Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

An off-duty police officer, Glover, shot and killed Prado during a late-night road incident. Glover claimed that Prado had tried to run him over and had a gun, which was not found. He claimed he was complying with a department rule, requiring officers to act even when off duty. Glover was placed on desk duty. An inquest jury found justification, but a year later Glover was charged with homicide and perjury and suspended from the force. He committed suicide. Prado's estate brought excessive-force and loss-of-life claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and named the city a defendant under a statute that requires the city to pay judgments assessed against employees for acts committed within the scope of employment. The jury found that Glover used unreasonable force under color of law, but found that he was not within the scope of employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because of the risk that jurors would mistakenly intuit that if the officer used excessive force, he must have acted outside the scope of employment so that refusal to give the modified scope-of-employment instruction was prejudicial error. Under Wisconsin law an employer who retains an employee after he commits a tort does not ratify his conduct.

County sheriff deputies responded to a call indicating that Marc had left the home he shared with his parents and was possibly a danger to himself and others. Officers located Marc and determined that he should be involuntarily committed. During initial evaluation at a hospital, officers discovered Marc's wallet, but their search was not thorough enough to discover that the wallet contained a razor blade. Later, still in police custody, Marc regained possession of the razor blade during transport to a mental health facility. He used the blade to commit suicide in the back of a squad car. His father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Marc's risk of suicide. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the officers' actions did not indicate deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff began work as a police officer in 1976. In 1992 he was charged with misconduct related to an improper arrest and, following a hearing, was fired. The state trial and appellate courts affirmed the Police Board; the highest court rejected an appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with Illinois Human Rights Commission, for the first time alleging racial and age discrimination and retaliation. While the matter was pending, he filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 and state laws. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The IHRC awarded $274,283.05 for lost wages, holiday and overtime pay, lost pension annuity interest, and other prejudgment interest, plus attorney's fees of $400,555.50. Neither party appealed the IHRC’s final determination. Plaintiff filed a federal suit, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit barred by claim preclusion.

Plaintiff, wrongly convicted of two murders in 1986, obtained a certificate of innocence in 2009 and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 from Illinois Assistant States Attorneys, Wharrie and Kelley, alleging that they induced false testimony during his trial and retrial and suppressed the compromised nature of the testimony and its acquisition, denying him due process. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging denial of their claim of absolute immunity. They also claimed that Illinois sovereign immunity law precludes federal jurisdiction, and only the Illinois Court of Claims may hear the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to immunity and suggested that the district court consider relinquishing jurisdiction over state claims. Wharrie is entitled to absolute immunity for alleged solicitation of false testimony from a co-defendant/fellow gang member after the original trial, as well as for alleged suppression of its falsity. Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Kelley with respect to his alleged coercing testimony from an eyewitness.

Defendant's stepmother was killed while he and others robbed his father's house to steal guns. A state court sentenced him to 71 years' imprisonment for murder and armed robbery. His conviction was affirmed. State courts rejected collateral attack. The district court rejected a petition for habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the attorney's failure to object to defendant being required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court declined to address whether the prosecutor violated the due process clause by taking advantage of an error during defendant's testimony. The claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, whose decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court decisions.

As Graham entered a public library, her purse, containing $5,000 in cash, was grabbed. She struggled with the snatcher. The robber shot Graham in the head and her mother in the chest, before fleeing. Graham described the attacker to police officers, but did not say that she knew her assailant. A neighbor, visiting the women in the hospital, told police that he had heard a rumor that Phillips, who lived in Graham's neighborhood, had been watching currency exchanges and robbing people who cashed tax-refund checks (as Graham had done). Graham later identified Phillips from a photo array and a lineup. Phillips had a strong alibi and there was no other evidence against him. After his acquittal, he filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against the village and officers. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants, holding that the identification established probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mentioning Phillips' name to the victim, who claimed she did not know him, did not taint the identification.

Indiana State Prison maintains an inmates' recreation fund, required by Ind. Code 4-24-6-6(a), to accrue money from sources outside the state budget, such as profits from a prison commissary. Prison officials are to use this money for the inmates' benefit by purchasing recreational items or using funds for a purpose not covered under existing state appropriations. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claimed that for 10 years, prison officials have misappropriated proceeds by uses ranging from diverting money for personal uses, to using the fund for purposes already covered by existing allocations, such as purchase of devices enhancing security. The district court screened and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915A (b)(1), finding that petitioner did not have a statutorily protected property interest in the fund. Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes mandate that state penal facilities maintain a recreation fund or dictate how money in such funds be spent, The state statute did not give inmates a property interest in the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine and was sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2000. Defendant's collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 was unsuccessful. Almost a decade later, he filed a motion, asking the court to reopen the case. The judge treated it as a successive collateral attack, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant filed notice of appeal 186 days later, after the time allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2107 and Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the appeal is saved by Rule 4(a)(7). If Rule 4(a)(7) requires a separate document, in addition to entry of the order on the docket, the date of "entry" is postponed until the district court complies with Rule 58 (requiring entry of a separate judgment), or 150 days have passed, whichever happens first. The district judge did not enter a Rule 58 judgment. If one was required, the time for appeal started 150 days after March 14, 2011, and the appeal was timely. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. Disposition of a motion filed in a 2255 proceeding, long after final judgment, does not require a separate Rule 58 judgment.

Petitioner entered a blind plea of guilty with respect to gang-related murders in 1992 and a state court entered judgment on two counts of intentional murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, the mandatory minimum for double homicide. After exhausting state court remedies, she filed a petition for habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded that many of the claims were defaulted and that others failed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner preserved only questions of whether her attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a particular witness; failing to obtain psychological evidence to support an argument that her confession was involuntary; and failing to recognize that another witness had made inconsistent statements and had motive to lie. All fail on the merits; there was no reason to believe that any of the alleged deficiencies changed the outcome.

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as Senior Humane Officer for the city after refusing to support defendant's successful mayoral campaign and brought suit, claiming that the position of SHO was not subject to political termination and that his dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court, relying on an official job description, found that the SHO was a policy-making position, and that plaintiff could be dismissed for political reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that city ordinances authorized the SHO to exercise policy-making discretion.