Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate waiting to be keyed into his cell, was wounded by a pellet fired in an attempt to break up a fight. He showed his wound to an officer, who refused a medical technician's request to move plaintiff to the health care unit. The prison was on lockdown. The technician never returned with medical supplies. Plaintiff made additional requests, but claims that the technician stated that she was told by staff not to document any treatment for gunshot wounds and would not give her name. Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance to the warden. Four days later, he was treated in the health care unit. The doctor expressed concern that plaintiff was not brought in on the day of his injury to prevent infection. Plaintiff claims that an internal affairs investigator was sent intimidate him into dropping his grievance. Plaintiff was placed on transfer to a facility where he had known enemies. The warden, grievance officer, and administrative officer determined that there was no emergency and no justification for compensation. His court-appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw and the district court dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that his claim for retaliation was prematurely dismissed.

Plaintiff, a self-described tax consultant, worked for the county board of review (property tax assessments) for 10 years, until 2002. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962c, he alleged that defendants, elected and appointed board employees, flagged his clients' files and ran the board as a "pay for play" racketeering enterprise to extort campaign donations and consulting work from him. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not identify any statute, regulation, or contract that suggests his work as a consultant for private clients might be a constitutionally protected property interest. His allegations of improper treatment were implausible, negating both constitutional and RICO claims.

An Illinois statute makes it a felony to audio record any part of any conversation unless all parties consent and applies regardless of whether the conversation was intended to be private. The offense is elevated to a class 1 felony, with a possible prison term of 4 to 15 years, if a recorded individual is performing duties as a law-enforcement officer. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1). Illinois does not prohibit taking silent video of officers performing duties in public. The ACLU has not implemented its planned Chicago police accountability program for fear of prosecution. The district court held that the First Amendment does not protect a right to audio record. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement as applied to recording of the kind at issue. The statute restricts a medium commonly used for communication of information and ideas, triggering First Amendment scrutiny. Any governmental interest in protecting conversational privacy is not implicated when officers are performing duties in public places. Even under the more lenient intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to content- neutral burdens on speech, this application of the statute "very likely flunks." The law restricts more speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests.

Petitioner was arrested after a traffic stop and vehicle search. Charges were dropped when lab results revealed that plant material found in the vehicle was not marijuana. Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the officers lacked probable cause. The officers claimed to be following up on an anonymous tip. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The judge granted petitioner's motion for a new trial, without giving the officers an opportunity to respond. He ruled that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reasoning that the officer had fabricated the tip and that other officers offered false testimony to support this fabrication. The judge then recused himself and the case was reassigned. The judge granted reconsideration and reinstated the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not abuse his discretion by reconsidering the new trial grant, a non-final order, and determining that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no direct evidence contradicting testimony about the tip; the jury was able to weigh inconsistencies and make credibility determinations.

Dr. Jajeh, a Syrian-born Muslim, became an attending physician at the county hospital in 1991. Starting in about 2002 he had conflicts with another doctor and regularly complained about that doctor. In 2006 he complained that the conflict involved religious and ethnic discrimination. There was no evidence that problems continued after that time. In 2007 extensive budget cuts forced the county to lay off more than 200 physicians, including Dr. Jajeh. Dr. Jajeh brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, and terminated in retaliation for his complaints about the discrimination he suffered. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding no evidence of discrimination or that he was laid off in retaliation for his complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The owner and a prospective tenant signed a residential lease at a home for which the owner had not yet obtained a certificate of occupancy. As the tenant began moving his belongings into the house, a building inspector reminded him that all rental property must have a certificate of occupancy before a tenant can live in the house. Visibly upset, the owner berated the inspector in the presence of a police officer, who arrested the owner for disorderly conduct. Following his conviction, the owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The district court dismissed the officer and later granted summary judgment to the inspector. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence supported that the owner was arrested for disorderly conduct and only later cited for failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy.

Police, believing the car to be stolen and the driver intoxicated, stopped plaintiff's car and implemented high-risk procedures. Officers, equipped with body shields, identified themselves and loudly commanded the driver to show her hands and get out of the car. The driver did not comply, but reached for a compartment in the vehicle and lit a cigarette. She put her feet out of the driver-side window onto the door, while she leaned back toward the console. She picked up a water bottle and set it on the ground beside the car. Officers repeated the order for about 10 minutes before using an SL6 baton launcher to fire a warning shot that hit the vehicle. They continued to issue commands for five minutes, then fired four shots, hitting her legs. Plaintiff, who was highly intoxicated, required stitches and was unable to walk for a week. Her suit claiming excessive force resulted in a verdict in the officers' favor. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The officers had reason to know that they should mitigate the force being used in light of plaintiff’s lack of resistance and were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Eilman, a college student, was arrested outside an airport after behaving so badly that agents had called police. Eilman had developed bipolar disorder following an auto accident the previous year. She had not taken her medication and did not tell the police about her mental-health condition. By phone, her mother and stepfather told officers about her disorder. They did not believe the stepfather and the officer who talked to her mother did not share the information. Officers thought that Eilman was being difficult or was on drugs. In custody, Eilman alternated between calm and manic. Officers released her into a neighborhood she did not know, near a public-housing project with an exceptionally high crime rate without returning her cell phone. She was raped and either jumped or was thrown out a seventh-story window. She suffered permanent, serious brain damage. In a suit by her guardian under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied some of defendants’ claims of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, noting that whether police should have understood Eilman’s need for medical care is a factual issue and that police may have made her situation worse by releasing her far from where she was arrested.Easterbrook

A former part-time police officer for a town of just over 400 people filed a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against defendants who allegedly conspired to prosecute him for sexual offenses involving dancers at a strip club in retaliation for his cooperation with an FBI investigation. The defendants, characterized by the court as "a truly unique web of characters," were the first assistant state’s attorney, a deputy sheriff/investigator, the former owner of the now-defunct strip club, and plaintiff's brother, an occasional patron of the strip club. The district court dismissed for lack of evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prosecutor "was far from a saint," but the evidence did not show that he deviated from his prosecutorial role, so he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that plaintiff pled guilty to the sex offense charges, the court found no evidence of conspiracy.

Hicks worked as a mechanic for the Forest Preserve District for two years and received 28 disciplinary action forms from his supervisor. Hicks, who is black, participated in an investigation of his supervisor for discrimination, and later filed his own discrimination complaint. Eventually the FPD offered Hicks a choice: either accept a demotion to a non-mechanic position and take a significant pay cut, or face further disciplinary action up to and including termination. On advice of his union, Hicks took the demotion, but then brought suit for retaliation. He was awarded $30,000 and reinstated to his former position as a mechanic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to a jury instruction on retaliation.