Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A class of persons required to register on the state’s online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier.

Plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but remain in state custody as civil detainees under Illinois’ Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. They filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Commitment under the Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not punishment. Generally persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Limitations imposed on their ability to interact with other detainees are justified by security concerns, even if not imposed by treatment professionals. Not allowing detainees to communicate by letter using the facility’s internal mail system does not impinge on a constitutional right or constitute punishment.

Convicted of fraud, tax, and money laundering offenses, Swanson failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, but was apprehended as a fugitive in Seattle the next month. His presentence report recommended a four-level U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) enhancement for his status as an organizer-leader of criminal activity, driving his total offense level to 34 with a 151-188 month guideline range. Swanson’s trial counsel filed 13 pages of objections, including that the evidence revealed there was no criminal organization and to use of the 2001 guidelines. On remand, the court imposed a 151-month sentence. Swanson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel abandoned a poorly developed but winning objection to the enhancement. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel raised the objection twice and did not withdraw it; his performance was not objectively deficient. Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.

Coleman was fired from the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Coleman was told that his position had been eliminated by budget cuts; he contends that his politics were the real cause for his discharge and a decision not to rehire him. Coleman’s job is not in the category for which politics is a legitimate consideration. Coleman sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and invoked the Shakman consent decrees, which allow parties aggrieved by certain Cook County patronage to bring civil contempt proceedings. The district judge dismissed the civil rights claim but declined to dismiss the Shakman claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dunlap is not protected by absolute immunity pursuant to the order under which he was appointed. In 2002 the Juvenile Detention Center and inmates settled a case; the court retained jurisdiction and in 2007 appointed Dunlap as administrator in an order, stating that Dunlap would have immunity: “[Dunlap] and his staff shall have the status of officers and agents of this Court and as such shall be vested with the same immunities as vest with this Court.” Dunlap’s decisions were administrative, not judicial. The order did not direct adoption of any particular personnel plan nor direct specific employment decisions.

In 1999, Hill was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that each of Hill’s prior convictions (attempted murder; two aggravated battery) qualified as a career-offender “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1), and a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and imposed a sentence of 276 months. He filed two unsuccessful petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance, two unsuccessful petitions to modify his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582, then filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224, claiming that his classification as a career offender and armed career criminal was erroneous and that he was “innocent” of the sentence enhancements imposed. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While noting that Hill’s conviction under the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-3, qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, the court held that the petition failed because Hill could not establish that the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail, was subjected to a pat down and strip search by defendant, a guard. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling plaintiff’s testicles and penis through the plaintiff’s clothing and, while strip searching him, fondled his nude testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to jail policy and without any justification. The guard denies the allegations. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the guard. He acknowledged that because the parties’ factual disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment he had to “presume that the defendant grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals in a way that was not related to penological interests,” but concluded that plaintiff had “presented evidence of only de minimis injury,” had “suffered at most an assault and battery,” and had presented no evidence concerning defendant’s “subjective intent.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. Excessive force is not the only means by which a prisoner’s civil rights can be violated.

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The motion to correct petitioner’s sentence was not a motion pursuant to Ind. Code 35-38-1-15 but a collateral attack on his sentence. Therefore, he had no constitutional right to counsel.

Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from 2000, until his termination in 2006. Levin was over the age of 60 at the time of his termination and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. He was replaced by a woman in her 30s. He brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the individual-capacity defendants on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Levin’s section 1983 age discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At the time of the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although age is not a suspect classification, states may not discriminate on that basis if such discrimination is not “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age discrimination in employment is irrelevant; a constitutional right was clearly established.

Thompson was murdered in 2001. Carter was 16 years old and Thompson was 19. No fingerprint, DNA, or physical evidence connected the murder to Carter, or to anyone else. Detectives picked up Carter and took her to the police station. She was not given Miranda warnings; no one told her that she was free to leave. Carter was effectively without any legal guardian. She was allowed to speak to her father for a few minutes and was given food and drink and eventually released. A few hours after Carter’s release, her apartment building caught fire. The cause was arson, and the fire started in the apartment where Carter and Thompson lived. Police again took Carter to the station, with no adult, and without stating her rights. A third trip to the station resulted in a stay of 55 hours. Carter was allowed to move around freely and was provided with necessities; she changed her story several times. She eventually received Miranda warnings, spoke to her parents, and confessed to the murder. She was convicted and sentenced to 30 years. The district court denied her petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was adequate evidence to conclude that the confession was voluntary.

The Church holds a festival, open to the public, without charge, and obtains a Chicago permit to close portions of streets to vehicles. For the 2008 festival, the parish used a team of paid security guards and volunteer off-duty police officers (parishioners), headed by Kolasinski, a parishioner and Chicago police officer. Members of another church (Garfield) attended the festival to conduct ministry. Its pastor (Teesdale) carried a bullhorn; others carried signs with Scripture verses. The group distributed gospel tracts. Kolasinski, off-duty, wearing a shirt that read “St. Symphorosa Police,” told Teesdale that he could not use a bullhorn or distribute literature without permission. Teesdale attempted to use the bullhorn. Kolasinski handcuffed Teesdale and stated that he was under arrest. Police arrived 30 minutes later. Teesdale was arrested for trespass, a charge eventually dismissed. Teesdale, and others alleged violations of First and Fourth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the city from preventing attendance at future festivals. A court order permitted Garfield members to enter the festival during specific hours with limitations on the size of signs and a prohibition on sound-enhancement. The 2009 festival passed without incident. The court ruled in favor of the city, but found that First Amendment rights at future festivals were threatened by official policy. The Seventh Circuit remanded that holding for dismissal, based on lack of standing.