Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1995 a jury convicted petitioner of cocaine­ trafficking and tax-fraud. Direct appeals were unsuccessful. He later discovered that a member of the jury had called in sick one day in the middle of deliberations. The government maintained that the rest of the jury was sent home and did not deliberate that day. After the district judge sent an investigator to interview the jurors, the court denied a habeas corpus petition, holding that petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it in direct appeal. The court also found insufficient proof of improper deliberations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the 12-person jury claim was not defaulted. Petitioner was not aware of the situation during direct appeal and adequately raised it in his habeas petition. The investigator's testimony about interviews with jurors, who gave inconsistent information, was inadmissible, but the court's finding was based on normal judicial procedures and was not clearly erroneous. The court pointed out that the temporary absence of a juror, who returned before the verdict, might be subject to harmless error review.

The appellate court reversed plaintiff's murder conviction. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, accusing officers of violating his rights by influencing a witness to identify him as the killer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment against him. Four years later, plaintiff filed a new suit against defendants he had sued before, plus prosecutors and the governmental entities that employed them. He had, in the meantime, obtained a "certificate of innocence," under 735 ILCS 5/2–702, enacted in 2008. The district court dismissed the claims against the original three defendants on the basis of claim preclusion and the claims against the others based on the two-year limitations period. The court also concluded that claims against the prosecutors under state law must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because federal courts follow state immunity rules and Illinois wants claims of this kind to be presented to its Court of Claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state-issued certificate did not create a new claim, restarting the clock and overriding the rules of issue and claim preclusion.

The law firm successfully represented plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation suit against her employer. The jury awarded $65,000 in damage. The attorneys then sought attorneys' fees of 131,665.88. The district court awarded $70,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated, acknowledging concerns about excessive fees. The district court looked to impermissible considerations in calculating the award; most significantly, it reduced the statutory award based on the existence of an agreement, which specifies that the agreed contingent fee will not apply to the statutory award of fees(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)). The court should have provided plaintiff with an opportunity to respond before applying the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (a chart of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area, prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be used in fee-shifting cases), and should have provided a clear explanation as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $400. The district court also erred in reversing its award of fees to outside counsel.

For 20 years, GEMS has been taking groups of African American high school students on tours of historically black universities. In 2008, the organization reserved 41 rooms at hotel in Baton Rouge. A day or two later, the hotel canceled the reservation. The group had to drive through the night to their next destination in Texas. The organization filed civil rights and contract claims on behalf of itself and students. Throughout discovery, plaintiffs continually missed deadlines. The district court dismissed as a discovery sanction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 37(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that it lacked jurisdiction. Given the willful nature and volume of the discovery violations, along with the warnings of dismissal that were issued, the district court was within its discretion in granting a motion to dismiss without having explicitly warned of that possibility.

A pretrial detainee in a maximum security area expressed concern for his safety and was moved to an area for detainees charged with possessing weapons in jail. He later reported that detainees were bringing weapons into particular cells, but a search uncovered no weapons. The following week he was falsely identified by an officer, within hearing of other detainees, as a gang leader. He was stabbed days later. An officer called for back-up immediately. While waiting, she stood in a secure area and did not try to stop the attack. Additional officers arrived 15 or 20 minutes later. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk. A general risk of violence in a maximum security unit does not itself establish knowledge of a substantial risk; plaintiff did not report any problems with fellow detainees or fear of attacks after being moved. A prison guard, acting alone, is not required to take the unreasonable risk of attempting to break up a fight if circumstances indicate that such action would put her in significant jeopardy. The response delay is "most troubling," but insufficient to constitute deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff, an Arab Muslim, served as an associate professor at a state from 2001 to 2006. His performance record was consistently sub-par, and he frequently sparred with policy decisions made by his supervisor. Informed that his contract would not be renewed, he filed suit, alleging that that the school refused to renew his contract based on his race, national origin, and religion, and in retaliation for several claimed instances of complaining about discrimination, all in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment for the school. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no direct or circumstantial evidence that plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated individuals outside his protected class, nor did plaintiff establish retaliation.

Unable to maintain a satisfactory academic record in a state dental school, plaintiff was dismissed. He unsuccessfully petitioned school committees and administrators to overturn the decision, then filed a complaint alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner received ample process. He had ample notice, having been on academic probation, he was given several opportunities to remediate, and was allowed to appeal.

An inmate began suffering from pain in his groin after an injury in 2004. Staff at the prison health unit recognized that his pain was caused by an inguinal hernia but gave him only mild pain medication. The inmate complained and was examined by a doctor who pushed the hernia back into his abdomen and refused a request for surgery. For several months the condition worsened, with a visible bulge and pain, but medical staff continued to refuse surgery. The inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed prior to service. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the physicians and remanded for determination of whether their response to more than two years of complaints has been blatantly inappropriate in the face of the inmate's pain and the risk the worsening hernia poses to his present and future health.

Plaintiff entered into a lease with the housing authority in 2007 as "Resident" and named her two sons as "Household Members." The lease provided that certain criminal activities could lead to immediate eviction. Plaintiff received a notice to vacate a few weeks later, after a visit by her daughter led to a gunfight in the parking lot. While plaintiff's challenge was pending, second and third notices issued. Police had been called to her apartment and determined that plaintiff had stabbed her husband, who was living at the apartment and was high on cocaine. Officers found joints on the counter. Plaintiff vacated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case is moot because plaintiff never contested the second and third notices and, therefore, cannot be restored to the apartment; there was evidence that she lied on her application and was never eligible for tenancy. She incurred no expenses and state court proceedings provided all the process that was due. The court rejected a claim of emotional distress and a claim that the complex constituted segregated housing.

Plaintiff resigned from her probationary employment with the department of corrections after she was charged, by the state's attorney, with failure to cooperate in an investigation. She had been a witness in a criminal investigation; she sued the detective conducting the investigation, alleging that when she refused to lie to further the investigation, he tortiously interfered with her employment. She sued the sheriff and the director of personnel, claiming First Amendment retaliation, retaliatory discharge, and violation of procedural due process rights. Claims against the detective were dismissed for failure to state a claim; the court granted the county summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that the detective had anything to do with the charge against plaintiff. There was no evidence that the investigation of plaintiff or the charges were in retaliation for refusal to lie. Because she was in her probationary period, plaintiff had no property interest in her position.