Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts.

VRichards, an Indiana inmate, had complained since January 2008 about abdominal pain and blood in his stool; physicians in the prison system assured him that he was fine. In October 2008 they sent him to a hospital, where specialists diagnosed ulcerative colitis. By then it was too late to do anything but excise the colon and construct an ileo-anal pouch. Richards filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in December 2010, contending that defendants violated the eighth amendment by indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Richards concedes that his claim accrued in October 2008, but contends, however, that the time was tolled while he was physically unable to sue despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of Richards’ physical condition and his ability to file suit.

Alexander, a criminal defense attorney, alleged that a local prosecutor, McKinney, conspired with FBI agents to manufacture false evidence and bring trumped-up charges of conspiracy to commit bribery against him. Alexander had frequently criticized McKinney. A jury acquitted Alexander of the charges, and he sued McKinney for violating his due process rights. The district court dismissed, finding McKinney entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint did not identify a deprivation of a cognizable constitutional right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Alexander’s complaint was merely an attempt to recast an untimely false arrest claim into a due process claim. The Fourth Amendment, not the due process clause, is the proper basis for challenging the lawfulness of an arrest. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a substantive due process claim may not be maintained where a specific constitutional provision protects the right at issue.

Mosley was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated arson and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 60 years on the murder charge and 15 years on the arson charge. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Illinois state courts, Mosley filed a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The district court granted his petition and directed the State to release Mosley unless within 30 days it either filed an appeal or announced its intention to retry him. The Seventh Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The court agreed that, assuming the accuracy of the original trial record and the affidavits of two potential alibi witnesses whom Mosley’s defense lawyer did not call to testify, Mosley’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance. The state appellate court’s decision that Mosley was not denied effective assistance of counsel was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court, however, heard additional evidence that contradicted the affidavits, but did not make findings on that evidence. The court remanded for determination of whether, based on new evidence not available to the state appellate court, Mosley’s trial counsel was in fact constitutionally ineffective.

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it.

Toliver is serving a life sentence for the 1992 murder of Tina Rogers. His habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel did not call two exculpatory witnesses, and that the prosecution failed to disclose an exculpatory document. On remand, the district court granted the petition on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective, but denied relief on the exculpatory-evidence claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel is deceased and Toliver’s testimony, which the district court accepted as true, confirmed that counsel did not call witnesses that Toliver desired because counsel thought the jury would disbelieve them based onr family relationship. The transcript from the 1992 pre-trial conference confirmed the difference of opinion between Toliver and his attorney about securing additional witnesses. Toliver’s counsel was busy preparing for another homicide trial.

Hare pled guilty, during trial, to being part of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. He claims that his counsel had failed to tell him of a pre-trial plea offer involving significantly less prison time than he received in the end. Hare’s previous attempt to win relief from his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on other grounds was rejected. He sought permission to file a successive collateral attack on his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the application. Hare did not have new evidence of his innocence, and could not establish “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His petition was not supported by Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), which involved a failure to communicate a plea offer for a lower sentence than the defendant actually received when he later pled guilty. The Frye Court merely applied the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel according to the test previously articulated in 1984.

In a 1998 attempt to kill a member of a rival gang, gang members shot and killed Jacqueline Brenaugh, when she peered out of her apartment window After being arrested, Coleman admitted serving as an accomplice. The confession was recorded. He moved to suppress his confession, claiming that he had invoked his right to an attorney several times and that the police had proceeded in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The court denied Coleman’s motion, holding that “the credibility is resolved on behalf of the State.” Convicted of first-degree murder under an accomplice liability theory, Coleman was sentenced to 28 years. On appeal, he included an affidavit from his attorney, Wiener, stating that Wiener had called the police station during the interrogation and requested that police cease questioning his client. After exhausting state appeals and post-conviction remedies, Coleman filed a pro se habeas petition. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In 2006 Rann was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 years for each sexual assault conviction and 15 years on the child pornography conviction. Rann unsuccessfully pursued direct appeal in state court arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not seek to suppress incriminating evidence in the form of digital images obtained without a warrant from a zip drive and a camera memory card. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rann’s challenge to the warrantless search of digital media devices brought to police by his victim (his 15-year-old biological daughter) and his victim’s mother was without merit. Because he cannot prevail on his Fourth Amendment argument, Rann’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland fails.

West was convicted of second degree sexual assault of a child (Wis. Stat. 948.02(2)) and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment followed by six years’ extended supervision. He claimed that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a 14-month delay between the filing of charges against him and the scheduled start of his trial. This delay prejudiced him, he claims, because his allegedly key alibi witness, Robinson, died in the interim. The state court rejected his constitutional claim and summarily affirmed his conviction. West sought habeas corpus relief in the district court, which denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record contained ample evidence supporting the state court conclusion that West was not prejudiced by the delay. Robinson did not die anywhere close to the “presumptively prejudicial” 12-month mark; rather, he passed away six months after the state filed its complaint.