Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Betker was shot twice during a late-night police raid on his home. The officer who shot him was part of a tactical unit executing a no-knock search warrant secured by Officer Gomez, who obtained the warrant after receiving information from Capol, the estranged sister of Betker’s wife, Sharon, regarding Sharon being a convicted felon allegedly in possession of a firearm. Capol now swears that most of the information that Gomez related in his affidavit to support the warrant’s issuance was not true. In Betker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Gomez’s motion for judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Betker has produced sworn deposition testimony of Capol contradicting the probable cause affidavit. If believed, that testimony would establish that Gomez knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth made false or misleading statements in the affidavit. Absent those false statements, probable cause for the no-knock warrant would not have existed.

Elusta sued tChicago and police officers for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He first retained Cerda and De Leon, who conducted discovery and obtained a settlement offer of $100,000. Elusta rejected this offer, apparently because his retainer contained a 40% contingent fee provision. The district court permitted the attorneys to withdraw. Elusta retained Smith and Genson. A jury found in Elusta’s favor on two counts and awarded $40,000. Smith and Genson petitioned for attorney’s fees on behalf of Elusta pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Before the court could rule, Elusta retained new attorneys, Johnson and Gentleman, to litigate the fee issue. They sought direct payment of some of the fees to Elusta, rather than to Smith and Genson. Smith and Genson’s petition languished for nearly 16 months before Cerda and De Leon filed sought fees, asserting an attorney’s lien or a right to recover under quantum meruit. The court granted Smith and Genson’s request for $82,696.50 under section1988. Cerda and De Leon had not perfected an attorneys’ lien, but the court allowed recovery of $15,000 in quantum meruit. The court rejected Elusta’s motion to have 60% of both amounts paid to him directly. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Griffin, a high school freshman, was told to go home for dress code violations. Bell, a police officer, accompanied Griffin and twice removed Griffin’s hat. Bell claims that Griffin struck Bell in the face. A second security officer grabbed Griffin’s arm. Bell told Griffin that he was under arrest and got one handcuff on Griffin before Griffin began to struggle. The struggle continued for approximately 20-30 minutes before Bell attached the second handcuff. Griffin told a different story, claiming to have been beaten. Before trial, Bell moved to exclude a two-minute video of part of the incident, recorded by Brown, a friend of Griffin’s. Brown apparently could not be located at the time of trial. Bell contended that, without Brown as a witness, Griffin could not establish a proper foundation, and that the video was confusing and unfairly prejudicial because it showed only a small part of the incident and included gaps. The court excluded the video, excerpts from the video, and still photos created from the video, and prohibited reference to the video to explain a discrepancy in Griffin’s testimony. A jury rejected Griffin’s 42 U.S.C. claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Hoppe is a tenured professor of Philosophy at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics after the new chair of the Aviation Department, Brogan, deemed her unqualified because she had no formal training in aviation, had never worked in the industry, and had not obtained any degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During the two years before her removal from the course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation. She sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court awarded the university summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions or her inability to perform them, the undisputed evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe three different accommodations, which she rejected, and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe has no evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and Brogan’s decision and failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation.

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity.

After seeing Tebbens soliciting funds in an intersection using a fireman’s boot, Chicago Police Officer Mushol determined that Tebbens possessed firefighter identification, but was not a firefighter. Seeing Tebbens soliciting a second time, the officer issued tickets for not having a valid city permit to solicit funds on behalf of his charity and one for failing to display a city permit, both of which eventually were dismissed. On charges relating to theft of the firefighter identification, Tebbens accepted court supervision. Seeing him soliciting a third time, Officer Mushol arrested Tebbens. Charges were later dismissed. Tebbens sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the arrest was without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He sought indemnification against the City of Chicago under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Officer Mushol had probable cause to arrest Tebbens for violating the terms of his court-ordered supervision and was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Tebbens for violating the supervision order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Park hoped to become a dental surgeon when she enrolled at the Indiana University School of Dentistry (IUSD) in 2006. After one year at the school, Park began to experience a series of serious setbacks, including several failing grades and allegations of professional misconduct. Eventually, the school dismissed her. Park appealed without success to school committees and administrators. The district court dismissed her suit, alleging Equal Protection and Due Process violations, as well as claims for state law breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Park did not allege bad faith in the dismissal and had no contract claim. Park’s interest in becoming a dentist is not one that the due process clause protects. Park did not allege intentional discrimination.

During unrelated federal civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed motions for sanctions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions in litigation against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions and that the revocation of Eichwedel’s credit was supported by “some evidence in the record.” The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly disposed of the right-of-access claim, but certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: As of the date Mr. Eichwedel’s state court challenge to the revocation of his good-conduct credits became final, was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known?

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim.

In 2001, Hall was convicted in state court of murdering his stepson. Shortly after his verdict came down, Hall discovered that one of his jurors had a son that was a fellow inmate of his. Before his trial, the juror’s son informed the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but during the trial, the juror found out that his son and several co-inmates changed their mind about Hall, and thought him guilty. The juror relayed this information to several jurors. The state court rejected Hall’s motion to correct error, and Hall was denied relief on direct appeal. After unsuccessfully seeking collateral relief in Indiana, Hall filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the state should have carried the burden of proving that the extraneous information that reached his jury was not prejudicial. The district court granted the petition. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the state court violated a clearly established constitutional right, but did not adequately address the issue of prejudice. The district court erred in presuming prejudice.