Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, active in Wisconsin’s "open carry" movement, carried a holstered handgun into stores and was arrested for disorderly conduct. His gun was confiscated, but eventually returned. He was not prosecuted. He sued arresting officers and municipalities under 42 U .S.C. 1983, asserting false. He claimed retention of his guns was an unconstitutional seizure and violation of the Privacy Act because officers obtained his Social Security number during booking. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. In 2011, Wisconsin adopted a concealed-carry permitting regime and amended its statutes to clarify that openly carrying a firearm is not disorderly conduct absent circumstances indicating criminal or malicious intent. WIS. STAT. 947.01(2). Also in 2011, plaintiff was convicted of homicide, mooting his claim for prospective declaratory relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to damages claims. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. At the time, the state constitutional right to bear arms was new, Wisconsin law was unclear, and the Supreme Court had not decided a case applying the Second Amendment to States. It was reasonable for officers to believe that the circumstances gave them probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest. Delayed return of the handguns was not a "seizure."

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.

Convicted of attempted murder, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and invasion of privacy, defendant was sentenced to 51 years in prison. He was unsuccessful at seeking post-conviction relief in Indiana state court and filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court looked at counsel's performance as a whole and deferred to the Indiana Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel's decisions to pursue alibi and misidentification defenses were strategic in nature and reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel's decision to lie, during opening statements about petitioner's whereabouts, was "troubling" but did not change the analysis. It is unlikely that a different result would be reached, absent counsel's errors.

Plaintiff was arrested for drinking on a public way. A search incident to arrest turned up a heroin packet and a baggie of crack cocaine, so drug possession charges were added. He was jailed for 12 days before bonding out. The drinking charge was dismissed and, at a preliminary hearing, a state judge concluded there was no probable cause for the drug charges. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the officers. After the jury returned a verdict for defendants, plaintiff argued that the court erred in allowing an assistant prosecutor to testify that low-weight cases are routinely thrown out, as an expert, without proper disclosures and foundation. The district court rejected the argument, stating that the prosecutor never offered an opinion, but testified as to her experience on the narcotics call in the state court, offering factual statements based on her personal observations. The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. The prosecutor testified based on her specialized knowledge and non-disclosure of her planned testimony as an expert was not harmless.

Plaintiff alleged that while he was a pretrial detainee, asleep in his cell, a guard opened the door, allowing another inmate to enter and attack him. He sustained injuries to his head and eyes. He requested medical attention, but received none for five days. He was locked down for 72 hours following the attack. The district court screened the 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and held a brief telephonic merit-review hearing, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that even if plaintiff's condition did not worsen from the delay, deliberate indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Although the evidence may not ultimately substantiate plaintiff's allegations, if proven the conditions are severe enough to have required more prompt attention. On remand the district court should give plaintiff, who was acting pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the officers who ignored his injuries.

A former inmate sued an officer who ordered forcible shearing of plaintiff's dreadlocks (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district judge dismissed. In an opinion that included a picture of the the late musician Bob Marley (a Rastafarian), the Seventh Circuit reversed. Claims for damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, would fail based on sovereign immunity (official capacity) and because the Act does not create a personal capacity cause of action against state employees. Illinois inmates are allowed to have any length of hair that does not create a security risk, but the officer told plaintiff that only Rastafarians were allowed to have dreadlocks. A ban on long hair, even if motivated by sincere religious belief, would likely pass constitutional muster, but this was a case of "outright arbitrary discrimination" rather than failure to accommodate religious rights. There was no articulated ground for a Rastafarian exception. Even "Heretics have religious rights" and plaintiff claimed that dreadlocks are, for him, religious observance, though dreadlocks do not have symbolic significance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem as they do for Rastafarians. There is no suggestion that allowing plaintiff's dreadlocks would create a "wildfire of idiosyncratic observances," or that defendant acted on a reasonable belief of a security threat.

The County Sheriff terminated plaintiff's probationary employment as a deputy based on violations of standard operating procedures, failure to follow orders, and insufficient commitment to the job. He sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981, claiming he was fired because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of discrimination fell short of supporting an inference that he was terminated because of his race. No evidence suggests that the sheriff or other decision-makers participated in any of the alleged racially charged behavior: watching Blazing Saddles in the workplace and giving plaintiff racially tinged nicknames. Although plaintiff identified several white deputies who were retained despite performance problems during their probationary employment, their misconduct was not comparable to his, so they cannot be considered similarly situated.

The Postal Service terminated plaintiff's 32 years of employment as a clerk, claiming that it fired her because she told her psychiatrist she was having thoughts of killing her supervisor, and it believed she posed a danger to fellow employees. Plaintiff is an African-American woman and claimed discrimination and retaliatory discharge. In support of her disparate treatment claims she presented evidence that two white male employees at the same facility had recently threatened another employee at knife-point, yet received only one-week suspensions from the same manager who fired her. The district court granted the Postal Service summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the similarly-situated inquiry is flexible, common-sense, and factual. A reasonable jury could infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the firing. Plaintiff's evidence could also demonstrate pretext.

Former Illinois Department of Transportation employees alleged they were wrongfully terminated because of their political beliefs and party affiliation. They were among about 190 employees laid off in 2004 as part of budget cuts. They filed their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims exactly two years after the effective date of the terminations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period began to run when plaintiffs received unequivocal notices of termination.

In 2002 the city amended its ordinance to allow police to impound vehicles and impose a $500 fine on persons driving without a valid license or proof of insurance. The ordinance generated protests that it applied more harshly against minorities. The city had an outdoor assembly ordinance, requiring written application for a permit 20 days in advance, and providing discretion to require the event organizer to pay a cash deposit as a condition of permit issuance. In addition to enforcing the permit ordinance, city officials barred one protestor from speaking at a city council meeting concerning the towing ordinance. Plaintiffs sued the city, its mayor, and its police chief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights of free speech, of assembly, and to petition government for redress of grievances. The district court denied the mayor and police chief's claims of qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The mayor barred anything and everything one of the protestors proposed to say at a public meeting, in retaliation for the protestor's prior statements. Other claims of immunity require resolution of factual issues.