Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a part-time mail handler for the USPS since 1987, injured his back on the job in 1998. He returned to "light-duty" work until 2003, when he reinjured himself at work. Except for one week, he did not return to work nor did he provide documentation concerning his injury. In 2005, a supervisor notified him that he would be terminated. Plaintiff's union filed a grievance and the settlement required plaintiff to see a doctor and either return to "full duty" or apply for disability retirement by a certain date. Physicians cleared him to work with several permanent restrictions. A USPS physician determined that plaintiff was unfit for "full duty." He was terminated for violation of the agreement. The EEOC found no discrimination. He filed a claim that, although he was not legally disabled, he was "regarded as" disabled. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After determining that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), prior to 2009 amendments, applied, the court found that plaintiff did not establish that USPS regarded him as disabled. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the "100% healed" requirement of the settlement agreement under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff, hired by IDOT in 1989, was suspended in 2003, pursuant to a "last chance" agreement, for fighting in the workplace. There had been prior disciplinary measures. In 2005, plaintiff was involved in a worksite altercation with a co-worker and a supervisor. IDOT initiated discharge proceedings. Plaintiff disputed that he had physical contract with his supervisor, but did not alleged that the attempt to discharge him was retaliation for his filing a race discrimination charge in 2001. An ALJ conducted a hearing at which plaintiff was represented by counsel and concluded that plaintiff had engaged in an altercation but that discharge was not warranted. A state trial court overturned the decision and sustained the discharge. Three years later, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the retaliation claim does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the claim made in the state court. The claim could have been raised in that forum.

Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims.

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.

In 1989 Dominguez was arrested and in 1990 he was convicted of home invasion and sexual assault. In 2002 he was exonerated by DNA; in 2005 he received a pardon. Under Illinois law, his claim for malicious prosecution accrued in 2002. Under federal law, constitutional claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) accrued in 1989 and 2002. Wrongful arrest claims accrue on the date of arrest, but wrongful conviction claims accrue when conviction is invalidated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of about $9 million for malicious prosecution and concealment of exculpatory evidence. The city has been insured by different companies and each asserted that the policy for another year applied. None provided a defense. The district court held that the issuer of the "occurrence" policy in force at exoneration must defend and indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city's misconduct occurred in 1989 and 1990, but the policy does not define the "occurrence" as misconduct by a law-enforcement officer. It defines the occurrence as the tort under state or federal law, and, in both, the tort occurs witn its last element, exoneration. Until then, Dominguez could not establish "malicious prosecution" or "violation" of section 1983.

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.

Petitioner, serving a 60-year sentence for attempted murder, burglary-battery, and bail jumping, received full collateral review by federal courts, and his first application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) for permission for a second collateral attack was denied. Intending to file a second 2244(b) application, he asked to be excused for untimely filing and for an order requiring the prison to allow him expanded use of the copier. The court rejected those claims, but exercised its discretion to excuse petitioner from compliance with Rule 22.2(a)(4) and (5), requiring submission of copies of documents from prior cases, and Appellate Rule 21(d), requiring submission of multiple copies of pleadings. Analysis of timeliness must wait for the papers to which the question applies. Petitioner adequately alleged that prison action frustrated his attempt to file an application, but did not identify underlying legal claims frustrated by the delay.

A fight broke out during a New Year's party at a pub. Several patrons were wounded and a security guard was killed. Plaintiff, an off-duty police officer whose wife was a manager at the pub, was present and was later arrested. After the charges were dropped, he sued for false arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court denied defendant's motion for a finding of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While there was not "arguable probable cause" for the murder charge, the charge of assisting a criminal was supported by the plaintiff's "hazy" and changing account of events and a videotape of events.

Petitioner, serving a life sentence in Illinois, suffers a chronic medical condition and other ailments that require him to take several prescription drugs daily. After he became ill because someone accidentally gave him another inmate's medication, petitioner decided to educate himself. He ordered six books from a prison-approved bookstore, including: Carpe Diem: Put A Little Latin in Your Life; Diversity and Direction in Psychoanalytic Technique; and Neurodevelopmental Mechanisms in Psychopathology. After screening, a prison review officer decided that he could not have Physicians' Desk Reference and the Complete Guide to Prescription & Nonprescription Drugs 2009. The prison rejected a grievance and sent the books to petitioner's family. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the rational connection to legitimate prison interests and petitioner's lack of a property interest.

Defendant was convicted of a drug offense and is in prison in Texas. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1, assuming that a prior walkaway escape from a halfway house was a qualifying felony. Absent career offender status, the guidelines range would have been 120 to 150 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. His attorney failed to file a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court later held, in another case, that walkaway escape is not a crime of violence. After a complicated series of motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 28 U.S.C. 2241, involving a Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit denied pending motions. The court noted that defendant would not be sentenced as a career offender today and likely would receive a much lower sentence; taxpayers are footing the bill. There is no judicial procedure to remedy the situation; only the executive branch can grant relief. The court called the claims being "batted around" between circuits with differing views of how the merits may be heard "an untenable and unseemly waste of judicial resources."