Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Responding to complaints about a party, officers arrived and attempted to quiet and disperse the crowd of nearly 100 attendees, mostly of Mexican descent. Tension escalated. A full-blown melee ensued. Officers and civilian were injured and seven people were arrested. Party-goers filed suit against 17 officers and the town under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for use of excessive force, false arrest, and deprivation of equal protection, and under state law for battery, malicious prosecution, hate crimes, and evidence spoliation. The 78 plaintiffs pursued different claims against various combinations of individual named officers, unidentified officers, and the town. After a six-week trial, the jury returned sizable verdicts in favor of 23 plaintiffs against six individual officers and the town. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the judgment appeared to permit 13 plaintiffs to recover twice for the same injury on state-law claims, once from the individual officer and again from the town. As a result of confusing jury instructions and an improper special verdict form, the judgment did not reflect that the town's liability for the state-law claims against its officers was based on respondeat superior and was joint and several. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to evidentiary rulings.

American citizen-civilians alleged that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006 and released from military custody without being charged with a crime. At the time they worked for a privately-owned Iraqi security services company. Plaintiffs sought damages and brought a claim to recover personal property that was seized. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility for the alleged torture and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the alleged treatment was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise. A "Bivens" remedy is available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. The court noted that U.S. law provides a civil remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. Claims by aliens, alleging torture by U.S. officials, are distinguishable. The Administrative Procedure Act's "military authority" exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone.

After the company announced a plan to outsource positions, it arranged for the new vendor to accept applications from its employees. Two targeted employees applied for positions within the company, rather than pursuing employment with the new vendor, but were not hired. A third employee stayed with company, but claimed that the company has paid him less than he deserves because it has never promoted him. Plaintiffs attribute these adverse employment actions to their supervisor's bias against Hispanics. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant company on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, but affirmed on the pay discrimination claim. The district court improperly discounted the plaintiffsâ strongest evidence and erred in its analysis of the failure-to-hire claims under Title VII, by basing its decision on the lawful treatment of at least one Hispanic employee.

At jury selection in a criminal trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the only two African-American members in the venire. The defendant was convicted. The Seventh Circuit remanded for findings under the third step in the analysis under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): the prosecutor's credibility in offering a race-neutral reason for the strike (step two). The district court must make an independent credibility determination concerning the prosecutor's race-neutral reason that one juror "appeared agitated and also frustrated" throughout voir dire. A judge may consider a variety of factors in making a credibility determination, but may not assume that a prosecutor of the same race as a juror would not engage in discrimination against that juror simply because of their shared race.

Wisconsin inmates challenged the state's Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act, Wis. Stat. 302.386(5m), which prevents the state Department of Corrections from providing transgender inmates with certain medical treatments. The district court ruled in favor of the inmates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the medical consequences and concluding that the policy violated the Eighth Amendment.

Following an anonymous tip, the FBI conducted surveillance of defendant and observed that he regularly transported about four people back and forth between his home and his restaurant. A consent search of the home revealed three people who were illegally present in the U.S. and a make-shift dormitory in the basement and garage. Defendant was convicted of two counts of illegally harboring or shielding illegal aliens (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)) and sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $10,000 in fines and forfeit his house. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court rejected a motion to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing ineffective counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning proposal of an incorrect jury instruction; failure to object to video-taped testimony of prosecution witnesses; failure to ensure that a language barrier did not prevent communicating with defendant; and preventing defendant from testifying on his own behalf.

Plaintiff, who is white, worked with an African-American who was confrontational, rude, and disruptive in the workplace. Plaintiff claims that a 940-pound steel coil that fell on him, from a machine operated by the "workplace bully," was dropped purposefully because of his race. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer on a racially hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1981, without considering plaintiff's response brief or exhibits, which were non-compliant with local rules. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in enforcing its rules and deadlines. The record contained insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the co-worker's offensive conduct before the accident was severe or pervasive. While the injury was severe, no reasonable inference could be drawn that the coil was purposefully dropped because of race or that the employer was negligent in discovering the alleged racial harassment. The company had a reasonable procedure in place for detecting and correcting harassment, but plaintiff did not avail himself of that procedure.

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition and denied a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a COA to consider the unresolved, substantial constitutional issue of whether petitioner was entitled to counsel in the state proceeding. Whether the proceeding is characterized correctly as direct or collateral presents a necessary antecedent non-constitutional question.

Plaintiff received a written warning from his supervisor for failing to complete a task and went to management to complain. The complaint triggered a series of events that led to his discharge. He sued his former employer, complaining of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as discriminatory discharge, discriminatory employment actions, and retaliatory discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but reversed as to the retaliatory discharge claim. The sum of the circumstantial evidence, including past discrimination, the investigation, and a "race card" statement, would not allow a rational jury to conclude that racial discrimination caused the firing. The evidence did not show that any similarly situated person actually received better treatment than plaintiff. Plaintiff did not prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, but his history of complaints and the "race card" statement were enough to allow the retaliation claim to survive summary judgment.

Seeing that plaintiff was not wearing a seatbelt, the officer followed him to a store where plaintiff worked, arriving at 5:57 p.m.. Plaintiff, due at work at 6:00 p.m., sped into the parking lot. The officer pulled in behind him and activated his emergency lights. Plaintiff did not respond, so the officer drove the squad car between him and the store, then followed him toward the store and grabbed him. Plaintiff did not stop, but ran to the store. The officer used his taser. Apparently plaintiff continued to struggle and the officer used handcuffs and pepper spray. Plaintiff was fired. He filed suit for excessive force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The officer counter-sued for battery. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding against the officer on his battery claim, against plaintiff on his false arrest claim, and for plaintiff on his excessive force claim, but granting only nominal damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury could reasonably have believed that the tasering was justifiable and the judge acted within his discretion in denying attorney fees in a suit seeking to redress a private injury and based on an isolated incident.