Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The village fired its village manager, at the same time restructuring its work force by abolishing three positions and creating one new slot. Plaintiff occupied an abolished position: executive coordinator to the village manager. Her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claimed that she was fired because she was associated with the village manager, who had lost a political struggle. Because the village implemented its plan by ordinance, the district court dismissed on the ground of legislative immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An ordinance adopted through the legislative process, and having the force of law, is covered by legislative immunity no matter the motives of those who proposed, voted for, or otherwise supported the proposal. The court acknowledged that the ordinance made the termination an official village policy, for which the village does not enjoy immunity, but: "It is common to hold a person's associations against him ... it is an important part of the new officeholder's own right of association to be able to choose who to work with, the better to promote his ideas and policies." A position as a policymaker"s right-hand woman is "confidential" in nature.

Defendant, convicted of several serious drug and firearm charges, received a mandatory life sentence. His counsel appealed on evidentiary grounds, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant then filed a habeas petition (18 U.S.C. 2255) asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The government admitted failure to timely file notice of enhanced penalty. The district court set aside the mandatory life sentence and held a hearing on other issues, then imposed a sentence of 480 months. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability with respect to the conviction, and affirmed the revised sentence. The district court reasonably considered defendant’s routine drug purchases.

Dass, born in India, was first hired as a teacher in 1991. In 2002, Dass was hired at Casals. Donaldson was the principal and rated Dass's overall performance through 2005 as excellent, but never recommended Dass for tenure based on concern that Dass was not a strong disciplinarian. Donaldson retired in 2005 and non-renewed Dass for the 2005-2006 school year. Dass was rehired for the year, but because of an error, was displaced after that school year when Casals lost teaching positions due to budget constraints. Dass won a grievance and was reinstated. Dass received medical leave in December 2006. She did not return the rest of the school year. In 2007, the principal recommended non-renewal. The Board accepted the recommendation. Dass filed suit, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101.; and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assignment to teach seventh grade was not an adverse employment action and there was no evidence of discrimination based on national origin.

The prisoner's "skeletal" complaint alleged that, while escorting him down a hallway to segregation, guards instructed him to move against the wall. When he did not comply, a guard, “slammed” him against the wall, twisted his wrist, and caused pain that lasted for two months. The district court dismissed after preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for prisoner safety. Infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it appears, in retrospect, that the degree of force was unreasonable, and unnecessary in the strict sense. In tort law, any unconsented and offensive touching is a battery. Imprisonment strips a prisoner of that right to be let alone, and many other interests as well. In this case, action of the guards was in response to defiant behavior.

The bar, popular with the college crowd, lost its liquor license after several altercations between employees and customers required police intervention. Wis. Stat. 125.12(2)(ag)(2), provides that a liquor license can be revoked or suspended if the holder "keeps or maintains a disorderly or riotous, indecent or improper house." The district court rejected an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In light of the incidents that occurred at the bar, it was an "unlikely candidate" to bring a successful "as applied" challenge and the law is constitutional on its face.

Plaintiff received 24 parking tickets over a 14-month period. All arrived by mail, typically in batches. All were written by Chicago Police Department Unit 253. Some were inconsistent, implying that the Toyota was in two places at once or was simultaneously double-parked and parked on the sidewalk. All 13 tickets attributed to one officer issued on four dates, had sequential numbers, and recorded the time as 10:00 p.m. Four issued after plaintiff sold the Toyota. Because none were legitimate, all were dismissed, but plaintiff had to go to court seven times. Plaintiff complained to the supervisor, the Internal Affairs Division, and Independent Police Review, then contacted the Chicago Tribune, which ran several stories. The Internal Affairs Division began an investigation that resulted in a recommendation to fire several officers. The district court dismissed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to a substantive due process claim, stating that plaintiff did not plead facts suggesting a deprivation that meets the high threshold for such claims. The court reversed dismissal of a class-of-one equal protection claim and related civil conspiracy claim, stating that the disturbing pattern, without reasonable explanation, adds up to deliberate and unjustified official harassment.

While on patrol, Officer Turner spoke to a man who reported that someone had just broken into his home and fondled his two daughters, who had been sleeping. A short time later, Turner interviewed the girls, who described the intruder as wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a dark baseball cap. Turner left the house and stopped a man walking a dog in an alleyway near the house (plaintiff). Plaintiff was wearing camouflage cargo shorts and a black baseball cap. No one else was in the area. Plaintiff agreed to stay in the police cruiser, Turner re-interviewed the girls, called the state's attorney's office for advice, arrested plaintiff, and conducted a "show-up," where the girls identified plaintiff as the intruder. The state court later dismissed charges for lack of evidence. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Illinois state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to a false arrest claim against Turner and an indemnification claim against the county (Local Governmental Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101).

Plaintiff is serving time in a state prison, but was transferred to county jail to attend court proceedings. During two stays, the jail applied a policy of making “nutriloaf” the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation at the time of transfer, regardless of behavior in the jail. After two days, plaintiff began vomiting and experiencing stomach pains and constipation. He stopped eating nutriloaf and subsisted for eight days on bread and water, losing 8.3 percent of his weight during two stays. A jail infirmary nurse gave him antacids and a stool softener. Upon return to prison he was diagnosed with an anal fissure. In response to his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, defendants submitted only a "preposterous affidavit from a sheriff's officer" indicating that nutriloaf is nutritious. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, noting that defendants' decision "to defy rather than to defend" make it impossible to know the part diet played in making plaintiff sick. It is possible that jail officials were aware that nutriloaf was sickening him yet decided to do nothing, showing deliberate indifference to a serious health problem in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court suggested sanctions against defendants.

Defendant discarded a loaded handgun during a foot chase with police and was arrested for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. He signed a Miranda waiver and began giving a statement, but soon invoked his right to counsel. Officers halted the interview and summoned a guard to take defendant to his cell. Defendant changed his mind and asked to speak without counsel present. The interview was recorded. After new Miranda warnings, officers asked if he wanted a lawyer. He replied, “Yeah, I do, but you ....” Officers reminded him that they could not talk if he was asking for counsel. After a long pause, defendant stated unambiguously that he wanted to continue without a lawyer and gave a statement. The district court denied a motion to suppress, defendant was convicted, and, based on designation as an armed career criminal because of three prior felony convictions, was sentenced to 252 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Officers did not violate the Miranda/Edwards rule. A conviction for the Illinois crime of making insulting or provoking physical contact with a peace officer is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

Plaintiffs were involved in a physical altercation with employees of a nightclub. Plaintiffs sustained visible injuries. Club employees took them outside, handcuffed them and called the police. The officers were apparently unwilling to listen to plaintiffs' side of the story; they were taken to a squad car and placed in the rear seat, though they were never told they were under arrest. Both were charged with assault and battery. Although there were surveillance cameras, tapes were never requested and were destroyed before plaintiffs filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city, officers, the club, and its owner. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that the club and owner were not functioning as state actors; that plaintiffs failed to show a conspiracy between the city and the club; that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs; and that probable cause defeats a claim of malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.