Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Guzman, seven-and-a-half months pregnant, home alone, in bed, heard the doorbell and knocking. She walked toward the door. Sergeant Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department burst through the door. Officers wearing body armor rushed in, many with guns drawn. Guzman, fearful and crying, was ordered to lie face down on the floor. When she tried to position herself more comfortably, Rojas forced her down, pressing her pregnant belly against the floor. The Joint Gang Task Force executed a warrant, searching the apartment for about an hour. Guzman sued. The district court entered summary judgment in her favor, finding Bonnstetter and Rojas liable. At a damages-only trial, Guzman proved medical expenses. The court allowed defendants to testify that the search was legal and reasonable and that others might have caused Guzman’s injuries. The court instructed the jury that Guzman had to prove that Bonnstetter and Rojas were “personally involved” and could not be held “liable” for the conduct of “other employees.” The court instructed the jury to award nominal damages if Guzman failed to prove that her damages were the direct result of defendants’ conduct. Guzman was awarded $1. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendants’ theory of the case and evidence and the instruction likely confused the jury.

A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison’s permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers’ “Ten-Point Program,” which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of “gang literature” in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he’d copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. “Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample.” The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff’s 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty.

Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison’s medical provider, Wexford, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, 42 U.S.C.1983. More than 10 months later, the district judge had not screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A(a) and has denied three motions filed by Wheeler. Defendants have not been served; the litigation is stalled. The Seventh Circuit ordered the district court to proceed. Ten months exceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly alleges a serious ongoing injury. Prisoners are not invariably wrong. A district judge should be able to spot a complaint violating Rules 18 and 20 within days of its filing, and solve the problem by severance (creating multiple suits that can be separately screened) or dismissing excess defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. .

Plaintiffs Willis and Owens, 14 and 16 years old, respectively, were arrested outside of Willis’s home for allegedly dealing drugs. They claim that after being transported to the police station, they were subjected to a strip search before being confined for several hours. Willis and Owens were released to their families after being charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and were ordered to appear at juvenile court a few weeks later. The charges were eventually dropped. Willis and Owens filed suit against the two arresting officers, alleging false arrest and an illegal search under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and malicious prosecution under Illinois state law. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning plaintiffs’ knowledge of suspicious activity and of drug sales and drug-selling techniques on the block.

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself.

Convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder, Overstreet was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed and denied a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty proceedings. Counsel did not ask the judge to require spectators who wore buttons or ribbons with the victim’s picture to remove the displays of sympathy. He claimed that his lawyers failed to convey “effectively” or “meaningfully” the prosecutor’s offer of a plea bargain. A third argument was based on Overstreet’s mental problems. Psychiatric evidence indicated that on some occasions Overstreet would have lacked the ability to evaluate his legal situation rationally, but the district judge concluded that he understood the offer and discussed it intelligently with his sister.

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation.

A former inmate sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794–94e, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111–213, and the Eighth Amendment, claiming that prison officials ignored his need for placement in an ADA-compliant facility, and refused to consider him for a work-release program solely because he walks with a cane. Imprisoned for driving on a suspended license, the inmate had advanced osteoarthritis and vascular necrosis in his hip. The prison declined his request for installation of grab bars or for a transfer. The district court screened the complaint before service and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the court correctly dismissed the Eighth Amendment count, the inmate adequately alleged that refusal to accommodate his disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.

An Illinois prisoner who alleges that he is confined to a wheelchair because of an unspecified “nerve condition” claimed that, by applying a quorum rule, prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under the rule, under which outdoor recreation does not occur without participation by10 disabled individuals, defendants allegedly refused to allow him to engage in any physical outdoor recreational activity for seven weeks. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regardless of whether state officials are immune under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, applies and the suit was dismissed prematurely.

Former inmates of Cook County Jail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, charging that failure to provide more than a single dentist to 10,000 inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause. Although some are convicts, most are pretrial detainees, to whom the cruel and unusual punishments clause does not apply; the due process clause has been interpreted to provide equivalent protection. Two district judges denied class certification, but in a third materially identical suit, the judge granted certification after the Supreme Court held that "neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties." The Seventh Circuit granted the Rule 23(f) appeal from certification, limited to whether a district court, in deciding class certification, should "defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling on a motion for certification of a similar class." The court upheld the certification as not precluded, while noting that it could be incorrect. Without a rule of preclusion, class action lawyers can keep bringing identical class actions with new representatives until they draw a judge who is willing to certify the class, but preclusion is not the solution.