, publicly criticized the city's decision to purchase a certain brand of tractor and indicated that board members were influenced to purchase the more-expensive tractors by having been taken on an expenses-paid visit to the company's plant. A letter was published in the local paper and the board ultimately changed its decision. After the debate, the plaintiff's subordinates were promoted over him and his applications for promotion were denied. The district court rejected First Amendment retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff made his public comments in the context of performing his job. When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.

Nurses sued their former employer, a privately-operated jail, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging racial discrimination and hostile work environment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record concerning plaintiffs' allegations about references to monkeys and skin color, clothing marked by the confederate flag, and disparate treatment, was insufficient to establish a triable issue of hostile environment. With respect to other claims of discrimination, the plaintiffs did not establish a materially adverse employment action. State law whistleblower claims failed because the plaintiffs failed to allege violation of federal, state, or local law or misuse of public resources.

Defendant, convicted five times of felonies--murder, attempted murder (twice), aggravated battery, and domestic battery--and several times of other offenses, including unlawfully possessing firearms, participated in a shoot-out in 2009 and was prosecuted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court declined to sentence him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which carries a 15-year minimum term, reasoning that four of the five convictions could not count. When defendant's parole on murder and aggravated battery convictions expired, officials sent him a letter saying that his civil rights to vote and hold office had been restored automatically. The letter did not state that Illinois does not restore the right to possess firearms. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the defendant had three countable felonies. The letter's inclusion of a date on which parole ended ties the letter to a single sentence and implies that rights have been restored only with respect to convictions underlying that sentence. Defendant did not receive such letters for other convictions.

The inmate, placed in the most restrictive disciplinary segment of the prison for 240 days due to misconduct in another segment, filed suit. On remand, after the Seventh Circuit held that the case did implicate a constitutional "liberty" interest, the inmate provided no evidence of how conditions in the disciplinary segment differ from conditions for the general population. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the inmate had the burden of proof in the civil proceedings.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

The union represents housekeepers at a hotel owned by the village. After the union staged a mock funeral procession on the premises, police blocked efforts to stage a second protest on August 31, 2009. After the union filed suit, it was denied permission to distribute pamphlets at the entry to the hotel (November incident). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the village. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the record clearly indicated that the union had dropped its claims with respect to the August 31 demonstration. At the time of the summary judgment motion, the union had not attempted to file a supplementary pleading to cover the November incident.

Former captains from the Illinois Department of Corrections sued state and union officials, alleging that the defendants unlawfully punished them for seeking to organize with a rival union. The district court entered summary for the defendants, including a decision that the governor was protected by immunity. The governor's line-item veto of funding for captains' positions was legislative in nature and, therefore, protected by immunity and the plaintiffs failed to tie the governor to any allegedly-retaliatory actions before or after the veto. The decision to eliminate the middle management position at issue was a policy decision, unlike hiring or firing a particular individual, regardless of the subsequent creation of a new, similar position. The captains did not show how deposing the governor or more extensive deposition of the deputy chief of staff would lead to relevant evidence on the immunity issue. That two unions were competing to represent the captains did not establish a conspiracy between one of the unions and the administration with respect to determining the seniority of captains who took positions as corrections officers after their positions were eliminated.

A former high school teacher and union president was fired for allegedly viewing pornography on school computers. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on an assertion that the firing was retaliation for union activity. Before terminating the teacher's employment, the school district held an open hearing at which the teacher was allowed to present evidence and witnesses. He did not refute the charges, but only issued an apology; he has had all of the process he is due. With respect to First Amendment retaliation claims, the court stated that the relationship between the union and the district was "contentious, combative, and miserable," but that the district had an independent, legitimate reason for the termination.