Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights.

Petitioner, imprisoned in Wisconsin for a term of 60 years following a 1994 conviction for sexual assault and attempted homicide, sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case involved police misconduct in "doctoring" the crime scene to conceal evidence of prostitution, by withholding semen-stained sheets and towels from the massage parlor. The items were later tested and did not disclose petitioner's DNA. The court stated that the evidence was irrelevant, in that it could only be used to impeach the victim, given the other evidence and petitioner's own admissions. Rejecting a "Brady" claim concerning petitioner's gun, the court noted that nothing suggests that defense team was unaware of the gun, the state's possession of it, or the prosecution's theory of its role in the crime, or that the defense unsuccessfully requested access.

When he arrived at the prison, plaintiff told the prison clinical director that he had rheumatoid arthritis and asked for Enbrel, a medication successful in controlling the condition before his incarceration. Because Enbrel was not on the approved formulary, personnel had to seek prior approval from the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons. The doctor submitted a request for Gabapentin, used to treat nerve pain, but not Enbrel, and approved a consultation with an outside rheumatologist. Despite the rheumatologistâs instruction and plaintiff's repeated requests and complaints of pain and swelling, he didnât receive Enbrel for 10 months. Because plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court screened his "Bivens" complaint alleging cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all defendants, except the clinical director, then entered summary judgment for the clinical director. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the non-medical defendants on the pleadings, but held that the prisoner properly stated a claim against medical defendants. Affirming summary judgment in favor of of the clinical director, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer for DOC in 2006, assigned to duty that required walking. In 2007, she was reassigned to a control room and no longer required to walk. In 2007, plaintiff received a warning for excessive absenteeism and was switched to a different schedule. She never worked under the new schedule. She took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and returned to the bettr schedule. After her return, she was in an automobile accident, but did not disclose physician's restrictions on activity until a 2008 hearing on her refusal of overtime. In early 2008, plaintiff used vacation time to visit her brother, who had been injured. When she returned, she had been reassigned to watch tour duty. She refused some duties, stating that she physically could not do the job and that it violated her medical restrictions. Her supervisor asked for her resignation. She was barred from entering and never returned to work. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOC on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact under the indirect method of proof analysis.

Plaintiff was operating a video camera in public park, perhaps because of the presence of a former domestic partner. An angry crowd accused him of videotaping their children in a public park and called police, who arrested him for disorderly conduct. The charges were eventually dropped and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, on grounds of qualified immunity. While videotaping is not a crime in Illinois, one officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct and the other could have reasonably believed there was probable cause.

An Indiana inmate, alleging mistreatement during a shakedown, was denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis because his three previous suits had been dismissed (28 U.S.C. 1915(g)). The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his suit for failure to pay fees. His previous filings had been dismissed for failure to prosecute, after the judge deemed his allegations unintelligible, and not as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. That they might have or even should have been dismissed on those grounds is irrelevant.

A longtime employee of the Illinois Secretary of State's office, the only African-American on a crew of 27 maintenance workers, was fired after incidents concerning his knowledge of private use of state property and an off-the-books leave policy. He was reinstated after arbitration. He brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that two white managers targeted him because he is black. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated, based on evidence that the employee engaged in the same conduct as his supervisor but was disciplined more harshly. Formal job titles and rank are not dispositive; an employer cannot insulate itself from claims of racial discrimination by making formalistic distinctions between employees.

A diabetic, suffering a hypoglycemic episode while driving, veered off the road. Officers believed he was intoxicated. When he did not comply with commands to step out of his car, they physically removed him, maced him two or three times, struck him four times with a baton to place handcuffs on him and prevent him from kicking his legs and flailing his arms, and kept him in the prone position until a paramedic arrived. The paramedic recognized the condition and took the patient to a hospital, where he died of natural causes roughly two weeks later. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, failure to train the officers, and condoning the use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had probable cause to be believe the driver was intoxicated and the force was not excessive, under the circumstances.

The state agency took a 15-month-old away from his home and parents and into temporary protective custody, following an accident and a hospital visit. Protective custody involved a safety plan that limited the parents' access to the child; the parents claimed to have been threatened into accepting the plan. In the parents' suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court determined that child welfare workers could have reasonably believed that taking temporary protective custody of the child was supported by probable cause and that the seizure did not violate a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process, and procedural due process claims premised on the initial removal, but vacated with respect to the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims premised on the continued withholding of the child as well as the substantive due process and procedural due process claims premised on the safety plan.

Inmates sued (officials in the Illinois Department of Corrections for marking up the price of commissary goods beyond the statutory cap (730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a). The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the case is really about a substantive violation of Illinois law, not about the procedures required before the plaintiffs can be deprived of a property interest. Even assuming a property interest, no pre-deprivation process could have predicted or prevented the alleged deprivation, and plaintiffs have not alleged the absence of adequate post-deprivation remedies. Where meaningful pre-deprivation review would either be impossible or ineffectual, adequate post-deprivation remedies may satisfy constitutional due process requirements.