Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2006 petitioner was sentenced as a career offender for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. His appeals were unsuccessful; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant was engaged in litigation with the state, seeking to vacate one of the convictions used as a basis for career offender status. He was ultimately successful. In the meantime, the district court denied a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and, on remand, denied it twice again. The court declined to stay with respect to the challenged state conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Petitioner was diligent in pursuing remedies and the district court should have stayed the then-unripe petition while the state challenge was pending, to enable petitioner to comply with the requirements for a timely habeas petition.

Plaintiff, an inmate, worked as a library clerk. Defendant, the director of education, ordered plaintiff fired on the ground that, on the job, he had highlighted copies of opinions for personal use and had stolen an opinion from the library. A day after plaintiff told the librarian that he had filed a grievance, defendant filed a conduct report to justify ordering plaintiff fired. Plaintiff had a receipt showing that he had checked out the opinion and the theft charge was dropped. The hearing officer upheld the copying charge and ordered plaintiff confined to his cell for 14 days and the copies destroyed. After the state court ordered a new hearing, the prison expunged the disciplinary order from plaintiff's record; the order had already been carried out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that plaintiff had not shown "that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the constitutionally protected conduct." The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to other defendants, but reversed with respect to the director of education, noting the timing of his conduct report and evidence of animus toward plaintiff.

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to possession of firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and waived his right to contest any aspect of his conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded either the sentencing-guidelines range calculated by the district court "or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater." The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to a term of 180 months, the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). He did not pursue direct appeal. Nearly two years later, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in Oklahoma state court seeking to vacate two of the convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The Oklahoma court entered an order purporting to dismiss the cases, along with six others pending against him. Petitioner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court rejected the motion as untimely and held that it was barred by the waiver. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that while the appeal was in briefing, the Oklahoma court issued a nunc pro tunc order clarifying that its dismissal order did not in fact vacate the predicate convictions.

Officers went to plaintiff's home to question her sons about a burglary. A confrontation ensued and escalated. One of the officers Tasered plaintiff three times, and the officers arrested her for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were dropped, and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging use of excessive force and false arrest. A jury returned a verdict for the officers on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff waived her most plausible claim of trial error, the decision to admit two of her criminal convictions, when she introduced evidence of the convictions herself, before the officers could do so. The court also rejected claims based on evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. The parties told dramatically different stories about the confrontation and the jury was entitled to believe the officersâ version.

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

Petitioner brought a "Bivens" action, claiming that prison officials provided him with limited, deficient access to the law library for four months while he was confined in a special unit. He claims that the prison switched to electronic research databases and did not provide instruction, causing him to miss filing dates for an appeal in a case he had filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the Seventh Circuit reinstated the appeal in that case, the district court dismissed the Bivens action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that petitioner did not show any prejudice as a result of his limited library access.

Petitioner, convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison, unsuccessfully sought relief in Illinois state courts then filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching a witness, petitioner was not prejudiced, in light of the substantial evidence of guilt. Petitioner could not prove his claim that the prosecution knowingly obtained his conviction on the basis of perjured testimony.

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

The inmate asked for a vegan diet, telling the chaplain that he adheres to the Moorish Science Temple. The chaplain rejected the request, observing that the tenets of Moorish Science require a non-pork diet, which can include dairy products and some meat and fish. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in the inmate's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but granted the motion with respect to claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.2000cc to 2000ccâ5. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The inmate is no longer at the prison, so damages would be the only potential relief. Money damages are not available in suits against states under RLUIPA and suits against state employees in their official capacity are treated as suits against the states. RLUIPA does not authorize any kind of relief against public employees in their private capacities. The warden was entitled to summary judgment under section 1983, which does not provide for "supervisory liability." To decide whether the chaplain has qualified immunity, the district judge must determine whether he reasonably attempted to determine whether the inmate had a sincere belief that his religion requires a vegan diet.

A part-time school custodian, suffering mental disability, applied for full-time positions and was rejected. His performance had been evaluated as unsatisfactory. He filed a charge with the EEOC. A few months later the employer again evaluated his performance and fired him. In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not establish the elements of a valid discrimination and retaliation claim under the ADA: that he was meeting his employer' legitimate employment expectations, and was performing his job satisfactorily.